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Abstract		
This	dissertation	examined	the	integrity	of	spatial	representations	of	extensively	
travelled	environments	in	developmental	amnesia,	thereby	elucidating	the	role	of	the	
hippocampus	in	forming	and	retrieving	spatial	memories	that	enable	flexible	navigation.	
Previous	research	using	mental	navigation	tasks	found	that	developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.,	
an	individual	with	atypical	hippocampal	development,	could	accurately	estimate	distance	and	
direction	between	landmarks,	but	her	representation	of	her	environment	was	fragmented,	
inflexible,	and	lacked	detail	(Rosenbaum,	Cassidy,	&	Herdman,	2015).	Study	1	of	this	
dissertation	examined	H.C.’s	spatial	memory	of	her	home	environment	using	an	ecologically	
valid	virtual	reality	paradigm	based	on	Google	Street	View.	H.C.	and	control	participants	
virtually	navigated	routes	of	varying	familiarity	within	their	home	environment.	To	examine	
whether	flexible	navigation	requires	the	hippocampus,	participants	also	navigated	familiar	
routes	that	had	been	mirror-reversed.	H.C.	performed	similarly	to	control	participants	on	all	
route	conditions,	suggesting	that	spatial	learning	of	frequently	travelled	environments	can	occur	
despite	compromised	hippocampal	system	function.	H.C.’s	unexpected	ability	to	successfully	
navigate	mirror-reversed	routes	might	reflect	the	accumulation	of	spatial	knowledge	of	her	
environment	over	the	6	years	since	she	was	first	tested	with	mental	navigation	tasks.	As	such,	
Study	2	investigated	how	spatial	representations	of	extensively	travelled	environments	change	
over	time	in	developmental	amnesia	by	re-testing	H.C.	on	mental	navigation	tasks	8	years	later.	
H.C.	continued	to	draw	sketch	maps	that	lacked	cohesiveness	and	detail	and	had	difficulty	
sequencing	landmarks	and	generating	detours	on	a	blocked	route	task,	suggesting	that	her	
overall	representation	of	the	environment	did	not	improve	over	8	years.	Study	3	thoroughly	
examined	the	integrity	of	H.C.’s	detailed	representation	of	the	environment	using	a	route	
	 iii	
description	task.	H.C.	accurately	described	perceptual	features	of	landmarks	along	a	known	
route,	but	provided	inaccurate	information	regarding	the	spatial	relations	of	landmarks,	
resulting	in	a	fragmented	mental	representation	of	the	route.	Taken	together,	these	results	
contribute	meaningfully	to	our	current	understanding	of	the	integrity	of	spatial	representations	
of	extensively	travelled	environments	in	developmental	amnesia.	Non-spatial	factors	that	could	
influence	performance	on	navigation	and	spatial	memory	tasks	are	discussed,	as	is	the	impact	of	
these	results	on	theories	of	hippocampal	function.		
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CHAPTER	1	
General	Introduction	
	
Spatial	memory	of	newly	encountered	and	well-known	environments	is	critical	for	
navigation	in	everyday	life.	To	navigate,	animals	and	humans	must	be	able	to	remember	the	
location	of	distant	goals	and	orient	themselves	in	relation	to	those	goals	(Hartley,	Lever,	
Burgess,	&	O’Keefe,	2014).	The	hippocampus	plays	a	necessary	role	in	the	formation	of	new	
allocentric	spatial	memories	of	the	relations	among	landmarks	contained	within	an	
environment,	as	indicated	by	findings	in	animals	(Morris,	Garrud,	Rawlins	&	O'Keefe,	1982)	and	
humans	(Ekstrom	et	al.,	2003;	Maguire,	Nannery,	&	Spiers,	2006;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000).	By	
contrast,	recent	research	suggests	that	some	aspects	of	remote	spatial	memory	for	familiar	
environments	learned	long	ago	can	be	spared	following	hippocampal	damage	or	degeneration.	
Conclusions	of	spared	remote	spatial	memory	are	largely	based	on	tasks	that	rely	on	mental	
navigation	of	the	environment,	but	immersive,	real-time	travel	within	environments	may	be	
necessary	to	detect	deficits	in	individuals	with	hippocampal	damage	(Spiers	&	Maguire,	2007).	
In	this	dissertation,	I	will	examine	the	integrity	of	spatial	representations	of	environments	
traversed	over	many	years	in	an	individual	with	developmental	hippocampal	amnesia	using	
mental	navigation	tasks	and	a	novel	paradigm	that	allows	for	first-person	virtualized	navigation	
of	real-world	cities	using	Google	Street	View.	This	dissertation	research	makes	use	of	recent	
technological	advances	to	address	three	main	research	questions:		
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1) What	is	the	status	of	spatial	memory	representations	of	large-scale	environments	
learned	over	many	years	in	a	person	in	developmental	amnesia?		
	
2) Is	the	hippocampus	needed	for	flexible	navigation,	to	reconfigure	or	remap	familiar	
routes	in	the	service	of	navigation?		
	
3) Are	detailed	representations	of	well-known	large-scale	environments	affected	in	
developmental	amnesia,	as	they	are	in	individuals	with	adult-onset	hippocampal	
amnesia?		
	
Before	providing	an	overview	of	the	studies	conducted	to	address	these	three	questions,	I	
briefly	review	the	literature	on	the	function	of	the	hippocampus	and	how	it	is	believed	to	play	a	
necessary	role	in	allocentric	spatial	memory.		I	then	discuss	findings	that	contradict	
conventional	wisdom:	individuals	with	adult-onset	hippocampal	pathology	show	preserved	
memory	for	places	learned	long	ago,	indicating	that	not	all	types	of	allocentric	spatial	memory	
representations	depend	on	the	hippocampus.	Next,	I	discuss	evidence	of	spatial	learning	in	
developmental	amnesia	and	the	role	of	the	hippocampus	in	flexible	navigation.	Finally,	I	speak	
to	the	tools	that	are	most	commonly	used	to	investigate	spatial	memory	and	introduce	a	novel	
paradigm	based	on	Google	Street	View.			
Mnemonic	Function	of	the	Hippocampus		
	 Scoville	and	Milner’s	(1957)	characterization	of	the	amnesic	case	H.M.,	a	man	who	
underwent	bilateral	medial	temporal	lobe	resection	that	resulted	in	severe	anterograde	
amnesia,	sparked	renewed	interest	in	the	multiple	memory	systems	view	and	how	the	medial	
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temporal	lobes	play	a	role	in	some	forms	of	memory	but	not	others.	H.M.	was	able	to	learn	how	
to	trace	a	star	while	only	seeing	an	inverted	reflection	of	his	hand	through	a	mirror	(Milner,	
1962).	While	he	acquired	this	visuomotor	skill,	he	had	no	conscious	recollection	of	ever	
engaging	in	this	task	(Milner,	1962),	suggesting	that	non-declarative	procedural	memory	is	
dissociable	from	declarative	(consciously	accessible)	forms	of	memory	(Cohen	&	Squire,	1980).	
Research	since	H.M.	has	demonstrated	other	divisions	in	memory.	The	amnesic	case	K.C.,	who	
sustained	extensive	medial	temporal	lobe	damage	following	a	motor	vehicle	accident,	was	
incapable	of	recollecting	any	personally	experienced	events,	but	had	preserved	general	
knowledge	of	the	world	and	himself	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2005),	supporting	Tulving’s	(2002)	
proposed	distinction	between	episodic	(memories	of	specific	events	confined	to	a	particular	
time	and	place)	and	semantic	memory	(memory	for	facts	or	general	knowledge).		There	is	
growing	evidence	that	the	hippocampus	is	always	necessary	to	support	episodic	memory	and	
some	forms	of	semantic	learning	and	memory	(Blumenthal	et	al.,	2017;	Eichenbaum	&	Cohen,	
2001;	Nadel	&	Moscovitch,	1997;	O’Keefe	&	Nadel,	1978;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2008;	Vargha-
Khadem	et	al.,	1997).	
Evidence	that	the	Hippocampus	is	Specialized	for	Allocentric	Spatial	Memory		
Behavioural	evidence	from	animal	lesion	studies	implicating	the	hippocampus	in	
allocentric	spatial	learning	is	plentiful	(e.g.	Morris,	Garrud,	Rawlins,	&	O’Keefe,	1982;	Murray,	
Davidson,	Gaffan,	Olton,	&	Suomi,	1989;	Olton,	Becker,	&	Handelmann,	1979;	see	Good,	2002,	
and	O’Keefe	&	Nadel,	1978	for	reviews).		Seminal	evidence	of	the	importance	of	the	
hippocampus	for	spatial	memory	acquisition	and	retention	comes	from	O’Keefe	and	
Dostrovsky’s	(1971)	discovery	of	place	cells	in	the	rodent	hippocampus,	which	show	a	low	firing	
rate	when	the	animal	is	travelling	through	an	environment	until	an	animal	is	within	that	cell’s	
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“place	field”,	a	specific	constrained	region	within	the	environment	that	induces	increased	firing.	
Place	cell	activity	does	not	depend	on	the	animal’s	orientation.	Hartley	and	colleagues	(2014)	
describe	place	cells	as	the	“building	blocks	of	spatial	representation,”	giving	rise	to	a	cognitive	
map.	
	The	discovery	of	place	cells	led	to	O’Keefe	and	Nadel’s	(1978)	Cognitive	Map	Theory	
(CMT),	which	posits	that	the	hippocampus	supports	mental	representations	of	the	spatial	
relations	among	landmarks/cues	that	are	map-like	(with	an	Euclidean	metric),	flexible	and	view-
independent.	Such	a	representation	is	also	referred	to	in	the	literature	as	an	allocentric	
representation.	Environments	can	also	be	learned	via	stimulus-response	learning	or	habit	
learning,	where	self-referenced	(egocentric)	sequences	of	turns	are	used	to	form	mental	
representations	of	the	environment.		Navigation	within	an	environment	necessarily	involves	an	
egocentric	representation,	as	one’s	position	within	the	environment	must	be	updated.	Such	
representations	do	not	require	the	hippocampus	(and	instead	rely	on	the	caudate	nucleus	
(Dahmani	&	Bohbot,	2014)),	but	they	lack	the	flexibility	required	to	navigate	barriers	
(Eichenbaum,	2017;	O’Keefe	&	Nadel,	1978).	Successful	navigation	often	involves	the	ability	to	
switch	between	and	integrate	allocentric	and	egocentric	spatial	representations,	which	is	
believed	to	require	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex	and	the	retrosplenial	cortex	(Columbo	et	al.,	
2017).		
In	2005,	Hafting,	Fyhn,	Molden,	Moser,	&	Moser	identified	grid	cells,	which	appear	to	be	
involved	in	path	integration	(estimating	direction	and	distance	using	self-motion	signals),	in	the	
hippocampal	formation	(specifically	the	medial	entorhinal	cortex,	and	pre-	and	parasubiculum;	
Boccara	et	al.,	2010).	Importantly,	place	cells	(Ekstrom	et	al.,	2003)	and	grid	cells	(Doeller,	Barry,	
&	Burgess,	2010;	Jacobs	et	al.,	2013)	have	also	been	found	in	humans.			
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Other	cells	involved	in	spatial	cognition	have	also	been	found	in	the	hippocampal	
formation	(which	includes	the	hippocampus	itself	and	adjacent	cortical	areas	with	which	it	has	
connections,	including	the	entorhinal	cortex,	subiculum,	presubiculum,	and	parasubiculum).	
Head	direction	cells	(Taube,	Muller,	&	Ranck,	1990)	have	been	found	in	the	entorhinal	cortex	
and	dorsal	presubiculum,	as	well	as	outside	of	the	hippocampal	formation,	in	the	retrosplenial	
cortex	and	the	anterior	dorsal	thalamic	nucleus	(Hartley	et	al.,	2014).	Head	direction	cells	show	
increased	firing	when	an	animal	is	facing	in	the	cells’	“preferred”	direction,	which	corresponds	
to	a	compass	direction	(Hartley	et	al.,	2014),	and	are	believed	to	provide	directional	information	
to	place	cells.		
Boundary	cells	show	increased	firing	when	an	animal	approaches	a	constrained	region	
near	the	edges	of	an	environment,	and	have	been	found	to	influence	place	cell	firing	(Hartley	et	
al.,	2014).	Although	boundary	cells	have	not	been	found	in	the	hippocampus	itself,	they	have	
been	identified	in	all	other	regions	of	the	hippocampal	formation	(Hartley	et	al.,	2014).	This	
highlights	that	external	sensory	information	about	environmental	geometry	can	influence	
cognitive	mapping	(Hartley	et	al.,	2014).		
Studies	of	spatial	memory	and	navigation	in	humans	also	implicate	the	hippocampus.	
Neuroimaging	studies	have	shown	increased	hippocampal	activation	when	healthy	controls	
navigated	complex	virtual	environments	that	they	had	learned	prior	to	scanning	(Maguire,	
Frackowiak,	&	Frith,	1996)	and	when	taxi	drivers	recalled	complex	routes	around	London	
(Maguire,	Frackowiak,	&	Frith,	1997).	Studies	of	patients	with	hippocampal	lesions	provide	
further	evidence	that	the	hippocampus	plays	a	critical	role	in	learning	new	spatial	layouts	and	
routes.	The	amnesic	case	H.M.	was	unable	to	learn	or	show	improvement	on	a	visually	guided	
maze-learning	task	(Milner,	1965).	Similarly,	the	amnesic	case	K.C.	had	difficulty	on	a	tabletop	
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test	of	spatial	memory	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000).	The	inability	to	acquire	new	spatial	
information	has	also	been	seen	for	larger-scale	environments	in	multiple	amnesic	cases.	K.C.	
was	unable	to	learn	to	navigate	an	8-step	route	within	a	university	building	after	extensive	
training	or	recall	the	floor	plan	of	a	library	where	he	had	worked	for	two	years	following	the	
onset	of	his	amnesia	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000).	When	asked	to	navigate	between	landmarks	
within	the	neighbourhood	that	he	moved	to	after	the	onset	of	his	amnesia	and	lived	in	at	the	
time	of	testing,	amnesic	case	E.P.,	who	sustained	substantial	bilateral	damage	to	the	
hippocampus	and	surrounding	structures,	was	unable	to	provide	a	response	(Teng	&	Squire,	
1999).	While	there	is	evidence	that	the	hippocampus	is	not	solely	responsible	for	spatial	
navigation,	it	is	clear	that	it	plays	a	critical	role	in	forming	new	spatial	memories.	In	contrast,	its	
role	in	retrieving	spatial	memories	for	environments	learned	long	ago	is	less	clear.		
Preserved	Schematic	Representations	of	Remote	Environments	in	Adult-Onset	Amnesia		
To	examine	the	role	of	the	hippocampus	in	retrieving	spatial	memories	for	environments	
learned	long	ago,	Rosenbaum	and	colleagues	(2000)	compared	the	performance	of	K.C.	and	
healthy	control	participants	on	mental	navigation	tasks	designed	to	assess	remote	spatial	
memory	for	direction,	distance,	routes,	and	landmark	appearance.	This	required	that	a	mental	
representation	of	the	remotely	learned	environment	was	recalled	and	used	to	solve	verbal	or	
paper-and-pencil	tasks.	These	tasks	were	used	to	test	K.C.’s	memory	for	the	environment	in	
which	he	grew	up	and	lived	most	of	his	life,	learned	prior	to	the	onset	of	his	amnesia.		K.C.’s	
ability	to	estimate	distance	and	direction	from	one	landmark	to	another	was	intact,	and	he	
could	draw	the	general	layout	of	the	environment	in	a	sketch	map.	Results	suggest	that	K.C.	
retained	a	representation	of	his	home	environment	that	was	sufficient	for	navigation,	despite	
extensive	hippocampal	and	medial	temporal	lobe	damage.		
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Gathering	further	evidence	that	remote	spatial	memories	can	exist	independent	of	the	
hippocampus,	Herdman,	Calarco,	Moscovitch,	Hirshhorn,	and	Rosenbaum	(2015)	tested	adult-
onset	amnesic	cases	D.G.	and	D.A.	on	mental	navigation	tasks	specific	to	their	home	
environments.	Similar	to	K.C.,	D.G.	and	D.A.	were	able	to	draw	sketch	maps	of	their	well-known	
environments	that	maintained	the	overall	configuration,	and	provide	estimates	of	distance	and	
direction	comparable	to	those	provided	by	healthy	controls	on	a	vector-mapping	task.	Further	
support	for	the	preservation	of	remote	spatial	memories	in	cases	of	hippocampal	damage	come	
from	work	with	patient	E.P.,	who	showed	intact	performance	on	tests	of	topographical	memory	
(Teng	&	Squire,	1999),	and	T.T.,	a	former	London	taxi	driver	with	bilateral	hippocampal	damage	
who	could	navigate	main	artery	routes	in	a	virtual	reality	simulation	of	central	London,	England	
(Maguire	et	al.,	2006).		
Impaired	Detailed	Representations	of	Remote	Environments	in	Adult-Onset	Amnesia		
Although	it	has	been	shown	that	several	individuals	with	damage	to	the	hippocampus	
are	able	to	navigate	in	familiar	environments	learned	long	ago,	there	is	evidence	that	they	may	
experience	spatial	memories	differently	than	controls,	as	representations	of	detailed	features	
appear	to	be	lost	in	some	individuals.	For	example,	the	sketch	maps	of	cases	K.C.,	D.G.,	and	D.A.	
contained	fewer	streets	and	landmarks	compared	to	control	participants’	sketch	maps,	although	
landmarks	and	street	segments	that	were	included	were	accurately	placed	(Herdman	et	al.,	
2015;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000).	The	amnesic	cases	also	performed	worse	than	controls	on	a	
landmark	recognition	task	(Herdman	et	al.,	2015;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000).	Furthermore,	K.C.,	
D.G.,	and	D.A.	each	showed	impoverished	descriptions	of	familiar	routes,	suggesting	that	the	
hippocampus	is	required	for	vivid	re-experiencing	of	a	route	(Herdman	et	al.,	2015).	
Impoverished	detailed	representations	are	suggested	in	Maguire	and	colleagues’	(2006)	report	
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of	the	case	T.T.,	who	could	rely	on	main	artery	roads	to	reach	a	destination,	but	had	difficulty	
navigating	along	non-artery	(minor)	roads.	Taken	together,	adult-onset	amnesic	individuals	
show	intact	schematic	mental	representations	of	well-known,	remotely	learned	environments,	
sufficient	for	navigation,	but	impoverished	detailed	representations	of	the	same	environments.		
Spatial	Memory	Development	in	Developmental	Amnesia		
The	study	of	developmental	amnesic	cases	provides	additional	valuable	information	
about	hippocampal	contributions	to	spatial	memory,	as	it	allows	one	to	examine	whether	
spatial	memory	develops	normally	in	an	individual	with	an	atypically	developed	hippocampal	
system	and	absence	of	episodic	memory.	By	examining	spatial	memory	in	an	individual	with	
developmental	amnesia	we	can	determine	whether	patterns	of	impairment	and	preservation	
are	consistent	with	that	seen	in	adult-onset	amnesia.	If	not,	it	may	be	that	the	development	of	
remote	spatial	memory	is	more	vulnerable	to	early-onset	hippocampal	damage,	or,	
alternatively,	greater	neural	plasticity	and	tendency	for	functional	reorganization	may	result	in	
relatively	more	preservation	(Manning,	2008;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2011).		
Studies	with	individuals	with	developmental	amnesia	who	have	early-onset	hippocampal	
abnormalities	lend	further	evidence	that	the	hippocampus	is	required	to	learn	new	
environments.	For	example,	Vargha-Khadem	and	colleagues	(1997)	found	that	three	
developmental	amnesic	cases	were	impaired	in	learning	object-place	associations	and	had	
difficulty	remembering	a	route	around	the	testing	room.	King,	Burgess,	Hartley,	Vargha-
Khadem,	and	O’Keefe	(2002)	reported	that	developmental	amnesic	case	Jon	was	severely	
impaired	in	identifying	the	location	of	various	objects	within	a	virtual	town	square	when	tested	
from	a	shifted	viewpoint,	where	successful	identification	would	require	the	object	location	be	
defined	relative	to	the	environment	(allocentric)	rather	than	relative	to	the	body	(egocentric).	
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His	ability	to	identify	landmark	locations	was	markedly	better	when	tested	from	the	same-
viewpoint,	where	a	hippocampal-independent	egocentric	framework	could	have	been	used,	but	
he	began	to	show	a	deficit	when	ten	or	more	object	locations	had	to	be	remembered	(King	et	
al.,	2002).		
Gardiner,	Brandt,	Baddeley,	Vargha-Khadem,	and	Mishkin	(2008)	have	shown	that	
individuals	with	developmental	amnesia	have	the	ability	to	acquire	semantic	knowledge,	albeit	
very	slowly	and	over	an	extended	period	of	time.	As	schematic	spatial	representations	have	
been	proposed	as	analogous	to	semantic	memory	(Winocur	&	Moscovitch,	2011),	the	following	
question	arose:	Can	spatial	learning	ever	occur	in	an	individual	with	atypical	hippocampal	
system	development	and	the	absence	of	episodic	memory?		Perhaps	with	extensive	experience	
and	time	travelling	within	an	environment,	individuals	with	developmental	amnesia	can	form	
spatial	representations	that	resemble	semantic	memories	that	are	sufficient	for	navigation.		In	
Vargha-Khadem	and	colleagues	seminal	study	published	in	1997,	caregivers	of	three	cases	of	
developmental	amnesia	reported	that	they	were	unable	to	reliably	find	their	way	in	familiar	
surroundings.	While	this	would	suggest	that	spatial	learning	does	not	occur,	even	in	highly	
frequented	environments,	this	was	not	formally	tested.		On	the	contrary,	family	members	of	
developmental	amnesic	H.C.	reported	that	she	is	able	to	navigate	within	the	environment	she	
has	lived	in	since	birth	when	she	is	free	from	distractions	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015),	which	led	to	
the	systematic	testing	of	H.C.	on	mental	navigation	tasks.		
	In	many	ways,	our	work	with	developmental	amnesic	H.C.	using	mental	navigation	tasks	
shows	a	similar	pattern	to	that	seen	with	adult-onset	amnesia	cases.	She	shows	intact	
performance	compared	to	demographically-matched	controls	on	tasks	assessing	distance	and	
direction,	including	proximity	judgments,	distance	judgments,	and	vector	mapping	(see	Figure	
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1.1	for	a	sample	of	a	vector	mapping	trial).	Taken	together,	this	suggests	that	she	has	been	able	
to	form	a	schematic	representation	of	her	home	environment.			
	
Figure	1.1.	Sample	of	a	vector	mapping	trial,	reproduced	without	changes	from	Rosenbaum,	
Cassidy,	&	Herdman	(2015).	A	vector	(representing	estimated	direction	and	distance)	from	a	
marked	landmark	to	an	unmarked	landmark	was	drawn	by	H.C.	(left)	and	a	control	(right)	on	a	
map	that	outlines	a	frequently	travelled	environment.	Link	to	Creative	Commons	attribution	
license:	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode	
	
She	had	difficulty,	however,	accurately	sequencing	more	than	two	landmarks	that	were	
close	in	proximity	to	one	another	along	a	route	and	producing	detailed	spatial	features	on	
sketch	maps	(see	Figures	1.2	and	1.3).	She	produced	approximately	one	third	the	number	of	
details	(landmarks	and	street	segments)	on	her	sketch	maps	compared	to	controls.	Such	results	
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hint	towards	an	impoverished	representation	of	her	home	environment	that	lacks	detail	and	
richness.		
	
Figure	1.2.	Sketch	maps	of	H.C.’s	childhood	environment	as	drawn	by	H.C.	(left)	and	a	control	
participant	in	2010	(right).	Reproduced	from	Rosenbaum,	Cassidy,	&	Herdman	(2015),	
unchanged.	Link	to	Creative	Commons	attribution	license:	
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode	
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Figure	1.3.	Sketch	maps	of	a	downtown	city	environment	adjacent	to	H.C.’s	childhood	
neighbourhood	as	drawn	by	H.C.	(top)	and	a	control	participant	(bottom)	in	2010.	Reproduced	
from	Rosenbaum,	Cassidy,	&	Herdman	(2015),	unchanged.	Link	to	Creative	Commons	
attribution	license:	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode	
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Role	of	the	Hippocampus	in	Flexible	Navigation		
Successful	navigation	towards	a	goal	that	is	not	within	plain	sight	can	be	achieved	with	
different	wayfinding	strategies	(Eichenbaum,	2017).	Franz	and	Mallot	(2000)	found	that	goals	
could	be	reached	by	recognizing	a	landmark,	moving	towards	it,	recognizing	another	landmark,	
approaching	it,	and	so	on.	Such	recognition-triggered	responses	can	be	combined	to	form	a	
route.	Routes	can	overlap	and	intersect,	which	allows	for	topological	navigation;	however,	
navigation	lacks	flexibility,	as	it	can	only	occur	along	paths	that	have	been	travelled	before	
(Eichenbaum,	2017).	Using	allocentric	survey	navigation,	a	cognitive	map	allows	novel	routes	
within	a	well-known	environment	to	be	navigated	flexibly,	that	is,	using	paths	that	have	never	
been	travelled	but	can	be	inferred	from	known	relations	between	landmarks	(Eichenbaum,	
2017).		
The	Cognitive	Map	Theory	(CMT)	postulates	that	allocentric	spatial	representations	of	
environments	(view-independent	knowledge	of	spatial	relations	among	landmarks)	are	stored	
within	the	hippocampus,	and	that	such	representations	permit	flexible	navigation	(O’Keefe	&	
Nadel,	1978).	As	O’Keefe	and	Nadel	did	not	differentiate	between	recent	and	remote	cognitive	
maps,	it	is	unclear	whether	or	not	they	believed	that	cognitive	maps	for	remotely	learned	
environments	could	exist	without	support	from	the	hippocampus.	Evidence	of	intact	
performance	on	many	mental	navigation	tasks	in	adult-onset	and	developmental	amnesia	
suggests	that	map-like	knowledge	of	well-known	environments	can	exist	independent	of	the	
hippocampus.		
To	further	test	the	limits	of	the	CMT,	one	might	question	whether	these	intact	map-like	
representations	of	environments	learned	long	ago	are	sufficient	for	flexible	navigation.	One	way	
to	investigate	this	is	with	a	blocked	route	task,	where	participants	must	deviate	from	their	
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typical	route	to	make	their	way	to	a	specified	destination.	Amnesic	case	K.	C.	was	able	to	
provide	directions	for	the	most	efficient	route	between	two	landmarks	when	the	most	direct	
route	was	blocked,	which	implies	that	the	hippocampus	may	not	be	required	for	the	flexible	
implementation	of	allocentric	representations	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000).	Similarly,	amnesic	case	
E.P.	was	able	to	provide	directions	between	well-known	landmarks	for	the	environment	he	grew	
up	in	and	resided	in	for	28	years,	even	when	the	main	street	was	blocked	(Teng	&	Squire,	1999).	
One	issue	in	interpreting	these	findings,	however,	is	that	the	environments	and	routes	within	
them	are	very	well-known,	so	that	even	lesser-known	detours	do	not	require	the	same	level	of	
flexibility	as	would	detours	within	newly	learned	environments.	Testing	someone	with	
developmental	amnesia	shows	that	new	spatial	learning,	even	if	extensive,	may	be	inflexible	
when	hippocampal	integrity	is	compromised.	Developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.	was	also	able	to	
navigate	between	two	landmarks	using	a	detour,	but	she	failed	to	use	the	most	efficient	route,	
suggestive	of	inflexible	use	of	spatial	representations	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	It	appeared	as	
though	H.C.	relied	on	well-known	streets	on	the	blocked	route	task,	which	suggests	that	she	
could	have	navigated	using	overlapping	routes,	exhibiting	topological	navigation	rather	than	a	
map-like,	survey	navigation	(Eichenbaum,	2017).	Furthermore,	H.C.’s	configuration	of	space	on	
the	sketch	maps	seemed	to	be	fragmented.	In	her	sketch	maps	(Figure	1.2	and	1.3),	she	was	
able	to	represent	distinct	areas	within	the	environment,	but	could	not	integrate	them	into	a	
cohesive	whole.	Overall,	H.C.	was	believed	to	have	a	coarse	schematic	representation	of	space	
that	lacked	coherence	and	thus	could	not	be	used	flexibly	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	
Analogous	to	what	is	seen	in	humans	with	hippocampal	lesions,	rats	with	hippocampal	
lesions	were	able	to	navigate	successfully	in	a	complex	“village”	environment	that	was	learned	
prior	to	hippocampal	damage	(Winocur,	Moscovitch,	Fogel,	Rosenbaum,	&	Sekeres,	2005;	
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Winocur,	Moscovitch,	Rosenbaum,	&	Sekeres,	2010).	When	faced	with	a	blocked	route,	
however,	rats	with	hippocampal	lesions	made	more	errors	and	took	longer	to	find	the	goal	
destination	(Winocur	et	al.,	2010),	in	line	with	findings	in	developmental	amnesic	H.C.	When	the	
location	of	the	goal	destination	was	reconfigured	within	the	environment,	rats	with	
hippocampal	lesions	had	difficulty	remapping	and	integrating	this	new	information	with	
preserved	spatial	memory	of	the	familiar	complex	village	(Winocur	et	al.,	2005).	Remapping	
requires	learning	new	spatial	relations,	a	skill	well	documented	to	be	reliant	on	the	
hippocampus. 
It	remains	inconclusive	whether	spatial	representations	that	exist	outside	of	the	
hippocampus	can	be	flexibly	used	in	humans.	Attempts	to	mimic	the	level	of	disorientation	
created	by	reconfiguring	major	spatial	cues	in	Winocur	and	colleagues’	(2005)	animal	study	in	
humans	have	been	limited	by	the	inability	to	reconfigure	real-world	environments	that	are	well-
known	to	participants.		
Tools	Used	to	Investigate	Spatial	Memory		
Virtual	reality	technology	has	become	a	popular	tool	to	investigate	spatial	navigation,	
especially	in	studies	investigating	new	spatial	learning,	because	one	can	measure	navigational	
aptitude	within	dynamic	environments	that	were	created	specifically	for	the	study	and	are	free	
from	distractions	or	changing	cues.	The	use	of	virtually	rendered	environments	is	not,	however,	
conducive	to	studying	memory	of	real-world	environments,	particularly	those	that	were	learned	
long	ago.	As	such,	much	research	has	relied	on	mental	navigation	tasks,	as	described	above,	to	
evaluate	one’s	ability	to	remember	and	navigate	environments	learned	long	ago.	While	these	
measures	have	proven	sensitive,	they	may	not	fully	capture	the	experience	of	real-world	
navigation	and	additional	important	information	could	be	gained	by	examining	more	immersive	
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navigation	in	the	real	world	(Maguire	et	al.,	2006;	Spiers	&	Maguire,	2007).	In	situ	navigation	is	
an	option	when	investigating	remote	spatial	memory,	but	this	can	be	time-consuming,	and	
mobility	and	physical	fatigue	issues	can	present	considerable	challenges.	Attempts	to	employ	
virtual	reality	paradigms	in	the	study	of	remote	spatial	memory	have	been	made.	Maguire	and	
colleagues	(2006;	Spiers	&	Maguire,	2007,	2008)	created	a	virtual	reality	rendering	of	London	
using	video	game	software.	Unfortunately,	it	is	time-consuming	and	difficult	to	create	virtual	
environments	of	real-world	places	that	are	not	overly	stylized.	A	recent	software	suite	that	
capitalizes	on	Google	Street	View	may	remedy	these	problems	by	providing	a	platform	that	
allows	for	virtual	navigation	of	real-world	environments	using	panoramics	from	actual	
environments,	instead	of	a	virtual-reality	rendering.	In	a	recent	application,	Patai	and	colleagues	
(2017)	successfully	used	this	software	to	investigate	the	brain	regions	involved	during	
navigation	of	recently	learned	or	highly	familiar	environments.	The	Google	Street	View	software	
was	also	used	in	Brunec	and	colleagues’	(2018)	study,	which	found	that	the	human	
hippocampus	supports	an	anterior-to-posterior	gradient	of	coarse-to-fine	spatiotemporal	
representations.	This	Google	Street	View	software	is	a	promising	new	tool	with	which	to	
investigate	spatial	memory.		
Overview	of	Studies		
The	above	review	suggests	that	spatial	representations	of	extensively	travelled	
environments	can	form	in	H.C.,	an	individual	with	developmental	amnesia.	Similar	to	adult-
onset	amnesic	patients,	H.C.’s	representation	of	her	home	environment	seems	to	be	coarse	and	
lacking	in	detail.	Contrary	to	what	is	seen	in	adult-onset	amnesic	cases,	H.C.’s	representation	of	
space	seems	to	lack	coherence	and	thus	likely	cannot	be	used	as	flexibly.	These	findings,	
however,	are	based	on	mental	navigation	tasks,	and	immersive	navigation	(that	combines	visual	
	 17	
cues	with	the	sense	of	dynamic	motion	through	the	environment)	may	be	more	ecologically	
valid	and	necessary	to	detect	additional	difficulties.	In	this	dissertation,	I	examined	the	integrity	
of	spatial	representations	of	an	extensively	travelled	environment	in	H.C.,	a	young	woman	with	
developmental	amnesia,	using	a	novel	Google	Street	View	platform	that	allows	virtual	reality	
navigation	of	real-world	environments,	mental	navigation	tasks,	and	a	route-description	task.		
The	first	study	sought	to	determine	whether	H.C.	could	virtually	navigate	routes	of	varying	
familiarity	within	her	extensively	experienced	home	environment.	If	this	is	the	case,	it	would	
provide	further	evidence	that	an	individual	with	atypical	hippocampal	development	can	form	
spatial	representations	of	frequently	travelled	environments	(Question	1)	and	that	these	
representations	are	sufficient	for	virtual	navigation.		It	also	would	be	in	line	with	adult-onset	
amnesic	cases’	intact	performance	on	mental	navigation	tasks	assessing	distance	and	direction,	
and	lend	support	to	the	theory	that	spatial	representations	of	environments	learned	long	ago	
can	exist	independent	of	the	hippocampus.	Difficulty	travelling	familiar	routes	within	her	home	
environment,	however,	would	suggest	that	any	representations	of	space	that	she	may	have	
formed	(as	documented	in	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015)	are	not	sufficient	for	virtual	navigation.		
By	varying	the	level	of	familiarity	with	routes	within	well-known	environments,	we	can	
examine	whether	intact	performance	is	due	to	familiarity	with	a	specific	route,	which	can	be	
learned	by	habit,	or	access	to	a	cognitive	map	or	schematic	representation	of	space	that	allows	
for	flexible	navigation.	An	fMRI	study	by	Hartley,	Maguire,	Spiers,	and	Burgess	(2003)	identified	
that	the	hippocampi	were	not	activated	when	travelling	well-worn,	familiar	routes,	but	instead	
the	right	caudate	nucleus	was	activated.		On	paths	less	travelled,	analogous	to	our	less	familiar	
routes,	the	hippocampus	did	appear	to	be	activated,	perhaps	because	such	navigation	requires	
a	flexible	representation	of	space,	achieved	with	a	cognitive	map	or	schematic	representation	of	
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the	environment.	If	H.C.	is	able	to	virtually	navigate	less	familiar	routes,	it	provides	evidence	
that	a	cognitive	map,	or	a	coherent	schematic,	gist-like	representation	of	space,	can	exist	
outside	of	the	hippocampus.	
		 To	push	the	envelope	even	further,	we	also	examined	whether	the	hippocampus	is	
needed	to	reconfigure	or	remap	familiar	routes	in	the	service	of	navigation	(Question	2).	H.C.	
and	healthy	controls	were	asked	to	navigate	familiar	routes	within	a	well-known	environment	
that	had	been	purposefully	altered	to	cause	disorientation	using	the	Google	Street	View	
paradigm.	During	these	trials,	participants’	familiar	routes	were	mirrored,	so	what	was	normally	
seen	on	the	participants’	right	was	seen	on	the	left,	and	vice	versa.		
To	foreshadow	the	results,	H.C.	performed	better	than	expected	on	the	less	familiar	and	
mirrored	routes	given	prior	evidence	of	inflexible,	incoherent	spatial	representations	of	her	
home	environment.	One	possible	explanation	for	her	intact	performance	is	that	because	she	
was	tested	on	the	Google	Street	View	task	6	years	after	completing	the	mental	navigation	tasks,	
her	intact	performance	across	all	Google	Street	View	route	conditions	reflects	improved	spatial	
memory	due	to	additional	experience	navigating	within	her	home	environment	and	more	time	
spent	actively	navigating	while	driving.	To	investigate	this	possibility,	the	second	study	in	this	
dissertation	reports	on	results	from	the	more	recent	re-administration	of	some	of	the	mental	
navigation	tasks.		
The	third	study	focuses	on	the	integrity	of	H.C.’s	detailed	representation	of	her	home	
environment.	Although	neural	plasticity	may	help	individuals	with	developmental	amnesia	
compensate	and	reorganize	functions	of	the	hippocampus	within	other	areas	of	the	brain,	H.C.	
provided	fewer	details	on	her	sketch	maps	(Figures	1.2	and	1.3)	and	had	greater	difficulty	
sequencing	landmarks	in	close	proximity	to	one	another	along	a	route	when	tested	on	mental	
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navigation	tasks,	compared	to	controls	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	This	hinted	at	a	less	detailed	
representation	of	her	home	environment.	In	the	third	study,	H.C.	and	healthy	control	
participants	were	asked	to	describe	a	familiar	walking	route	in	as	much	detail	as	possible.	H.C.’s	
route	description	was	transcribed	and	analyzed	for	the	number	of	entities,	spatial	references,	
and	sensory	descriptions,	and	compared	to	that	of	healthy	controls.	In	doing	so,	we	gain	a	
better	understanding	of	whether	representations	of	environments	are	lacking	in	richness	of	
detail	in	developmental	amnesia,	even	when	the	hippocampus	is	partially	intact	and	there	is	
greater	potential	for	neural	reorganization.		
To	summarize,	prior	research	using	mental	navigation	tasks	to	test	adult-onset	amnesic	
cases	has	revealed	that	schematic,	map-like	representations	of	environments	learned	prior	to	
the	onset	of	amnesia	can	exist	independent	of	the	hippocampus.	The	hippocampus,	however,	
appears	to	be	needed	for	representing	detailed	features	of	environments	learned	in	the	remote	
past	that	enable	a	sense	of	re-experiencing	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000;	Herdman	et	al.,	2015)	and	
for	learning	novel	spatial	relations	(Maguire	et	al.,	2006).	A	similar	pattern	was	found	in	the	
developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.	using	mental	navigation	tasks,	but	with	a	few	exceptions.	
While	H.C.	had	access	to	a	spatial	representation	of	her	extensively	travelled	home	environment	
that	seemed	to	lack	detail,	her	performance	indicated	a	lack	of	cohesiveness	between	spatial	
features	that	was	not	see	in	adult-onset	amnesic	cases	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).		
In	this	dissertation,	a	dynamic,	immersive,	virtual-reality	Google	Street	View	paradigm	was	
used	to	test	the	extent	of	intact	and	impaired	spatial	memory	by	examining	H.C.’s	ability	to	
virtually	navigate	within	her	home	environment,	thereby	confirming	whether	or	not	spatial	
representations	that	are	sufficient	for	navigation	can	form	in	developmental	amnesia	and	
whether	the	hippocampus	is	required	for	flexible	navigation	of	extensively	experienced	
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environments	(Study	1).	In	Study	2,	we	explored	how	representations	of	frequently	travelled	
environments	may	change	in	developmental	amnesia	over	the	course	of	8	years	by	re-testing	
H.C.	on	mental	navigation	tasks.	A	route	description	task	(Study	3)	was	used	to	examine	H.C.’s	
ability	to	richly	recall	a	very	familiar	walking	route,	providing	insight	into	whether	the	
hippocampus	is	required	for	accessing	a	detailed	representation	of	extensively	travelled	
environments	in	developmental	amnesia.	These	experiments	have	the	potential	to	inform	
theories	of	hippocampal	function	and	spatial	memory,	and	improve	our	understanding	of	the	
nature	of	new	spatial	learning	over	extended	periods	of	time	in	the	absence	of	a	typically	
functioning	hippocampal	system	and	episodic	memory.	
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CHAPTER	2	
Study	1:	Intact	Virtual	Reality	Navigation	in	Developmental	Amnesia	
	
Findings	from	studies	with	adult-onset	amnesic	cases	suggest	that	schematic,	gist-like	
representations	of	environments	learned	long	ago	can	exist	outside	of	the	hippocampus	
(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000;	Herdman	et	al.,	2015).	While	it	may	be	that	schematic	representations	
of	well-known	environments	do	not	rely	on	the	hippocampus	after	years	of	experience,	the	
creation	of	the	representations	themselves	would	have	at	one	time	relied	on	the	hippocampus,	
as	it	has	long	been	understood	that	the	hippocampus	is	needed	for	forming	new	spatial	
memories	(Barrash,	1998,	Maguire	et	al.,	2006).	These	findings	led	to	the	development	of	the	
Trace	Transformation	Theory	(Winocur	&	Moscovitch,	2011),	which	states	that	an	initial	
representation	of	a	new	environment	preserves	spatial	features	and	perceptual	details	and	is	
dependent	on	the	hippocampus.	With	time	and	experience	navigating	within	the	environment,	
one	can	abstract	the	salient	features	of	the	environment	that	are	important	for	navigation	and	
form	a	schematic,	gist-like	representation	of	the	environment.	It	remains	unclear,	however,	
whether	such	representations	can	form	with	extensive	experience	in	the	absence	of	a	fully	
functional	hippocampal	system	and	without	the	full	support	of	episodic	memory,	as	in	the	case	
of	developmental	amnesia.			
Developmental	amnesia	presents	a	unique	opportunity	to	examine	whether	spatial	
representations	can	form	in	an	individual	who	has	impaired	episodic	memory	as	a	result	of	
atypical	development	of	the	hippocampal	memory	system.	Episodic	memory	is	well	
documented	to	be	impaired	in	developmental	amnesia,	and	cursory	evidence	from	Vargha-
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Khadem	and	colleagues	(1997)	suggest	that	spatial	memory	may	also	be	compromised.	Episodic	
memory	and	spatial	memory	appear	to	be	intricately	linked	to	one	another.	Indeed,	encoding	
and	retrieving	a	personal	event	involves	the	integration	of	rich	temporal	and	spatial	contexts	
(Good,	2002).	Retrieval	of	episodic	memories	seems	to	rely,	at	least	in	part,	on	the	spatial	
contexts	in	which	they	occurred.	When	one	recalls	an	episodic	memory,	they	often	conjure	up	
where	it	occurred,	and	events	with	spatial	context	are	remembered	more	vividly	and	described	
in	greater	detail	than	those	lacking	such	context	(Robin,	Wynn,	&	Moscovitch,	2016).	The	
hippocampus	has	also	been	found	to	be	important	in	forming	“what-where”	associations	in	rats	
(Day,	Langston,	&	Morris,	2003;	Gilbert	&	Kesner,	2002,	2003;	Rajji,	Chapman,	Eichenbaum,	&	
Greene,	2006)	and	monkeys	(Gaffan,	1994).	Spatial	contexts	seem	to	provide	a	basis	for	episodic	
memories	to	unfold,	but	are	episodic	details	as	important	in	forming	spatial	memories?		
There	is	evidence	that	learning	can	occur	in	the	absence	of	episodic	memory.	Semantic	
learning	has	been	found	to	occur	in	adult-onset	amnesia	(Hayman,	Macdonald,	&	Tulving,	1993;	
Verfaellie,	Koseff,	&	Alexander,	2000)	and	developmental	amnesia	(Gardiner	et	al.,	2008)	over	
an	extended	period	of	time.		Given	this	evidence	and	the	proposed	parallel	between	semantic	
memory	and	schematic	representations	of	space	(Winocur	&	Moscovitch,	2011),	it	may	be	
possible	that	schematic	spatial	memories	can	form	with	extensive	repeated	exposure.	Brooks	
and	colleagues	(1999)	taught	an	adult-onset	amnesic	patient	to	navigate	simple	routes	using	a	
computer-generated	environment	that	was	based	on	the	patient’s	hospital	rehabilitation	unit.	
After	several	weeks	of	training,	the	patient	was	able	to	navigate	the	routes	in	situ,	
demonstrating	that	new	routes	can	be	learned	in	individuals	with	severe	hippocampal	damage	
after	repeated	exposure.		Reports	also	suggest	that	amnesic	case	H.M.	was	able	to	draw	the	
floor	plan	of	the	house	that	he	lived	in	after	the	onset	of	his	amnesia,	perhaps	due	to	significant,	
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ongoing	exposure	(Corkin,	2002).	Such	human	evidence	is	consistent	with	Winocur	and	
colleagues	(2010)	findings	that	rats	could	form	coarse	representations	of	space	after	
hippocampal	lesions,	although	the	formation	of	such	representations	required	extensive	
training.	H.C.’s	previously	reported	intact	performance	on	mental	navigation	tasks	that	estimate	
distance	and	direction	suggests	that	learning	can	also	occur	for	a	larger-scale	environment,	even	
in	the	context	of	an	abnormally	developed	hippocampal	system	and	episodic	memory	
impairment	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).		
Unlike	adult-onset	amnesic	patients,	however,	H.C.	had	difficulty	on	the	blocked	route	
task,	which	required	her	to	provide	an	alternate	route	between	two	landmarks	because	the	
most	efficient	route	was	blocked	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	H.C.	was	able	to	provide	an	
alternate	route,	but	her	directions	were	inefficient	compared	to	controls.	This,	along	with	
fragmented	sketch	maps,	suggests	a	representation	of	space	that	lacks	cohesion	and	likely	
cannot	be	used	as	flexibly.	To	our	knowledge,	such	inflexibility	in	remote	spatial	memory	
representations	has	not	been	formally	documented	in	adult-onset	amnesic	cases.	This	suggests	
that	flexible	representations	that	allow	individuals	to	navigate	to	the	same	destination	via	
different	means	may	be	more	vulnerable	to	early-onset	hippocampal	damage.		
While	mental	navigation	tasks	enable	investigation	of	spatial	memory	of	remotely	
learned	environments,	they	rely	solely	on	mental	representations	of	environments.	If	one	is	able	
to	accurately	estimate	distance	and	direction	between	landmarks,	you	might	speculate	that	
their	mental	representation	of	their	home	environment	would	be	sufficient	for	real-world	
navigation,	but	this	cannot	be	stated	with	certainty.		A	crucial	next	step	is	to	test	the	limits	of	
intact	performance	on	mental	navigation	tasks	using	realistic,	immersive	virtual	reality	tests.	
Previous	testing	with	mental	navigation	tasks	also	hinted	that	H.C.	had	access	only	to	a	coarse,	
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schematic	representation	of	her	home	environment	that	lacked	cohesion	and	was	inflexible	
(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	Using	an	immersive	virtual	reality	paradigm,	we	can	investigate	
whether	the	representations	that	H.C.	has	formed	are	sufficient	for	navigating	familiar	routes,	
as	well	as	flexible	enough	to	enable	navigation	of	routes	purposefully	designed	to	cause	
disorientation.	The	Google	Street	View	paradigm	offers	the	additional	benefit	above	
conventional	virtual	reality	paradigms	of	being	able	to	test	navigation	within	real-world,	
remotely	learned	environments.		
The	aim	of	Study	1	was	to	validate	and	extend	findings	of	intact,	but	inflexible,	schematic	
representations	of	space	in	developmental	amnesia	based	on	mental	navigation	of	well-known	
environments	using	Google	Street	View	as	a	platform	to	create	a	more	dynamic,	immersive	real-
world	paradigm.	Working	with	developmental	amnesic	H.C.,	the	present	study	investigated	the	
role	of	the	hippocampus	in	navigating	familiar	and	less	familiar	routes,	as	well	as	reorienting	
oneself	in	an	environment	following	disorientation.	This	study	sheds	light	on	the	development	
of	spatial	memories	in	the	context	of	an	abnormal	hippocampal	system	and	impaired	episodic	
memory.	As	H.C.	showed	intact	performance	on	mental	navigation	tasks	assessing	distance	and	
direction,	we	expected	that	she	would	perform	as	well	as	age-	and	education-matched	controls	
in	navigating	familiar	routes	within	her	home	environment.	
As	previously	mentioned,	Hartley	and	colleagues	(2003)	found	that	healthy	adults	
activated	the	right	caudate	nucleus,	rather	than	the	hippocampus,	when	navigating	frequently	
travelled	(“well-worn”)	routes,	but	that	the	hippocampus	came	online	again	when	navigating	
paths	less	frequently	travelled.	Our	less	familiar	route	condition	allows	us	to	examine	whether	
the	hippocampus	is	needed	to	recall	a	representation	of	one’s	home	environment	that	is	
interconnected	and	therefore	flexible	enough	to	enable	successful	navigation	between	two	
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known	landmarks	that	they	have	never	purposefully	travelled	between	before.		As	learning	new	
information	in	developmental	amnesia	seems	to	require	much	exposure	and	repetition,	we	
expected	that	H.C.	would	have	difficulty	navigating	between	familiar	landmarks	in	the	less	
familiar	route	condition.		
This	study	also	aimed	to	examine	whether	spatial	representations	that	exist	outside	of	
the	hippocampus	are	cohesive	and	flexible	in	humans	or	whether	flexible	use	of	the	
representations	would	require	the	hippocampus.		Although	rats	reared	in	a	complex	village	
environment	retained	a	representation	of	the	environment	after	hippocampal	lesions,	when	the	
goal	destination	was	reconfigured	in	the	environment,	they	were	unable	to	successfully	
navigate	to	the	goal	destination	because	they	could	not	learn	new	spatial	relationships	between	
the	familiar	external	environment	and	the	village	maze	(Winocur	et	al.,	2005).	In	a	follow-up	
study,	Winocur	and	colleagues	(2010)	found	that	rats	with	hippocampal	lesions	had	greater	
difficulty	on	a	blocked	route	task,	taking	more	time	and	making	more	errors	than	non-lesioned	
control	rats	before	reaching	the	goal	destination.	Taken	together,	findings	from	these	rodent	
studies	suggest	that	representations	of	environments	learned	prior	to	hippocampal	damage	are	
less	cohesive	and	less	flexible	than	in	non-lesioned	animals.		
One	way	to	induce	flexibility	is	to	capitalize	on	the	Google	Street	View	technology	to	
reconfigure	real-world	environments	that	are	well-known	to	participants,	by	mirroring	the	
environment,	so	that	what	is	normally	seen	on	the	left	is	now	seen	on	the	right,	and	vice	versa.	
Based	on	previous	research	implicating	the	hippocampus	in	reorienting	or	remapping	the	
environment	(see	Latuske,	Kornienko,	Kohler,	&	Allen,	2018	for	a	review),	we	anticipated	that	
this	modification	would	reinstate	the	hippocampus.	Given	that	previous	research	suggests	that	
H.C.	has	an	inflexible	representation	of	space,	we	expected	that	H.C.’s	performance	on	the	
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mirrored	route	condition	would	be	worse	than	her	performance	on	familiar	and	less	familiar	
conditions.	Although	we	expected	that	both	H.C.	and	control	participants	would	show	worse	
performance	on	the	mirrored	and	less	familiar	conditions	relative	to	the	familiar	condition,	
given	the	link	between	the	hippocampus	and	flexible	representations	of	space,	we	anticipated	
that	H.C.’s	performance	would	be	even	worse	than	that	of	control	participants.		
Methods	
Participants			
H.C.	is	right-handed	woman	who	was	28	years	old	at	the	time	of	testing.	H.C.	reportedly	
suffered	a	hypoxic	episode	soon	after	she	was	born	prematurely,	at	the	gestational	age	of	32	
weeks	(Hurley,	Maguire,	&	Vargha-Khadem,	2011).	Her	memory	difficulties	first	became	
apparent	around	the	age	of	four,	before	entering	school	(Hurley	et	al.,	2011).	She	successfully	
graduated	from	a	mainstream	high	school,	and	completed	one	year	of	technical	college	and	one	
year	of	culinary	school.	She	has	14	years	of	formal	education,	and	worked	as	a	cashier	at	a	local	
retail	store	at	the	time	of	testing.	H.C.	obtained	a	driver’s	license	when	she	was	17	years	old,	
and	had	12	years	of	driving	experience	within	the	city	she	grew	up	in	and	currently	resides.	She	
reports	normal	eyesight	and	hearing.			
Results	from	detailed	neuropsychological	testing	revealed	impaired	episodic	memory	
and	learning,	in	the	context	of	average	general	intelligence	and	intact	performance	on	tasks	
assessing	other,	non-mnemonic	cognitive	domains	(see	Table	1	for	a	summary	of	relevant	
findings	from	neuropsychological	testing;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2011).		This	pattern	of	performance	
has	remained	relatively	consistent	since	age	11	(Hurley	et	al,	2011).		
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	 	 	 	 	Table	1.	H.C.'s	Neuropsychological	Profile		
	 	
Test	 Raw	Score	 Normed	Score	 Label	
Intellectual	function	and	academic	attainment		
	 	WASI	
	 	 	 											Verbal	IQ	 104	 Percentile	 61	 Average	
										Performance	IQ	 106	 Percentile	 66	 Average	
										Full	scale	IQ	 106	 Percentile	 66	 Average	
AM-NART	
	 	 	 	
									Total	correct	 27	
Standard	
score	 101.28	 Average	
WAIS-III	
	 	 	 											Arithmetic	 10	 Scaled	Score	 8	 Low	Average-Average	
										Information	 19	 Scaled	Score	 12	 Average-High	Average	
Language	
	 	 	 	Boston	Naming	Test1	 58	 Percentile	 77-79	 High	Average	
Semantic	fluency	(animals)	 32	 Percentile	 >90	 Superior	
Phonemic	fluency	(FAS)2	 53	 Percentile	 70-80	 Average-High	Average	
WASI	
	 	 	 											Vocabulary	 58	 T-Score	 55	 Average	
Anterograde	Memory		
	 	 	 	WMS-III	
	 	 	 											Logical	Memory	I	 27	 Scaled	Score	 4	 Borderline-Mildly	Impaired	
										Logical	Memory	II	 3	 Scaled	Score	 1	 Moderately	Impaired	
California	Verbal	Learning	Test-II	
	 	 	 											Total	Trials	1-5	 44	 T-Score	 38	 Low	Average	
	 	 	 	 										Short	Delay	Free	Recall	 0	 Z-Score	 -4	 Severely	Impaired	
										Short	Delay	Cued	Recall	 5	 Z-Score	 -3.5	 Severely	Impaired	
										Long	Delay	Free	Recall	 3	 Z-Score	 -3	 Severely	Impaired	
										Long	Delay	Cued	Recall	 4	 Z-Score	 -3.5	 Severely	Impaired		
										Recognition	 13	 Z-Score	 -2	 Borderline-	Mildly	Impaired	
Rey	Osterrieth	Complex	Figure3	
	 	 	 											Immediate	Recall	 4	 T-Score	 <20	 Severely	Impaired	
										Delayed	Recall	 3	 T-Score	 <20	 Severely	Impaired	
										Delayed	Recognition		 17	 T-Score	 22	 Moderately	Impaired	
Processing	Speed	
	 	 	 	WAIS-III	
	 	 	 											Digit	Symbol	 96	 Scaled	Score	 13	 High	Average	
										Symbol	Search		 45	 Scaled	Score	 14	 High	Average-Superior	
Visuospatial	Function		
	 	 	 	Judgment	of	Line	Orientation		 24	 Percentile	 56	 Average	
Benton	Facial	Recognition		 45	 Percentile	 33-59	 Average	
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Rey	Osterrieth	Complex	Figure	
Copy3	 33	 Percentile	 >16	 Within	Normal	Limits	
WASI	
	 	 	 											Block	Design		 52	 T-Score	 54	 Average	
Attention	&	Executive	Function	
	 	 	 	Stroop4	
	 	 	 											Word	full	(seconds)	 45	 Z-score	 3.65	 Very	Superior	
										Color	full	(seconds)	 48	 Z-score	 -0.03	 Average	
										Interference	full	(seconds)	 80	 Z-score	 -0.57	 Average	
Trail	Making	Test	1	
	 	 	 											Trails	A	(seconds)	 34	 Z-score	 0.69	 High	Average	
										Trails	B	(seconds)	 55	 Z-score	 -0.23	 Average	
WASI	
	 	 	 											Matrix	Reasoning		 29	 T-Score	 55	 Average	
										Similarities	 35	 T-Score	 50	 Average	
WAIS-III	
	 	 	 											Digit	Span	Forward	 10	
	
-	
											Digit	Span	Backward	 5	
	
-	
											Digit	Span	Total		 15	 Scaled	Score	 8	 Low	Average-Average	
Wisconsin	Card	Sorting	Task		
	 	 	 											Categories5	 10	 T-Score	 57	 High	Average	
Note.	AM-NART,	American	National	Adult	Reading	Test;	WASI,	Wechsler	Abbreviated	Scale	of	
Intelligence;	WAIS-III,	Wechsler	Adult	Intelligence	Scale-III.	Additional	neuropsychological	test	
results	reported	in	Hurley	et	al.	(2011),	Rosenbaum	et	al.	(2011),	Rosenbaum	et	al.	(2015)	and	Rabin	
et	al.	(2012).	1Spreen	and	Strauss	(1998),	2Tombaugh	et	al.	(1999),	3Meyers	and	Meyers	(1996),	4in-
house	unpublished	normative	data,	5Heaton	et	al.	(1993).		
	
Developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.	shows	intact	personal	and	general	semantic	memory,	
but	episodic	memory	impairment	on	tests	of	public	and	personal	event	memory	(Rosenbaum	et	
al.,	2011).	Her	performance	on	a	lab-based	test	of	recognition	memory	that	required	
participants	to	report	whether	each	of	100	words	was	new	or	presented	10	minutes	prior	was	
impaired	compared	to	healthy	controls,	with	impairment	found	for	words	that	she	identified	as	
remembering	explicitly	and	words	that	were	familiar,	but	not	explicitly	remembered	
(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2011).			
While	H.C.’s	overall	brain	volume	does	not	differ	significantly	from	that	of	
demographically	matched	controls,	she	shows	a	volume	reduction	of	29.5%	and	31.2%	in	the	
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left	and	right	hippocampi,	respectively	(Olsen	et	al.,	2013).	Olsen	and	colleagues’	(2013)	manual	
segmentation	of	the	hippocampi	and	surrounding	medial	temporal	lobe	cortices	revealed	that,	
in	comparison	to	controls,	H.C.	showed	significant	anterior	hippocampal	volume	reduction	
bilaterally,	significant	volume	reduction	in	the	posterior	segment	of	the	right	hippocampus,	and	
marginal	reduction	in	the	posterior	segment	of	the	left	hippocampus.	Further	segmentation	of	
the	body	of	the	hippocampi	identified	significant	reduction	in	the	CA1	and	subiculum	bilaterally	
(Olsen	et	al.,	2013).	H.C.’s	right	dentate	gyrus,	CA2	and	CA3	subregion	was	marginally	smaller	
than	controls,	and	significantly	smaller	on	the	left	(Olsen	et	al.,	2013).		The	volume	of	H.C.’s	
entorhinal	cortex	and	perirhinal	cortex	did	not	differ	significantly	from	controls,	however	left	
parahippocampal	volume	was	marginally	increased	in	H.C.	(Olsen	et	al.,	2013).	
	In	addition	to	being	smaller,	H.C.’s	hippocampi	have	been	found	to	be	oriented	
vertically	and	appear	globular	in	shape,	suggestive	of	disruption	very	early	in	gestation	
(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2014).	Other	neuroanatomical	abnormalities	include	bilateral	atrophy	of	the	
fornix,	agenesis	of	the	mammillary	bodies,	and	bilateral	atrophy	of	the	anterior	thalamic	nuclei,	
all	of	which	suggest	a	congenital	basis	for	her	memory	impairment	(see	Figure	2.1;	Rosenbaum	
et	al.,	2014).			
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Figure	2.1.	H.C.’s	neuroimaging	reproduced	from	Rosenbaum	et	al.	(2014),	unchanged.	Figures	A	
(H.C.)	and	C	(control)	show	inverted	coronal	T2	images	perpendicular	to	the	hippocampus	
through	the	hippocampal	head	(HH).	Note	H.C.	shows	poor	digitization	of	the	HH,	absence	of	
the	anterior	pillar	of	fornix	(aAPF),	and	absence	of	the	mammillary	bodies	(aMB)	compared	to	a	
control.	Figures	B	(H.C.)	and	D	(control)	show	inverted	coronal	T2	images	through	the	anterior	
hippocampal	body	(HB).	Note	H.C.	shows	rounded	HB	compared	to	a	control.	Link	to	Creative	
Commons	attribution	license:	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode	
	
Twenty-three	healthy	control	participants	(16	women),	who	subjectively	reported	that	
they	were	free	of	neurological	and	psychiatric	illness	and	had	normal	or	corrected-to-normal	
hearing	and	vision,	were	matched	in	age	(M	=	28.43	years,	SD	=	4.55)	and	education	(M	=	16.26	
years,	SD	=	2.07)	to	amnesic	case	H.C.	One	of	these	controls	was	H.C.’s	younger	sister,	J.C.	(26	
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years	old,	15	years	of	education),	who	lived	23	years	in	the	same	environment	as	H.C.	She	
moved	to	Toronto	approximately	one	year	prior	to	testing,	but	makes	frequent	trips	back	to	her	
home	environment.	We	also	tested	H.C.’s	husband,	J.D.	(31	years	old,	14	years	of	education),	
who	has	lived	in	the	same	city	as	H.C.	his	entire	life.	H.C.’s	sister	and	husband	were	collectively	
termed	“neighbourhood	controls”,	given	their	familiarity	with	H.C.’s	home	neighbourhood.	This	
study	was	approved	by	the	ethics	boards	at	York	University	and	Baycrest	Hospital.	All	
participants	gave	informed	written	consent	and	were	provided	with	monetary	compensation	for	
their	time.		
Stimuli	&	Apparatus	
In	this	study,	we	used	a	Google	Street	View	software	package	(designed	by	Dr.	J.	
Ozubko),	which	includes	an	image	downloader	(gdownload),	navigation	paradigm	(Google	
Street	View	paradigm),	and	route	building	(Gnav	Route	Builder).	Using	the	gdownload	software,	
which	was	written	in	MATLAB	v7.5.0.342	and	used	the	PsychToolbox	v3.0.10,	thousands	of	
panoramic	photos	from	real	world	environments	were	downloaded	for	use	in	the	navigation	
paradigm.	The	Google	Street	View	paradigm,	also	reliant	on	MATLAB	and	PsychToolbox,	fulfills	
the	Merriam-Webster	dictionary	definition	of	virtual	reality1,	as	it	allows	participants	to	view	
the	virtual	environment	on	a	desktop	computer	monitor	and	navigate	within	the	environment	
using	keyboard	controls.	Keyboard	controls	were	selected	over	a	joystick	due	to	limitations	with																																																									1	Early	simulated	virtual	reality	environments	were	often	highly	stylized	and	constrained	by	
technology,	but	advancements	such	as	high-resolution	displays	and	increased	portability	of	
virtual	reality	tools	have	made	it	easier	to	use	virtual	reality	in	research	settings.	Alongside	this	
exponential	growth,	however,	has	come	debate	about	what	exactly	constitutes	virtual	reality.	
The	Merriam-Webster	dictionary	(2019)	defines	it	as	“an	artificial	environment	which	is	
experienced	through	sensory	stimuli	(such	as	sights	and	sounds)	provided	by	a	computer	and	in	
which	one’s	actions	partially	determine	what	happens	in	the	environment”.		Others	have	argued	
that	in	addition	to	interactive	features	(visual	responses	on	the	display	in	reaction	to	physical	
behaviours),	virtual	reality	tools	should	evoke	a	sense	of	immersion	and	sense	of	presence.	
	 32	
the	software	system.	Participants	used	the	up	button	on	the	computer	to	navigate	forward	
through	the	environment,	and	the	left	and	right	buttons	to	rotate	their	first-person	view	10	
degrees	to	the	right	or	left.	They	could	turn	a	full	360	degrees	at	any	point.	Although	a	sense	of	
presence	and	immersion	would	have	been	increased	by	matching	vestibular	and	proprioceptive	
cues	to	visual	cues	(e.g.,	by	capitalizing	on	technology	that	allows	one	to	navigate	the	
environment	by	walking	on	a	treadmill),	given	the	relative	novelty	of	the	Google	Street	View	
paradigm	and	budget	limitations,	such	considerations	were	outside	the	scope	of	the	current	
project.	We	anticipate,	however,	that	the	Google	Street	View	paradigm	could	be	integrated	with	
such	technology	in	the	future.		
Familiar	routes	were	generated	using	the	Gnav	Route	Builder	which	allows	participants	
to	work	with	the	experimenter	to	map	out	routes	using	Google	maps.	These	participant-specific	
routes	were	then	loaded	into	the	Google	Street	View	paradigm,	allowing	us	to	obtain	outcome	
measures,	described	below,	such	as	distance	to	goal	location,	that	require	the	location	of	the	
end	destination.		
	
Procedure		
Participants	were	tested	in	two	separate	sessions.	In	the	first	session,	they	filled	out	a	
Navigation	Strategies	questionnaire	(Brunec	et	al.,	2018),	which	classifies	participants	who	tend	
to	use	a	map-based	navigation	strategy	into	a	“Mapping”	group,	and	those	who	tend	to	use	a	
scene-based	strategy	into	a	“Non-Mapping”	group.	Individuals	in	the	“Mapping”	group	
endorsed	statements	indicating	that	they	picture	a	map	when	planning	a	route,	find	it	easy	to	
read	and	use	maps,	have	difficulty	picturing	buildings	along	a	familiar	street	in	their	minds	eye,	
are	able	to	take	short	cuts,	and	have	a	preference	for	providing	directions	in	terms	of	map	
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directions	rather	than	landmarks.	“Non-Mapping”	individuals	would	more	often	endorse	
statements	indicating	that	they	picture	scenes	of	what	they	would	see	along	the	way	when	
planning	a	route,	need	to	look	around	their	surroundings	when	navigating,	are	able	to	very	
clearly	picture	buildings	along	a	route,	have	difficulty	reading	and	using	maps,	and	have	a	
preference	for	providing	directions	in	terms	of	landmarks.	This	questionnaire	was	designed	to	
examine	whether	people	adopt	a	mapping/allocentric-based	strategy	when	navigating	or	
planning	navigation,	or	whether	they	rely	more	on	immersive,	first-person	views.	It	was	used	in	
the	current	study	to	characterize	H.C.’s	navigational	strategy.	It	was	also	speculated	that	we	
might	find	differences	in	control	participants’	who	describe	themselves	as	“Mapping”	vs.	“Non-
Mapping”	on	the	Google	Street	View	task	when	navigating	mirrored	routes	that	are	likely	to	
require	a	coherent	representation	of	the	environment	sufficient	for	flexible	navigation.			
Participants	then	worked	with	the	experimenter	to	establish	eight	highly	familiar	routes	
within	a	well-known	environment	that	they	navigate	on	a	regular	basis.	Since	our	interest	is	in	
remote	spatial	memory,	the	environments	and	routes	were	personalized	and	unique	to	each	
participant.	The	majority	of	controls	navigated	virtually	within	the	Toronto	or	the	Greater	
Toronto	Area,	as	the	remoteness	of	H.C’s	home	city	limited	recruitment	of	willing	participants	
who	had	lived	or	continued	to	live	in	that	city.	H.C.’s	sister,	J.C.,	and	husband,	J.D.,	however,	
were	tested	on	the	exact	same	environment	and,	in	fact,	the	majority	of	the	same	routes	as	H.C.	
As	such,	H.C.’s	performance	was	compared	to	that	of	the	full	group	of	23	healthy	controls,	and	
also	examined	more	closely	in	direct	relation	to	a	subset	of	that	group,	her	sister	and	husband	
(termed	the	neighbourhood	controls),	to	ensure	that	potential	differences	in	the	environment	
did	not	drive	results.					
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To	ensure	that	participants’	routes	did	not	vary	in	complexity,	routes	were	required	to	
have	at	least	three	turns	and	be	approximately	1.5	to	10	km	in	length.	Participants	were	then	
asked	to	identify	two	landmarks	of	which	they	are	familiar	with	the	location,	but	have	never	
purposefully	travelled	between,	forming	the	basis	of	the	required	four	less	familiar	routes.	
Participants	were	asked	to	identify	neighbourhoods	or	cities	with	which	they	are	unfamiliar	so	
GPS	follow-the-arrow	control	routes	could	be	created	in	such	environments.	
During	the	second	session,	participants	were	asked	to	navigate	routes	using	a	novel	
computer	paradigm	that	uses	first-person	images	from	Google	Street	View	to	allow	participants	
to	virtually	walk	through	a	real-world	city	with	which	they	are	very	familiar.	Developmental	
amnesic	H.C.	was	asked	to	navigate	her	current	environment	in	which	she	was	born	and	raised.		
Using	this	Google	Street	View	paradigm,	participants	were	asked	to	navigate	four	of	the	
personalized	highly	familiar	routes	that	they	provided	in	the	first	session.	They	were	also	asked	
to	navigate	between	four	dyads	of	landmarks	that	they	had	never	purposefully	travelled	
between,	but	were	aware	of	their	locations	(less	familiar	routes).	While	the	start	and	end	
locations	of	the	less	familiar	dyads	were	planned,	the	route	itself	was	not	planned	out	prior	to	
navigation.	Participants	were	reminded	to	navigate	from	one	landmark	to	the	next	using	at	least	
three	turns.	Four	of	the	highly	familiar	routes	that	participants	provided	during	the	first	session	
were	turned	into	mirrored	routes	so	that	what	would	normally	be	seen	on	the	participants’	right	
is	now	seen	on	the	left,	and	vice	versa	(see	Figure	2.2).	This	effectively	disorients	participants,	
requiring	them	to	turn	the	opposite	direction	to	which	they	are	used	to	in	order	to	navigate	
successfully	along	the	route.	
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Figure	2.2.	Example	of	conversion	of	a	familiar	route	to	a	mirrored	route,	as	seen	from	a	survey	
and	first-person	view.		
	
Participants	were	also	asked	to	engage	in	four	GPS	follow-the-arrow	control	trials	that	
provide	a	baseline	of	navigation	when	planning	is	not	required	(see	Figure	2.3	for	example).	
During	this	condition,	they	followed	an	arrow	that	directs	them	through	an	unfamiliar	
environment	(established	during	Session	1).	To	ensure	that	participants	were	attending	to	the	
scenery	as	well	as	the	arrow,	they	were	asked	to	press	a	button	every	time	they	perceived	that	
the	scene	had	changed.	Trials	from	all	four	conditions	were	randomly	presented.	
	 36	
	
Figure	2.3.	Example	of	a	GPS	follow-the-arrow	control	route.		
	
Analysis	
Information	about	whether	the	destination	was	successfully	reached	and	parameters	of	
navigational	efficiency	(number	of	pauses,	speed	of	navigation,	directness	of	travel,	and	number	
of	errors)	were	collected	for	each	trial	and	averaged	for	each	condition.	Calculation	of	these	
parameters	involved	collecting	raw	data	output	from	the	Google	Street	View	paradigm,	
including	the	latitude	and	longitude	of	the	participant	at	each	“step”	(button	press)	and	the	
speed	at	which	each	step	occurred.	Speed	could	be	deduced	by	calculating	the	distance	
between	two	steps	divided	by	the	duration	of	time	between	the	last	input	(button	press)	and	
the	current	input.	With	this	information,	one	could	determine	whether	the	participant	was	
moving	forward	in	a	“steady”	manner	(5	steps	in	the	same	direction)	or	whether	the	participant	
stopped	moving	(i.e.,	paused).	Pauses	were	defined	as	periods	when	individuals	ceased	stepping	
forward,	looked	to	their	left	or	right	for	any	period	of	time,	and	then	resumed	travel	in	their	
original,	pre-pause	direction.	During	pauses,	the	participant	could	press	buttons	to	shift	their	
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view	left	or	right	(i.e.,	look	around),	but	if	their	view	at	the	beginning	of	the	pause	shifted	more	
than	60	degrees	at	the	end	of	the	pause,	this	was	considered	a	purposeful	turn,	rather	than	a	
pause	to	look	around,	orient	oneself,	or	plan	navigation.	The	number	of	pauses	in	each	trial	
were	summed	and	averaged	for	each	condition.	Increased	number	of	pauses	is	suggestive	of	
more	time	spent	reorienting	or	planning	navigation.	
Level	of	confidence	in	navigation	during	each	condition	was	estimated	by	examining	the	
speed	of	navigation,	which	was	defined	as	the	latency	between	button	presses	while	navigating	
(with	turns	and	pauses	excluded).	A	higher	average	latency	represents	slower	speed	of	travel,	
which	is	believed	to	represent	less	confidence	in,	or	more	cautious,	travel.		
	The	ratio	of	distance	to	target	location	informs	how	directly	the	participant	was	
travelling	towards	the	goal	at	any	given	step.	Our	final	metric	ranges	from	0	to	1,	with	a	0	
indicating	direct	travel	towards	the	goal,	and	a	1	indicating	travel	in	the	opposite	direction,	
directly	away	from	the	goal.	Using	the	latitude	and	longitude	of	the	destination	and	the	
participant’s	current	location,	the	ratio	of	the	distance	to	target	location	was	calculated	at	each	
step	to	determine	what	proportion	of	the	distance	travelled	by	a	step	was	in	the	direction	of	the	
goal.	For	example,	if	a	participant	pressed	forward	and	took	a	step,	travelling	10	meters	
forward,	we	then	calculated	how	much	closer	the	participant	was	to	the	goal	after	that	step.	If	
the	participant	was	8	meters	closer	to	the	goal,	then	the	ratio	of	distance	to	target	location	was	
0.8	for	that	step.	Hence,	this	ratio	could	range	from	-1.0	(directly	away	from	the	goal)	to	+1.0	
(directly	towards	the	goal).	Euclidean	distance	to	goal	calculated	at	each	step	taken	within	a	trial	
(ignoring	pauses	and	turns)	was	averaged,	resulting	in	an	average	distance	to	goal	for	each	trial.	
To	make	this	metric	amenable	to	statistical	analysis,	we	subtracted	1	from	the	participant’s	
mean	ratio	of	distance	to	target	location	and	then	multiplied	by	-0.5.	This	linear	transformation	
	 38	
changed	the	scale,	such	that	a	0	indicates	travel	directly	towards	the	goal,	whereas	1	indicates	
travel	directly	away	from	the	goal.	Looking	at	the	average	ratio	of	distance	to	target	location	for	
each	step	informs	us	as	to	how	frequently	the	participant	was	moving	towards	the	goal.	This	
provides	a	metric	of	directness	of	travel,	as	participants	who	are	taking	efficient	routes	towards	
the	goal	should	infrequently	have	high	values	for	this	ratio.		
The	number	of	errors	for	each	trial	was	evaluated	manually,	with	errors	being	defined	as	
moving	away	from	the	goal	location	at	any	choice	point	or	intersection.	For	illustrative	
purposes,	Figure	2.4	provides	an	example	of	how	errors	were	calculated.	Figure	2.4	shows	an	
example	of	a	route	taken	by	a	participant	with	red	circles	indicating	choice	points	where	a	
decision	could	be	made	about	the	route.	As	can	be	seen,	at	most	choice	points,	the	participant	
was	moving	towards	the	destination,	until	the	street	labeled	“H-Street”.	At	the	intersection	of	
“F-Street”	and	“H-Street,”	the	participant	made	an	error	(indicated	with	the	orange	X),	choosing	
to	continue	along	“F-Street”	instead	of	turning	onto	“H-Street,”	which	would	have	been	a	more	
efficient	route;	the	participant	effectively	was	moving	away	from	the	destination.	At	“A-Street,”	
the	participant	made	another	error,	as	they	continued	to	move	away	from	the	destination	
(rather	than	turning	around	to	take	a	more	efficient	route).	It	was	not	considered	an	error	at	“B-
Street”	because	at	this	point,	the	participant	could	reach	the	destination	more	efficiently	by	
continuing	forward,	as	they	chose	to	do.	Their	choices	past	this	street	allowed	continued	
efficient	progression	towards	the	goal	location,	until	they	reached	the	intersection	of	“H-Street”	
and	“D-Street”,	where	the	participant	made	another	error	by	turning	left	on	“H-Street”,	away	
from	the	destination.		
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Figure	2.4.	Illustration	of	error	calculation.	The	blue	line	shows	the	path	travelled	by	the	
participant	while	navigating	between	the	(marked)	start	point	and	goal	destination	in	a	first-
person	view.	Red	circles	represent	choice	points	and	orange	Xs	represent	errors.		
Results	
	
H.C.’s	performance	on	parameters	of	navigational	efficiency	(number	of	pauses,	
directness	of	travel,	speed	of	navigation,	and	number	of	errors)	was	compared	to	that	of	age-	
and	education-matched	controls	using	Crawford	and	Garthwaite’s	(2002)	modified	t-test	
procedure,	a	conservative	approach	that	allows	comparison	of	single	cases	to	control	samples	
that	are	small	to	moderate	in	size.	All	analyses	were	tested	at	a	significance	level	of	p	<	.05.	This	
procedure	was	also	used	to	compare	H.C.’s	performance	to	that	of	the	two	controls	that	are	
familiar	with	her	home	environment.		
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Following	a	visual	inspection	of	the	distribution	of	the	data,	it	was	clear	that	the	pauses	
and	errors	were	not	normally	distributed.	This	is	expected	with	count	data	and	required	a	
generalized	linear	model	approach.	As	such,	a	Poisson	regression	with	an	exchangeable	working	
correlation	matrix	was	used	to	examine	whether	healthy	controls’	number	of	pauses	and	
number	of	errors	differed	on	familiar,	less	familiar,	mirrored,	and	GPS	control	trials.	Healthy	
controls’	directness	of	travel	and	speed	of	navigation	were	analyzed	using	a	Gamma	regression	
with	an	exchangeable	working	correlation	matrix.	Again,	given	the	non-normal	distribution	of	
the	data,	a	classic	parametric	approach	was	deemed	inappropriate.	As	our	research	questions	
were	most	concerned	with	performance	on	mirrored	and	less	familiar	routes	compared	to	the	
familiar	routes,	significance	testing	between	other	dyads	(e.g.,	GPS	and	mirror)	was	not	
completed	to	protect	against	Type	I	errors.	
Finally,	the	Revised	Standardized	Difference	Test	(Crawford	&	Garthwaite,	2005)	allowed	
us	to	examine	whether	H.C.’s	performance	on	route	conditions	differed	significantly	from	one	
another.	All	analyses	were	tested	at	a	significance	level	of	p	<	.05.	
Destination	Reached		
Taken	as	a	group,	healthy	controls	were	able	to	reach	their	target	destinations	on	98%	of	
the	familiar	route	trials,	90%	of	the	less	familiar	routes,	86%	of	the	mirrored	routes,	and	100%	
of	the	GPS	follow-the-arrow	control	routes.		H.C.	was	able	to	successfully	navigate	to	100%	of	
the	route	destinations,	in	all	route	conditions.		
Number	of	Pauses		
As	seen	in	Figure	2.5,	healthy	control	participants	had	fewer	pauses	per	trial	for	the	GPS	
follow-the-arrow	and	familiar	conditions	compared	to	the	more	challenging	mirrored	and	less	
familiar	conditions.	Compared	to	the	familiar	condition,	the	less	familiar	condition	led	to	an	
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additional	0.425	increase	in	the	log	of	the	number	of	pauses	(B	=	0.425,	χ2	=	25.213,	p	<	.001),	
meaning	that	the	less	familiar	condition	resulted	in	significantly	more	pauses	than	the	familiar	
condition.	Similarly,	the	mirrored	condition	resulted	in	an	additional	0.188	increase	in	the	log	of	
number	of	pauses	(B	=	0.188,	χ2	=	4.785,	p	=	.029),	and	the	GPS	control	condition	led	to	a	0.403	
decrease	in	the	log	of	number	of	pauses	(B	=	-0.403,	χ2	=	14.790,	p	<	.001)	compared	to	the	
familiar	condition.		
Amnesic	case	H.C.	showed	a	comparable	number	of	pauses	compared	to	healthy	
controls	across	familiar	(t	=	0.325,	p	=	.748),	less	familiar	(t	=	-0.489,	p	=	.315),	mirrored	(t	=	
0.177,	p	=	.430),	and	GPS	control	trials	(t	=	-0.371,	p		=	.714;	Figure	2.5).	This	pattern	did	not	
deviate	when	H.C.’s	performance	was	compared	only	to	her	sister	and	husband.		
H.C.’s	performance	on	the	familiar	route	condition	did	not	differ	significantly	from	the	
mirrored	(t	=	0.249,	p	=	.403),	or	less	familiar	route	condition	(t	=	0.916,	p	=	.185).	H.C.’s	number	
of	pauses	on	the	mirrored	route	also	did	not	differ	significantly	from	the	less	familiar	route	(t	=	
0.719,	p	=	.240).	The	number	of	pauses	on	the	GPS	route	did	not	differ	significantly	from	the	
familiar	(t	=	0.702,	p	=	.490),	mirrored	(t	=	0.414,	p	=	.341),	or	less	familiar	conditions	(t	=	0.133,	
p	=	.448;	Figure	2.5).		
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Figure	2.5.	Average	number	of	pauses	across	route	conditions	for	23	controls,	developmental	
amnesic	case	H.C.,	and	2	neighbourhood	controls	with	experience	navigating	H.C.’s	home	
environment.	Error	bars	represent	a	95%	confidence	interval.		
Directness	of	Travel		
Compared	to	the	familiar	condition,	control	participants’	less	familiar	condition	led	to	an	
additional	0.189	increase	in	log	of	the	distance	to	goal	ratio	(B	=	0.189,	χ2	=	3.845,	p	=	.050;	
Figure	2.6),	meaning	that	directness	of	travel	was	significantly	worse	for	the	less	familiar	
condition	than	the	familiar	condition.	Similarly,	the	mirrored	condition	resulted	in	a	0.364	
increase	in	log	of	the	distance	to	goal	ratio	(B	=	0.364,	χ2	=	35.379,	p	<	.001),	and	the	GPS	
control	condition	led	to	a	0.402	increase	in	the	log	of	distance	to	goal	ratio	(B	=	0.402,	χ2	=	
36.776,	p	<	.001),	all	in	comparison	to	the	familiar	condition.		
H.C.’s	performance	on	the	distance	to	goal	parameter	was	similar	to	that	of	healthy	
controls	for	the	familiar	(t	=	-0.979,	p	=	.338),	mirrored	(t	=	0.734,	p	=	.235),	less	familiar	(t	=	
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0.326,	p	=	.374),	and	GPS	routes	(t	=	-0.392,	p	=	.699;	Figure	2.6).	H.C.’s	pattern	of	results	was	
also	similar	to	that	of	her	2	family	members,	except	that	her	ratio	of	distance	to	goal	was	
significantly	higher	on	the	mirrored	condition	(t	=	11.304,	p	=	.028),	indicating	less	direct	travel	
on	mirrored	routes	compared	to	her	family	members.	
Unlike	controls,	H.C.’s	distance-to-goal	ratio	was	significantly	closer	to	zero	on	the	
familiar	condition	compared	to	the	mirrored	condition	(t	=	1.748,	p	=	.047;	Figure	2.6),	
indicating	more	direct	travel	toward	the	goal	on	the	familiar	routes.	Although	her	distance	to	
goal	ratio	for	the	familiar	condition	was	numerically	lower	than	the	less	familiar	condition,	this	
was	not	significant	(t	=	0.989,	p	=	.167).	H.C.’s	distance-to-goal	ratio	did	not	differ	significantly	
between	the	mirrored	and	less	familiar	conditions	(t	=	0.449,	p	=	.329).	Similarly,	the	distance	to	
goal	ratio	for	the	GPS	routes	did	not	differ	significantly	from	the	familiar	(t	=	0.448,	p	=	.659),	
mirrored	(t	=	0.863,	p	=	.199),	or	less	familiar	conditions	(t	=	0.547,	p	=	.295).	
Control	participants	and	H.C.	both	performed	worse	than	expected	on	the	GPS	control	
route	condition.	Upon	closer	inspection,	most	individuals	did	not	deviate	substantially	from	the	
planned	GPS	route,	so	the	higher	ratio	of	distance-to-goal	likely	reflects	the	nature	of	the	routes	
provided,	rather	than	difficulty	navigating	the	routes.		
	 44	
	
Figure	2.6.	Directness	of	travel	calculated	using	ratio	of	distance	to	goal	across	route	
conditions	for	23	controls,	developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.,	and	2	neighbourhood	controls	
with	experience	navigating	H.C.’s	home	environment.	Error	bars	represent	a	95%	confidence	
interval.		
	
Speed	of	Navigation		
Control	participants’	level	of	confidence	in	navigation	was	estimated	by	examining	the	
average	latency	between	button	presses.	Compared	to	the	familiar	condition,	the	less	familiar	
condition	led	to	a	negligible	0.016	decrease	in	the	log	of	reaction	time	(B	=	-0.016,	χ2	=	0.387,	p	
=	.534;	Figure	2.7),	meaning	that	the	average	latency	between	button	presses	for	the	less	
familiar	condition	was	not	significantly	different	from	the	familiar	condition.	The	mirrored	
condition,	however,	resulted	in	an	increase	of	0.108	(B	=	0.108,	χ2	=	12.177,	p	<	.001).	Thus,	
level	of	confidence	in	travel,	as	measured	by	the	average	latency	between	button	presses,	was	
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significantly	worse	in	the	mirrored	condition	compared	to	the	familiar	condition.	The	GPS	
control	condition	led	to	a	0.056	increase	(B	=	0.056,	χ2	=	2.892,	p	=	.089).		
H.C.’s	reaction	time	was	comparable	to	that	of	healthy	controls	when	travelling	along	on	
familiar	routes	(t	=	-0.544,	p	=	.592),	less	familiar	routes	(t	=	-0.612,	p	=	.273),	and	mirrored	
routes	(t	=	-0.163,	p	=	.436;	Figure	2.7).	She	was,	however,	significantly	slower	than	healthy	
controls	when	travelling	along	the	GPS	control	routes,	which	required	the	added	task	of	
pressing	“s”	when	the	scenery	changed	(t	=	3.10,	p	=	.005).	Similar	findings	were	obtained	when	
H.C.’s	performance	was	compared	to	her	family	members’,	except	that	her	performance	on	the	
GPS	condition	was	no	longer	significantly	significant	when	compared	just	to	her	sister	and	
husband	(t	=	1.983,	p	=	.297).	
Intra-individual	analyses	indicated	that	H.C.’s	speed	of	navigation	did	not	differ	
significantly	across	the	familiar	and	less	familiar	conditions	(t	=	0.074,	p	=	.471),	or	the	familiar	
and	mirrored	conditions	(t	=	0.518,	p	=	.305;	Figure	2.7).	There	was	no	significant	difference	in	
H.C.’s	speed	of	navigation	between	the	less	familiar	and	mirrored	conditions	(t	=	0.431,	p	=	
.336).	H.C.	was	significantly	slower,	however,	on	the	GPS	condition	compared	to	the	familiar	(t	=	
4.603,	p	<	.001),	less	familiar	(t	=	5.242,	p	<	.001),	and	mirrored	conditions	(t	=	3.675,	p	<	.001).	
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Figure	2.7.	Level	of	confidence	in	navigation	measured	by	average	latency	between	button	
presses	across	route	conditions	for	23	controls,	developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.,	and	2	
neighbourhood	controls	with	experience	navigating	H.C.’s	home	environment.	Error	bars	
represent	a	95%	confidence	interval.		
Progression	Errors		
As	progression	errors	were	defined	as	moving	away	from	the	goal	location	at	any	choice	
point	or	intersection,	they	were	not	calculated	for	the	GPS	control	route,	as	the	route	had	been	
pre-planned	by	experimenters.	As	expected,	controls’	performance	on	the	less	familiar	
condition	led	to	an	additional	1.549	increase	in	the	log	of	progression	errors	(B	=	1.549,	χ2	=	
13.578,	p	<	.001)	and	the	mirrored	condition	resulted	in	an	increase	of	1.324	log	of	progression	
errors	(B	=	1.324,	χ2	=	31.017,	p	<	.001)	compared	to	the	familiar	condition	(Figure	2.8).	Thus,	
the	regression	model	would	predict	that	significantly	more	errors	are	made	on	the	less	familiar	
and	mirrored	conditions	than	the	familiar	condition	for	control	participants.		
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At	turns	or	possible	turning	points,	the	number	of	errors	H.C.	made	(movement	away	
from	goal	location)	was	comparable	to	controls	across	the	familiar	(t	=	-0.381,	p	=	.707),	less	
familiar	(t	=	0.068,	p	=	.473),	and	mirrored	conditions	(t	=	0.069,	p	=	.473;	Figure	2.8).	There	
were	no	significant	differences	between	H.C.	and	her	family	members	across	conditions.		
H.C.	showed	the	expected	trend	of	fewer	errors	on	the	familiar	condition	compared	to	
the	less	familiar	(t	=	0.305,	p	=	.382)	and	mirrored	conditions	(t	=	0.383,	p	=	.353),	but	this	
difference	did	not	reach	statistical	significance.	The	number	of	errors	she	made	on	the	mirrored	
and	less	familiar	condition	did	not	differ	significantly	(t	=	0.001,	p	=	.500).		
	
Figure	2.8.	Average	number	of	progression	errors	per	trial	across	route	conditions	for	controls,	
developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.,	and	2	neighbourhood	controls	with	experience	navigating	
H.C.’s	home	environment.	Error	bars	represent	a	95%	confidence	interval.		
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Navigation	Strategies	Questionnaire		
	 On	the	Navigation	Strategies	questionnaire,	a	higher,	positive	score	on	a	scale	of	-14	to	
+14	means	that	the	participant	uses	more	of	a	mapping	strategy,	as	opposed	to	a	negative	
score,	which	suggests	a	non-mapping,	scene-based	strategy.		Based	on	their	self-report,	fifteen	
of	the	twenty-three	control	participants	were	classified	as	using	a	mapping	strategy.	The	
average	score	for	the	mapping	group	was	6.07	(SD	=	2.58),	and	scores	ranges	from	2	to	9.	Five	
control	participants	were	classified	as	using	a	non-mapping	strategy,	including	H.C.’s	husband.		
Their	average	score	was	-4.4	(SD	=	2.41),	with	a	range	of	scores	between	-1	to	-7.	Three	
participants	earned	a	score	of	0,	including	H.C.’s	sister,	which	resulted	in	their	not	being	
classified	as	belonging	to	either	a	mapping	or	a	non-mapping	group.	Performance	did	not	differ	
by	strategy	group	on	number	of	pauses	(χ2	=	0.290,	p	=	.865),	reaction	time	(χ2	=	4.080,	p	=	
.130),	directness	of	travel	(χ2	=	0.4.983,	p	=	.083),	or	progression	errors	(χ2	=	1.817,	p	=	.403).	On	
the	Navigation	Strategies	questionnaire,	H.C.’s	self-report	resulted	in	a	score	of	-5,	which	means	
she	used	a	non-mapping	strategy.	When	planning	a	route,	she	reported	picturing	scenes	of	what	
she	would	see	along	the	way.	She	also	reported	picturing	herself	travel	a	route	using	a	street-
level	view	rather	than	a	bird’s	eye	view,	and	said	that	she	would	be	more	likely	to	give	
directions	to	a	friend	using	landmarks	rather	than	map	directions.	She	said	that	she	prefers	to	
navigate	using	a	list	of	directions	rather	than	a	map,	and	she	reported	often	using	landmarks	to	
orient	herself	when	navigating.		
Discussion		
The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	substantiate	findings	that	representations	of	
environments	travelled	over	many	years	can	develop	and	be	maintained	outside	of	the	
hippocampus,	and	investigate	whether	these	representations	are	sufficient	for	flexible	
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navigation.	Both	amnesic	case	H.C.	and	healthy	controls	were	asked	to	navigate	very	familiar	
routes,	less	familiar	routes,	mirrored	routes	and	GPS-control	routes.	As	expected,	H.C.	was	able	
to	navigate	very	familiar	routes	as	well	as	healthy	control	participants,	providing	further	
evidence	that	representations	of	frequently	travelled	environments	can	form	in	an	individual	
with	atypical	hippocampal	development.	While	H.C.	showed	greater	difficulty	with	the	less	
familiar	routes	compared	to	the	familiar	routes,	her	performance	did	not	differ	from	that	of	
controls	in	the	less	familiar	routes	condition.	H.C.	performed	similarly	to	controls	on	the	GPS-
control	route	condition	across	all	navigational	parameters,	except	speed	of	navigation,	where	
she	was	significantly	slower	than	the	large	sample	of	controls,	but	not	the	two	controls	familiar	
with	her	neighbourhood.	This	difference	may	reflect	difficulties	in	task	switching	or	working	
memory.	H.C.’s	directness	of	travel	on	the	mirrored	routes	was	significantly	worse	than	that	for	
the	two	controls	familiar	with	her	home	environment,	though	she	did	not	differ	from	the	larger	
control	sample.	
H.C.’s	ability	to	navigate	very	familiar	routes	shows	that	representations	of	frequently	
travelled	environments	can	form	despite	an	atypically	functioning	hippocampus.	The	nature	of	
these	representations,	however,	remains	unclear.	It	may	be	that	she	has	created	a	mental	
representation	of	her	environment	that	is	akin	to	a	cognitive	map,	which	can	be	used	to	
navigate	flexibly,	and	is	traditionally	believed	to	require	the	hippocampus.	Given	the	frequency	
with	which	familiar	routes	are	travelled,	however,	successful	navigation	of	these	routes	also	
could	have	been	achieved	without	the	support	of	the	hippocampus,	using	habit	memory.		The	
unfamiliar	condition	was	designed	to	address	this;	if	she	was	able	to	navigate	between	
landmarks	within	her	home	environment	that	she	had	never	purposefully	travelled	between	
before,	we	expected	that	her	intact	performance	could	not	be	fully	be	explained	by	habit.	H.C.’s	
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ability	to	navigate	less	familiar	routes	comparably	to	control	participants	suggests	that	she	may	
have	access	to	a	representation	of	her	home	environment	that	is	somewhat	flexible	in	nature.	It	
is	important	to	note	that	H.C.	worked	with	the	experimenter	to	come	up	with	landmark	pairs	
between	which	she	had	never	purposefully	travelled.	As	such,	it	is	possible	that	she	
underestimated	the	frequency	with	which	she	travelled	between	the	landmarks,	and	that	that	
the	routes	were	sufficiently	rehearsed	to	support	performance.	
The	GPS	control	routes	required	participants	to	press	the	“s”	button	when	they	
perceived	that	the	scene	had	changed,	ensuring	that	their	focus	was	not	solely	on	the	arrow	at	
the	top	of	the	screen	that	pointed	towards	the	goal	location.	Subjectively,	the	experimenter	
noted	that	H.C.	seemed	to	be	more	fixated	on	accurately	documenting	scene	changes	than	
healthy	controls.	She	also	appeared	to	have	more	difficulty	switching	between	the	two	tasks	
(pressing	“s”	for	scene	change	and	pressing	arrows	to	navigate),	which	suggests	that	her	slower	
navigation	on	the	GPS-control	routes	may	be	more	related	to	a	task-switching	or	working	
memory	difficulty	rather	than	a	spatial	deficit	per	se.		
H.C.’s	overall	intact	performance	in	the	mirrored	condition	was	somewhat	surprising	in	
the	context	of	previous	findings	of	inflexible	representations	of	her	home	environment	
(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	It	may	be	that	navigating	a	mirrored	environment	may	require	a	
different	type	of	flexibility	than	that	needed	when	navigating	a	blocked	route	or	remapping	an	
environment.	This	possibility	is	discussed	in	detail	below.		Although	H.C.’s	mirrored	route	
navigation	was	generally	indistinguishable	from	the	larger	control	group	and	she	was	able	to	
reach	all	mirrored	route	destinations	successfully,	H.C.	showed	the	greatest	relative	difficulty	
when	directness	of	travel	was	taken	into	account,	which	is	perhaps	not	surprising	given	past	
evidence	that	she	was	unable	to	provide	the	most	efficient	detour	on	a	blocked	route	task	
	 51	
(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	It	may	be	that	directness	of	travel	would	be	the	most	sensitive	
measure	to	capture	differences	in	navigating	in	studies	moving	toward,	and	that	H.C.’s	
performance	on	this	measure	would	be	much	worse	than	controls	when	challenged	to	find	the	
most	direct	detour	on	a	blocked	route	task.	
How	Might	Spatial	Representations	of	Environments	Form	Without	a	Typically	Functioning	
Hippocampus	and	the	Full	Support	of	Episodic	Memory?		
Using	mental	navigation	tasks	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015)	and	the	immersive	Google	Street	
View	virtual	navigation	paradigm	employed	in	this	study,	we	have	demonstrated	that	spatial	
representations	of	frequently-travelled	environments	can	form	in	H.C.,	an	individual	with	
atypical	hippocampal	system	development,	yet	the	nature	of	the	representations	and	
mechanism	by	which	this	occurs	remains	unclear.	Previous	research	with	adult-onset	amnesic	
cases	using	mental	navigation	tasks	provides	evidence	that	the	hippocampus	is	not	required	for	
retrieving	a	schematic,	map-like	representation	of	environments	learned	prior	to	the	onset	of	
their	amnesia.	These	results	are	consistent	with	the	Trace	Transformation	Theory,	as	the	
environments	that	are	recalled	were	encoded	pre-injury	or	illness,	with	a	typically	functioning	
hippocampus	and	intact	episodic	memory.	Given	that	H.C.	has	never	had	a	typically	functioning	
hippocampus	or	episodic	memory	system,	reconciling	her	intact	performance	assessing	distance	
and	direction	on	mental	navigation	tasks	and	navigating	using	the	Google	Street	View	paradigm	
is	more	difficult.	The	hippocampus	is	well	known	to	be	required	for	learning	new	environments,	
which	has	received	support	from	studies	of	adult-onset	amnesic	cases,	neuroimaging	studies,	
and	non-human	animals.	As	previously	discussed,	developmental	amnesic	cases	also	are	unable	
to	form	new	spatial	representations,	at	least	after	minimal	exposure	(King	et	al.,	2002;	Vargha-
Khadem	et	al.,	1997).	
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Perhaps	H.C	was	able	to	learn	the	spatial	layout	of	her	home	environment	over	many	
years,	akin	to	how	H.C.	and	other	developmental	amnesic	cases	have	been	able	to	gain	semantic	
knowledge,	with	a	substantial	amount	of	repetition.	As	semantic	memory	is	relatively	preserved	
in	individuals	with	selective	hippocampal	damage	(Baddeley,	Vargha-Khadem,	&	Mishkin,	2001;	
Vargha-Khadem	et	al.,	1997;	including	H.C.:	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2011),	Gardiner	and	colleagues	
(2008)	attempted	to	teach	new	semantic	facts	to	developmental	amnesic	case,	Jon,	to	gain	a	
better	understanding	of	the	circumstances	required	for	acquisition	of	semantic	knowledge.	They	
found	that	Jon	had	difficulty	retaining	facts	during	the	acquisition	trials	and	showed	inter-trial	
forgetting,	which	they	took	as	evidence	that	episodic	memory	facilitates	the	acquisition	of	
semantic	knowledge.	He	was,	however,	able	to	retain	new	semantic	facts	with	substantial	
repetition.	As	Gardiner	and	colleagues	demonstrated	with	developmental	amnesic	case	Jon,	
semantic	knowledge	can	be	acquired	without	the	full	support	of	episodic	memory,	albeit	with	
laborious	training.	Our	results	suggest	that	coarse	knowledge	of	environments	can	also	be	
acquired	without	the	full	support	of	episodic	memory,	with	extensive	exposure.		In	this	way,	the	
environment	is	“semanticized”,	where	a	schematic,	gist-like	representation	may	form	that	is	
sufficient	for	navigation.	It	would	appear	that	H.C.	has	acquired	a	representation	of	her	home	
environment	that	is	sufficient	for	navigation,	but	it	is	unclear	how	long	it	took	to	form	the	
representation	or	how	substantially	this	representation	may	have	changed	over	time.	Future	
studies	could	aim	to	identify	the	minimum	amount	of	time	needed	to	create	a	spatial	
representation	of	an	environment.		
We	cannot	rule	out	the	possibility	that	H.C.’s	residual	hippocampal	tissue	may	be	
adequate	for	navigating	within	her	home	environment.	While	it	is	plausible	that	the	remaining	
tissue	in	H.C.’s	hippocampi	is	viable	and	sufficient	for	learning	new	spatial	relations	and	
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developing	representations	of	space	sufficient	for	navigation,	we	view	this	as	unlikely	given	that	
H.C’s	residual	tissue	does	not	support	episodic	memory.	An	experimental	design	similar	to	
Gardiner	and	colleagues’	(2008;	described	above)	that	charts	the	acquisition	of	spatial	
knowledge	(rather	than	semantic	knowledge)	in	developmental	amnesia	may	provide	insight	
into	this	possibility.	If	H.C.	showed	increased	inter-trial	forgetting	and	poor	retention	of	spatial	
facts	during	acquisition	trials,	this	could	be	interpreted	as	evidence	that	the	residual	
hippocampal	tissue	is	not	functioning	optimally,	and	that	alternate	explanations	of	acquisition,	
such	as	the	“semanticization”	of	the	environment,	may	provide	a	better	explanation	for	the	
acquisition	of	spatial	knowledge.	Furthermore,	fMRI	could	examine	the	role	of	the	hippocampus	
during	recollection	of	a	spatial	representation	to	determine	which	brain	structures	are	active	
when	navigating	familiar	environments.		
It	is	clear	that	H.C.	has	been	able	to	form	a	representation	of	her	home	environment	
over	many	years	of	travel,	but	we	cannot	state	with	certainty	that	this	representation	resembles	
a	flexible,	cognitive	map,	or	is	topological,	where	navigation	is	relational	between	points	of	
interest	but	precise	metric	information	is	not	used.	It	is	possible	that	H.C.	may	have	been	able	to	
navigate	familiar	routes	within	her	home	environment	using	a	non-hippocampal	dependent	
strategy,	relying	instead	on	the	caudate	nucleus	that	is	involved	in	habit	memory.		
The	fact	that	she	was	able	to	navigate	between	landmarks	within	her	home	environment	that	
she	had	never	purposefully	travelled	between	before	suggests	that	her	intact	performance	may	
not	fully	be	explained	simply	by	habit,	and	that	she	could	have	relied	on	a	cognitive	map.	
Alternatively,	H.C.’s	successful	navigation	of	the	less	familiar	routes	also	could	have	been	
accomplished	by	extrapolating	the	relations	between	landmarks	that	she	had	never	
purposefully	travelled	between	(e.g.,	A	and	C)	using	existing	knowledge	about	spatial	relations	
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between	overlapping	landmark	pairs	(e.g.,	A-B	and	B-C).	For	example,	H.C.	said	that	she	had	
never	purposefully	travelled	between	two	specific	restaurants,	but	she	could	have	been	familiar	
with	the	relationship	between	both	restaurants	and	her	in-laws’	house,	which	she	passed	along	
her	route.		In	this	way,	it	seems	that	H.C.’s	representation	of	her	home	environment	can	be	
used	somewhat	flexibly,	as	she	is	able	to	navigate	between	two	landmarks	that	she	reports	she	
has	never	travelled	between.	However,	it	is	possible	that	the	nature	of	her	representation	may	
not	be	a	cohesive	cognitive	map	that	allows	for	unlimited	flexibility,	but	instead	could	be	a	
topological	representation	formed	by	overlapping	frequently	travelled	routes.		Knowledge	of	
overlapping	routes	could	permit	some	flexible	navigation,	but	only	along	known,	overlapping	
routes.	Travel	along	such	well-learned	routes	may	be	habit-based,	and	thus	successful	
navigation	on	the	unfamiliar	trials	might	require	only	habit	memory	and	the	knowledge	that	the	
two	routes	overlap.	A	route-based	approach	such	as	this	is	also	consistent	with	H.C.’s	self-
reported	“non-mapping”	strategy.		
Flexible	Navigation:	Reconciling	Discrepancies	Between	Mental	Navigation	Tasks	and	Virtual	
Reality	
H.C.	previously	drew	sketch	maps	that	had	disjointed	features,	and,	although	she	was	
able	to	navigate	to	a	goal	destination	on	a	blocked	route	task,	she	was	unable	to	do	so	using	the	
most	efficient	route	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	Taken	together,	this	hinted	towards	an	inflexible	
and	incoherent	representation	of	her	home	environment.	While	H.C.’s	intact	performance	on	
familiar	routes	in	this	study	was	in	line	with	expectations,	her	ability	to	successfully	navigate	
100%	of	the	mirrored	routes	similarly	to	controls	was	unexpected,	as	such	routes	were	designed	
to	cause	disorientation	and	require	flexibility	to	solve.	Her	ability	to	navigate	the	mirrored	
routes	as	well	as	healthy	controls	contradicts	the	mental	navigation	findings,	and	suggests	that	
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H.C.	does	have	access	to	a	flexible	representation	of	her	home	environment.	What	might	
explain	H.C.’s	intact	performance	on	the	mirrored	routes?	
As	H.C.	was	tested	on	the	mental	navigation	tasks	in	2010,	6	years	prior	to	her	being	
tested	on	this	study,	her	intact	performance	across	all	Google	Street	View	route	conditions	
could	reflect	an	improvement	in	her	spatial	representation	of	her	home	environment.	As	
described	above,	individuals	with	amnesia	can	acquire	semantic	knowledge	(and,	it	would	seem,	
coarse,	gist-like	spatial	knowledge)	over	an	extended	period	of	time.	Six	years	may	have	
provided	H.C.	with	a	sufficient	amount	of	exposure	to	form	a	more	coherent	representation	of	
space	that	can	be	used	flexibly.	Within	this	time,	she	may	have	had	more	experience	to	areas	
that	she	was	previously	less	familiar	with,	and	with	ample	exposure,	gist-like	representations	of	
those	areas	could	have	formed	that	would	have	enabled	successful	navigation	on	the	less	
familiar	routes.	During	the	6-year	delay	between	testing,	H.C.	also	may	have	travelled	between	
well-known	routes,	which	would	encourage	the	formation	of	a	cohesive	representation	of	
space.	Indeed,	within	this	period,	H.C.	moved	from	her	childhood	neighbourhood	to	an	
apartment	and	then	to	a	house	within	the	city	core.	When	H.C.	and	her	husband	moved	into	
their	new	house,	they	travelled	routes	between	her	workplace	and	her	new	home,	and	her	
apartment	and	her	new	home	multiple	times,	so	as	to	help	H.C.	better	orient	her	new	house	
within	her	familiar	environment.	Both	H.C.	and	her	husband	felt	that	this	exercise	was	useful.	
H.C.	and	her	husband	reported	that	H.C.	is	able	to	travel	between	her	current	house,	which	
she’s	lived	in	for	3.5	years,	and	multiple	other	landmarks,	including	her	childhood	home,	her	
place	of	work,	the	movie	theatre,	and	various	restaurants	and	stores.	H.C.	and	her	husband’s	
subjective	reports	were	corroborated	with	objective	results	from	this	study,	as	H.C.	was	
successfully	able	to	navigate	between	her	new	home	and	other	landmarks	successfully.	This	
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would	suggest	that	she	was	able	to	either	learn	new	routes	within	this	three	year	period,	and/or	
was	able	to	successfully	orient	her	new	home	within	a	previously-formed	cognitive	map,	
allowing	her	to	navigate	flexibly.		It	is	important	to	note	that	during	these	years,	H.C.	spent	
more	time	driving	and	actively	engaging	in	her	home	environment,	which	has	been	associated	
with	the	development	of	an	in-depth	cognitive	map	that	can	be	used	for	navigation	(Maguire,	
Woollett,	&	Spiers,	2006).	It	may	be	that	the	years	she	spent	driving	were	more	influential	and	
allowed	for	faster	acquisition	of	spatial	knowledge.	
The	nature	of	the	tasks	themselves	also	could	have	contributed	to	H.C.’s	intact	
performance	on	the	mirrored	route	condition.	For	the	sketch	map	task,	she	was	required	to	
conjure	up	a	representation	of	space,	without	any	cues	except	for	the	names	of	the	boundaries	
of	the	environment.	H.C.’s	inclusion	of	significantly	fewer	details	on	her	sketch	maps	and	
difficulty	accurately	sequencing	more	than	two	landmarks	that	were	close	in	proximity	to	one	
another	along	a	route	hinted	towards	an	impoverished	representation	of	her	home	
environment	that	lacked	in	richness	and	detail.	The	Google	Street	View	task,	however,	provides	
visual	cues	in	the	form	of	landmarks,	roads,	textures,	and	other	environmental	features	that	
may	support	flexible	navigation.	It	may	also	allow	access	to	relational	information	among	
landmarks	and	the	geometry	of	space	that	may	make	it	easier	to	estimate	traversed	distance.	It	
is	possible	that	using	an	immersive	virtual	reality	tool	provides	more	details	or	cues	that	can	be	
used	to	navigate,	which	H.C.	has	difficulty	conjuring	up	in	her	mind’s	eye.	It	is	uncertain	whether	
a	detailed	representation	of	her	home	environment	fails	to	exists,	or	whether	she	just	has	
difficulty	accessing	it,	however	we	view	the	former	as	more	likely	given	the	parallels	drawn	
between	episodic	memory	and	detailed	representations	of	space.	As	the	provision	of	details	in	
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Google	Street	View	may	have	aided	navigation,	further	examination	of	the	integrity	of	detailed	
representations	of	H.C.’s	home	environment	may	further	illuminate	these	results.			
It	is	possible	that,	despite	having	difficulty	on	several	of	the	mental	navigation	tasks,	H.C.	
was	able	to	navigate	within	the	immersive	virtual	reality	task	because	the	visual	input	and	
immersion	may	lend	itself	to	habit	or	procedural	memory.	In	studies	looking	at	skilled	tool	use,	
Fernandes,	Park,	&	Almeida	(2017)	found	that	particular	elements	of	the	task	(e.g.,	retrieving	
attributes	of	the	tool	and	its	function)	required	declarative	memory,	which	relies	on	the	medial	
temporal	lobe,	whereas	skilled	performance	involving	actual	use	of	the	novel	complex	tools	is	
mediated	in	part	by	the	motor	procedural	memory,	which	relies	on	the	basal	ganglia.	It	may	be	
that	successful	performance	on	mental	navigation	tasks	requires	the	hippocampus	because	the	
environment	must	be	conjured	up	in	the	participants’	minds	eye,	but	with	additional	visual	and	
motor	cues,	provided	by	the	virtual	reality	task,	hippocampal-independent	habit	memory	is	
sufficient	for	successful	navigation.		
The	discrepant	mental	navigation	task	and	Google	Street	View	paradigm	results	suggest	
that,	although	mental	navigation	tasks	may	be	less	ecologically	valid,	they	may	be	more	
sensitive	to	deficits	in	spatial	memory	found	in	developmental	amnesia	than	immersive	virtual	
reality	tasks,	at	least	in	the	context	of	how	they	were	used	in	this	study.	While	this	may	be	the	
case,	it	is	also	possible	that	subtle	deficits	could	be	identified	using	immersive	virtual	reality	
tasks	that	incorporate	conditions	that	are	more	challenging	than	the	mirrored	condition.	With	
ongoing	technological	advances,	this	becomes	increasingly	more	feasible.	For	example,	future	
work	could	test	H.C.	and	healthy	control	participants	on	conditions	where	landmarks	central	to	
navigation	are	removed	from	Google	Street	View.	This	may	be	enough	to	disorient	H.C.	and	
further	our	understanding	of	well-travelled	environments	in	developmental	amnesia.		
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Although	the	mirrored	condition	was	designed	to	elicit	disorientation,	similar	to	what	
was	seen	in	Winocur	and	colleagues	(2005)	study	with	rats,	it	does	not	require	remapping	or	
reconfiguration	in	the	traditional	sense,	which	are	known	to	be	dependent	on	the	hippocampus.	
While	we	can	speculate	about	hippocampal	involvement	in	such	a	condition,	we	cannot	rule	out	
the	possibility	that	a	non-hippocampal-dependent	strategy	can	be	used	to	successfully	navigate	
the	mirrored	routes.		
Reorientation	is	traditionally	believed	to	involve	re-establishing	a	sense	of	one’s	position	
within	the	environment	(Vieites,	Nazareth,	Reeb-Sutherland,	&	Pruden,	2015)	or	recalibrating	
egocentric	knowledge	using	allocentric	knowledge	(Sutton	&	Newcombe,	2014).	As	such	
allocentric	knowledge	has	long	been	believed	to	be	reliant	on	the	hippocampus,	we	anticipated	
that	the	mirrored	route	would	require	the	hippocampus.	External	cues	can	help	one	to	regain	
their	bearings	when	their	internal	sense	of	direction	is	disrupted	(Keinath,	Julian,	Epstein,	&	
Muzzio,	2017),	as	it	is	in	the	case	of	this	study’s	mirrored	route	condition.		Successful	navigation	
of	the	mirrored	route	condition,	however,	may	not	entail	traditional	reorienting.		Whereas	
traditional	reorientation	involves	recalibrating	your	position	within	an	unchanged	environment,	
the	mirrored	condition	involves	navigating	a	changed	(mirrored)	environment.	While	the	
distance	between	landmarks	remained	consistent	in	the	mirrored	condition,	the	direction	of	
travel	flipped.	An	allocentric	or	map-like	representation	of	the	environment	is	not	sufficient	to	
reorient	oneself	because	the	environment	is	mirrored.	The	mirrored	condition,	however,	can	be	
solved	by	evoking	a	new	rule:	Turn	the	opposite	direction	from	what	you	would	normally	turn.	
In	this	sense,	successful	navigation	may	require	an	allocentric	or	map-like	representation	of	the	
home	environment,	that	may	be	dependent	on	the	hippocampus,	as	well	as	the	knowledge	of	
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this	new	rule,	which	allows	for	one	to	adapt	their	typical	egocentric	frame	of	reference,	that	is,	
where	one	would	normally	turn	left	at	a	particular	landmark,	they	will	now	turn	right.		
External	changes	that	occur	when	alterations	are	made	to	an	animals’	surrounding	or	
when	it	is	moved	to	a	different	environment	lead	to	the	reorganization	of	the	ensemble	of	place	
cells	in	the	hippocampus	that	represent	the	position	of	the	animal,	termed	“remapping”	
(Latuske	et	al.,	2018).	When	“global	remapping”	occurs,	the	activity	of	a	particular	place	cell	that	
is	observed	in	two	different	environments	is	not	correlated	and	different	ensembles	of	place	
cells	result	in	different	internal	maps	of	the	environment	(Latuske	et	al.,	2018).	The	mirrored	
condition	in	this	study	would	not	constitute	global	remapping,	as	many	of	the	cues	in	the	
environment	remained	unchanged.		It	may	be	more	in	line	with	“partial	remapping”,	which	
occurs	when	only	some	of	the	local	environment	cues	are	changed	that	affect	the	geometry	or	
context	of	the	environment	(i.e.,	the	environment	is	not	substantially	different;	Latuske	et	al.,	
2018).	We	are	unaware,	however,	of	studies	that	use	mirrored	environments	to	examine	
hippocampal	remapping.	There	is	evidence	that	well-known	hippocampal	maps	can	be	flexible	
and	withstand	minor	changes	in	distance	between	landmarks	or	cues	(Fenton,	Csizmadia,	&	
Muller,	2000),	but	to	our	knowledge	it	is	unknown	whether	they	can	withstand	a	reversal	of	
direction,	as	seen	in	this	study.			
Given	that	the	mirrored	condition	may	represent	some	form	of	partial	remapping	and	a	
successful	strategy	may	combine	a	hippocampal-dependent,	allocentric	representation	of	the	
environment	with	knowledge	that	ones’	movement	within	the	environment	will	require	turning	
the	opposite	direction	compared	to	normal,	we	anticipated	that	the	mirrored	condition	would	
require	the	hippocampus.	That	being	said,	if	a	schematic	representation	of	space	could	exist	
outside	of	the	hippocampus,	then	that	representation	plus	the	knowledge	of	the	new	rule	may	
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enable	successful	navigation,	even	in	individuals	with	hippocampal	compromise.	Alternatively,	
since	the	mirrored	routes	were	essentially	familiar	routes	that	were	flipped,	it	is	possible	that	
these	trials	could	be	successfully	solved	using	a	hippocampal-independent,	habit-based	strategy	
together	with	acquisition	of	this	new	rule.	In	hindsight,	the	mirrored	condition	may	not	have	
been	the	best	choice	to	explore	H.C.’s	ability	to	navigate	flexibly	within	her	home	environment.	
Instead,	a	blocked-route	task	may	be	more	appropriate	to	answer	this	question	and	should	be	
explored	in	a	future	study.		
Limitations			
One	of	the	major	limitations	of	this	Google	Street	View	study	is	that	movement	through	
the	environment	was	generated	using	computer	keys,	which	reduces	validity	and	
generalizability,	and	is	not	optimal	for	perceiving	the	amplitude	of	turning	movements	(Chance,	
Gaunet,	Beall,	&	Loomis,	1998).	Furthermore,	given	that	the	virtual	reality	stimuli	is	created	
panoramic	photos	from	Google	Street	View,	they	do	not	present	stereoscopically	and	do	not	
provide	three-dimensional	information	that	could	be	used	to	aid	in	the	estimation	of	distance	
and	direction.	Navigation	is	complex	and	involves	much	more	than	just	visual	input.	Vestibular,	
proprioceptive,	auditory	and	somatosensory	information	is	also	processed	and	integrated	
during	navigation	(Ekstrom,	Arnold,	&	Iaria,	2014).	Although	visual	cues	are	thought	to	be	most	
informative	when	processing	large-scale	space,	proprioceptive	information	has	been	found	to	
increase	the	accuracy	of	participants’	visual	perception	of	path	length,	even	when	the	
proprioceptive	information	was	incongruent	with	visual	cues	(Sun,	Campos,	&	Chan,	2004).	
While	desktop	virtual	navigation	of	a	real-world	environment	is	more	ecologically	valid	than	
mental	navigation	tasks,	it	fails	to	allow	the	participant	to	utilize	and	integrate	information	
obtained	outside	of	the	visual	domain;	information	that	may	assist	participants	during	
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navigation	of	virtual	reality	environments.	Due	to	budgetary	constraints	and	because	the	Google	
Street	View	paradigm	was	novel	when	this	study	first	began,	this	study	did	not	incorporate	
more	immersive	technologies,	such	as	larger	visual	displays,	head	tracking	devices,	kinetic	
movement	sensors,	or	treadmills/bikes,	that	would	have	enabled	participants	to	interact	more	
naturally	with	the	environment	and	increased	ecological	validity	and	generalizability.		Large	
advances	in	technology	have	made	testing	participants	on	a	more	immersive	paradigm	more	
practical	and	economically	feasible.	Growth	has	been	exponential.	For	example,	Roupé,	Bosch-
Sijtsema,	&	Johansson	(2013)	recently	capitalized	on	the	XBOX	360	Kinect	sensor	system	to	
create	an	interactive	navigation	interface	for	virtual	reality	that	uses	the	human	body.		In	future	
studies,	we	plan	to	work	with	collaborators	in	Computer	Science	and	Visuomotor	laboratories	to	
build	a	more	immersive	and	ecologically	valid	Google	Street	View	paradigm.		It	will	be	
important,	however,	to	weigh	the	added	demands	on	participants	that	arise	when	mobility	is	
necessary	to	complete	the	task.	Adding	sensory-motor	information	requirements	for	walking	
during	navigation	can	put	elderly	or	brain-injured	subjects	in	a	double	task	situation,	increasing	
cognitive	demands	and	therefore	reducing	performance.	Therefore,	when	future	researchers	
create	more	ecologically	valid	tasks,	they	should	carefully	consider	whether	doing	so	increases	
cognitive	demands,	which	might	confound	the	results.	An	example	of	how	increased	demands	
can	impact	performance	in	cognitively	compromised	individuals	can	be	found	in	this	study,	
where	H.C.	seemed	to	have	difficulty	switching	between	navigating	the	GPS	routes	and	pressing	
the	“s”	button	to	indicate	a	scene	change.	Individuals	with	neurological	compromise	may	
perform	poorly	not	because	of	the	navigation	component,	but	due	to	difficulties	with	
multitasking.		
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Unlike	examining	participant	performance	in	new	environments,	testing	participants	on	
environments	that	are	well	known	to	them	presents	a	unique	challenge,	as	each	participant	
required	their	own	personalized	routes	within	a	well-known	environment.	Given	our	
investigation	was	of	environments	traversed	over	many	years,	it	was	very	difficult	to	use	the	
same	routes	for	multiple	controls.	We	were	fortunate	that	H.C.’s	sister	and	husband	had	
experience	navigating	many	of	her	familiar	routes,	which	allowed	us	to	test	H.C.	and	her	family	
members	on	most	of	the	same	routes.	Given	the	individualized	nature	of	the	task,	another	
limitation	of	this	study	was	that	the	length	of	time	spent	generating	familiar	routes	with	the	
participant	(approximately	2-3	hours)	and	preparing	the	stimuli	for	each	participant	
(approximately	5	hours)	was	substantial.	The	lengthy	first	session	combined	with	a	4-5	hour	
second	session,	where	participants	were	tested	on	personalized	routes	for	all	four	route	
conditions,	made	this	a	particularly	onerous	study	for	participants	and	not	conducive	to	working	
with	populations	that	tire	easily.	While	much	can	be	gained	from	virtual	navigation	of	a	real	
world	environment,	methods	in	the	future	should	be	altered	so	as	to	reduce	the	burden	on	
participants.		
Given	the	personalized	nature	of	the	task,	testing	participants	on	familiar	routes	
required	that	participants	provided	a	verbal	description	of	familiar	routes,	with	an	overhead	
map	available	for	reference,	during	the	first	session.	This	had	the	potential	to	prime	participants	
for	navigation	of	the	route	in	the	subsequent	session	and	it	is	possible	that	participants	could	
have	been	relying	on	the	description	they	gave	or	envisioning	the	overhead	map	when	they	
navigated	from	a	first-person	view	using	Google	Street	View.	This	possibility	was	viewed	as	
unlikely,	as	H.C.	was	tested	3	months	after	her	first	session	and	most	participants	were	tested	at	
least	one	month	after	the	first	session,	based	on	their	availability.		
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Summary		
To	summarize,	the	first	study	of	this	dissertation	used	a	virtual	reality	paradigm	that	
allows	for	navigation	of	real-world	environments,	with	Google	Street	View	as	a	platform,	to	
substantiate	findings	that	spatial	representations	of	extensively	travelled	environments	can	
exist	in	a	developmental	amnesic	case,	H.C.,	who	experienced	atypical	development	of	her	
hippocampal	system	and	has	impaired	episodic	memory.	Importantly,	H.C.	was	able	to	
successfully	navigate	familiar	routes	that	had	been	mirrored,	a	condition	originally	designed	to	
require	flexibility	and	reconfiguration	or	remapping	of	the	familiar	environment,	potentially	
taxing	hippocampal	function.	Overall,	the	results	suggest	that	with	extensive	experience,	
representations	of	well-known	environments	may	exist	independent	of	the	hippocampus	and	
may	be	used	flexibly.	These	results	seem	to	be	at	odds	with	H.C.’s	previous	incoherent	sketch	
maps	and	generation	of	inefficient	detours	on	a	blocked	route	task	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	
One	possibility,	tested	in	Study	2,	is	that	the	6	years	between	testing	sessions	that	included	
active	driving	experience	within	the	environment	was	sufficient	for	forming	more	flexible	
representations	of	H.C.’s	home	environment.	Alternatively,	it	may	be	that	immersive	navigation	
provides	the	additional	visual	cues	required	for	flexible	navigation,	which	H.C.	has	difficulty	
conjuring	up	in	her	own	mental	representations,	or	that	H.C.	was	able	to	navigate	the	mirrored	
routes	using	a	hippocampal-independent	habit-based	strategy,	combined	with	knowledge	that	
she	must	act	against	her	instincts	and	adapt	their	typical	egocentric	frame	of	reference.	
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CHAPTER	3	
Study	2:	Do	representations	of	frequently	travelled	environments	improve	with	
time	and	experience	in	developmental	amnesia?	
	
In	the	previous	experiment,	I	showed	that	developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.	was	able	to	
navigate	familiar,	less	familiar,	and	mirrored	routes	in	her	home	environment	as	well	as	23	age-	
and	education-matched	healthy	controls.	These	results	held	when	her	performance	was	
compared	only	to	her	sister	and	husband,	who	shared	knowledge	of	the	same	home	
environment	and	most	of	the	same	routes.	Although	H.C.	was	able	to	navigate	to	the	goal	
destination	on	all	conditions,	she	took	less	direct	routes	in	the	mirrored	condition	compared	to	
her	sister	and	husband,	which	is	in	line	with	previous	findings	on	a	blocked	route	mental	
navigation	task	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	Nonetheless,	it	is	still	the	case	that	H.C.	was	otherwise	
able	to	navigate	similarly	to	controls	on	the	mirrored	route	task,	which	was	designed	to	elicit	
remapping	or	reorientation	of	the	familiar	environment	and	depend	on	hippocampal	function.	
Several	explanations	for	H.C.’s	seemingly	intact	performance	on	the	mirrored	condition	were	
described	above,	including:	H.C.’s	residual	hippocampal	tissue	may	have	been	sufficient	for	
flexible	navigation;	H.C.	did	not	need	to	conjure	up	a	detailed	representation	of	the	
environment	as	visual	cues	were	provided	during	dynamic	navigation,	which	may	have	
improved	her	ability	to	navigate	flexibly;	the	transformation	involved	in	the	mirrored	condition	
may	not	have	involved	remapping	and	reconfiguration	in	the	traditional	sense,	and	therefore	
may	not	depend	on	the	hippocampus;	and	with	more	time	and	exposure	the	representation	of	
her	home	environment,	perhaps	learned	in	a	similar	way	as	semantic	information,	may	have	
become	more	coherent	and	therefore	more	flexible.	The	latter	possibility	is	explored	in	the	
current	study.		
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Developmental	amnesic	cases	show	a	pattern	of	impaired	episodic	memory	in	the	
context	of	intact	semantic	memory	(Vargha-Khadem	et	al.,	1997).	Gardiner	and	colleagues	
(2008)	demonstrated	that	developmental	amnesic	case	Jon	was	able	to	learn	some	new	
semantic	facts	after	three	testing	sessions	that	occurred	in	intervals	of	6-8	weeks	and	consisted	
of	6	acquisition	trials.	While	he	required	greater	exposure	to	the	study	material	than	control	
participants	and	failed	to	recall	more	than	16	of	24	facts	even	with	this	additional	exposure,	he	
was	nonetheless	able	to	acquire	new	semantic	knowledge	(Gardiner	et	al.,	2008).	Our	previous	
work	with	H.C.	using	mental	navigation	tasks	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015)	and	the	Google	Street	
View	paradigm	described	in	the	previous	chapter	demonstrated	that	representations	of	
environments	can	form	with	extensive	time	and	exposure,	but	the	nature	and	extent	of	those	
representations	is	unknown.	To	date,	no	studies	have	formally	examined	whether	spatial	
memories	can	be	accrued	in	a	comparable	way	to	semantic	facts,	and,	if	this	is	possible,	how	
much	time	and	exposure	would	be	required.	Given	that	spatial	representations	require	the	
integration	of	multiple	pieces	of	information,	one	might	predict	that	learning	the	layout	of	an	
environment	would	take	substantially	longer	than	learning	a	single	fact.	Designing	a	spatial	
memory	study	analogous	to	Gardiner	and	colleagues’	study	(2008)	that	takes	into	account	the	
complexity	involved	in	learning	large-scale	spatial	memory	would	be	time-consuming	and	
challenging.			
In	this	chapter,	we	report	results	from	the	re-testing	of	H.C.	on	mental	navigation	tasks	8	
years	after	she	was	initially	tested	by	Rosenbaum	and	colleagues	(2015).	Results	from	H.C.’s	first	
testing	session	revealed	that	she	was	able	to	accurately	identify	landmarks	and	estimate	
distance	and	direction	on	vector	mapping,	distance	judgments,	and	proximity	judgment	tasks,	
suggesting	that	over	many	years	she	formed	a	representation	of	her	home	environment	
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(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	This	representation,	however,	seemed	to	be	inflexible	and	lacking	in	
detail,	as	evidenced	by	her	impoverished	and	fragmented	sketch	maps,	difficulty	accurately	
placing	and	sequencing	landmarks	that	are	in	close	proximity	to	one	another,	and	failure	to	
provide	the	most	efficient	detour	on	a	blocked	route	task	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).		
While	the	current	study	cannot	speak	to	exactly	how	much	time	and	exposure	is	
required	for	an	individual	with	atypical	hippocampal	system	development	to	form	a	
representation	of	a	large-scale	environment,	it	will	provide	insight	into	whether	such	
representations	continue	to	improve	with	time.	This	study	may	also	provide	an	understanding	
of	why	H.C.’s	performance	was	largely	indistinguishable	from	that	of	controls	on	the	challenging	
mirrored	route	condition	of	the	Google	Street	View	paradigm	reported	in	Chapter	2,	which	was	
administered	6	years	after	she	was	first	tested	on	mental	navigation	tasks.	There	is	evidence	
that	H.C.	can	form	spatial	representations	of	environments	that	are	coarse	and	inflexible,	and	it	
is	likely	that	the	formation	of	these	representations	of	space	required	extensive	exposure	
and/or	time	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	As	such,	it	would	stand	to	reason	that	H.C.’s	
representation	of	her	home	environment	would	improve	over	the	course	of	6-8	years.		
If	improvement	is	seen,	we	can	examine	more	closely	what	types	of	information	about	
the	environment	change	over	time.	For	example,	with	additional	time	and	exposure	H.C.	could	
have	formed	a	more	flexible	representation	of	her	home	environment,	which	could	explain	the	
discrepancy	between	her	intact	Google	Street	View	performance	in	2016	and	the	incoherent	
sketch	maps	and	poor	performance	sequencing	landmarks	demonstrated	in	2010	(Rosenbaum	
et	al.,	2015).	Conversely,	one	might	predict	that	H.C.’s	representation	of	her	home	environment	
may	not	gain	flexibility	as	H.C.	subjectively	reported	using	a	non-mapping	strategy	during	
navigation	(see	Chapter	2).	It	is	also	possible	that	over	the	course	of	many	years,	H.C.’s	
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representation	of	space	has	come	to	include	more	detailed,	perceptual	information	that	may	or	
may	not	be	relevant	to	navigation.	If	this	is	the	case,	we	may	see	more	detail	in	her	sketch	
maps.	By	re-testing	H.C.	on	mental	navigation	tasks,	we	can	examine	whether	frequent	
navigation	over	8	years	benefits	spatial	memory	for	large-scale	environments	in	the	face	of	
hippocampal	compromise	and	gain	insight	into	the	nature	of	such	(if	any)	improvements.		
	 To	anticipate,	we	found	that	H.C.’s	performance	did	not	improve	on	any	of	the	mental	
navigation	tasks,	and	was	qualitatively	worse	on	the	blocked	route	task.	As	a	follow-up,	the	
possibility	that	a	retrieval	deficit	impeded	performance	was	explored	by	re-testing	H.C.	on	the	
landmark	localization	task	while	providing	maps	with	increasing	levels	of	support.			
Methods	
Participants			
H.C.	(previously	described)	was	30	years	old	when	she	participated	in	this	study,	which	
took	place	in	April	2018,	two	years	after	the	Google	Street	View	study	described	in	Chapter	2	of	
this	dissertation,	and	8	years	after	she	was	originally	tested	on	mental	navigation	tasks	
(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	She	received	her	driver’s	license	at	the	age	of	17.	Soon	after	she	was	
first	tested	on	the	mental	navigation	tasks	in	2010,	she	moved	to	an	apartment	in	the	
downtown	city	core.	Although	the	primary	impetus	for	this	study	was	to	examine	differences	
between	H.C.’s	current	and	past	performance	on	mental	navigation	tasks,	for	comparison	
purposes,	we	also	compared	H.C.’s	performance	to	the	previously	reported	results	from	the	6	
controls	that	were	tested	in	the	original	study	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015;	mean	age	=	26.5,	SD	=	
12.34;	mean	education	=	14,	SD	=	1.79).	This	study	was	approved	by	the	ethics	boards	at	York	
University	and	Baycrest	Hospital.	All	participants	provided	informed	written	consent	and	were	
provided	with	monetary	compensation	for	their	time.		
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Materials	and	Procedure		
H.C.	was	re-tested	on	a	set	of	mental	navigation	tasks	that	has	been	used	extensively	in	
previous	research	to	assess	spatial	memory	for	environments	learned	long	ago	(Herdman	et	al.,	
2015;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000).	H.C.	was	re-tested	on	tasks	based	on	
two	environments	that	are	each	approximately	6	km2	–	the	neighbourhood	that	she	grew	up	in	
and	resided	in	until	2010,	and	the	adjacent	downtown	city	core,	where	she	has	since	lived.	Due	
to	time	constraints,	H.C.	was	tested	on	a	subset	of	the	original	tasks.	She	was	re-tested	on	those	
tasks	on	which	she	previously	showed	a	deficit	in	order	to	address	the	question	about	
improvement	over	time.	Stimuli	were	kept	consistent	whenever	possible.	The	tasks	were	
completed	in	the	following	order:		
Sketch	mapping.	
		
H.C.	was	asked	to	draw	a	detailed	map	of	the	neighbourhood	that	she	grew	up	in	as	
accurately	as	possible,	including	as	many	of	the	landmarks	and	streets	as	she	could	think	of,	on	
an	8.5	x	11-inch	sheet	of	white	paper	that	was	marked	only	with	imperial	and	metric	scales.	
Prior	to	beginning,	she	was	directed	to	attend	to	the	scales	and	was	provided	with	the	names	of	
the	streets,	railway	tracks,	or	body	of	water	that	made	up	the	northern,	eastern,	southern,	and	
western	boundaries	of	the	environment.	This	process	was	repeated	for	the	downtown	city	core	
environment	that	is	adjacent	to	her	childhood	neighbourhood,	and	in	which	she	has	resided	for	
the	past	8	years.		
The	number	of	street	segments	and	landmarks	in	her	childhood	neighbourhood	and	her	
current	downtown	neighbourhood	were	calculated	based	off	a	modified	version	of	Blades	
(1990)	sketch	map	information	content	(as	used	in	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	Street	segments	
were	defined	as	segments	of	streets,	roads,	or	transit	passages	that	were	attached	on	at	least	
	 69	
one	end	to	a	landmark	or	neighbouring	street	segment,	and	could	be	named	or	unnamed.	
Landmarks	were	functionally	relevant	and/or	easily	identifiable	static	structures.	The	number	of	
landmarks	and	number	of	street	segments	were	summed	across	both	environments	to	create	a	
“Landmark	Total”	and	“Street	Segments	Total”	score,	which	were	then	summed	to	create	a	
“Details	Total”	score.	The	coherence	of	the	overall	configuration	of	each	map	was	also	noted.	
Landmark	localization.			
For	this	task,	H.C.	was	asked	to	mark	the	locations	of	ten	landmarks	within	her	childhood	
neighbourhood	as	accurately	as	possible	on	an	8.5	x	11-inch	sheet	of	white	paper	that	was	
marked	with	the	streets	that	made	up	the	boundaries	of	the	environment	and	both	imperial	and	
metric	scales.	This	process	was	repeated	for	the	downtown	city	score	environment.	The	same	
ten	landmarks	from	each	neighbourhood	were	used	at	Time	1	(2010)	and	Time	2	(2018).		
Landmark	localization	error	for	each	landmark	was	calculated	as	the	absolute	linear	
distance	in	kilometers	between	H.C.’s	response	and	the	actual	placement	of	the	landmark.	A	
mean	landmark	localization	error	was	calculated	by	averaging	the	error	from	each	trial.		
Landmark	sequencing.			
This	task	spanned	both	the	downtown	core	environment	and	H.C.’s	childhood	
neighbourhood.	Consistent	with	the	testing	that	occurred	6	years	ago,	H.C.	was	provided	with	
randomly	ordered	photographs	of	well-known	landmarks	from	both	environments.	In	
Rosenbaum	et	al.	(2015),	H.C.	was	tested	on	fifteen	landmarks.	In	the	current	study,	only	
thirteen	of	the	fifteen	photographs	could	be	re-used	as	one	location	no	longer	existed	
(Blockbuster)	and	another	(Mac’s	Convenience	Store)	had	been	relocated.	A	photograph	of	the	
new	Mac’s	Convenience	Store	location	was	used	instead.		As	such,	H.C.	was	provided	with	
fourteen	photographs	of	well-known	landmarks	and	asked	to	imagine	travelling	from	North	to	
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South	and	put	the	photographs	in	the	order	that	they	would	be	passed	travelling	along	this	
route.		
A	landmark	sequencing	accuracy	score	was	derived	by	calculating	the	total	number	of	
landmarks	that	were	correctly	sequenced	with	respect	to	at	least	one	adjacent	landmark	and	
dividing	this	number	by	14.		
Blocked	routes.			
Given	H.C.’s	ability	to	virtually	navigate	mirror-reversed	routes	(as	described	in	Chapter	
2),	whether	her	performance	would	improve	on	the	blocked	route	task,	another	task	that	
requires	flexible	navigation,	was	of	particular	interest.	Unfortunately,	many	of	the	blocked	
routes	used	in	the	previous	study	could	not	be	re-used	in	the	current	study	as	the	landmarks	no	
longer	existed	or	had	changed	location.	As	such,	only	two	blocked	routes	in	this	study	were	
consistent	with	those	used	at	Time	1.	We	also	examined	whether	H.C.	would	be	able	to	
complete	a	blocked	route	task	for	some	of	the	routes	that	she	navigated	in	Google	Street	View,	
with	the	hopes	that	this	might	shed	some	light	on	whether	the	immersive	nature	of	the	task	
may	impact	the	results.		She	was	also	asked	to	navigate	between	her	workplace	and	home,	
avoiding	a	detour,	as	well	as	between	her	current	home	and	her	childhood	home,	where	her	
parents	still	reside.		
Results		
	 H.C.’s	current	performance	on	the	navigation	tasks	(Time	2)	was	compared	to	her	
performance	when	last	tested	in	2010	(Time	1)	using	Crawford,	Garthwaite,	and	Wood’s	(2010)	
C_CTC.exe	program,	which	allows	one	to	test	the	difference	between	the	scores	of	two	single	
cases,	taking	into	account	the	standard	deviation	of	a	control	sample	(in	this	case,	the	6	controls	
who	participated	in	the	original	study	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015)).	While	this	test	fails	to	account	
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for	the	repeated	measurement	of	H.C.	on	each	task	(as	it	assumes	two	separate	cases),	it	seems	
to	be	the	best	single-case	statistical	test	to	address	the	question	at	hand.		
	 H.C.’s	current	performance	was	also	compared	to	the	6	controls’	performance	reported	
in	Rosenbaum	et	al.	(2015)	using	Crawford	and	Garthwaite’s	(2002)	modified	t-test	procedure.		
Sketch	Mapping			
H.C.’s	sketch	maps	of	her	childhood	environment	and	the	city	centre	are	found	in	Figures	
3.1	and	3.2,	respectively.	Identifying	landmark	and	street	names	have	been	replaced	for	
confidentiality	purposes.	For	comparison	purposes,	we	direct	the	reader	to	reproductions	of	the	
sketch	maps	that	H.C.	and	a	representative	control	drew	of	the	same	environments	when	tested	
in	2010	(Figures	1.1.	and	1.2;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	The	graph	in	Figure	3.3	illustrates	the	
number	of	landmarks,	street	segments,	and	total	details	that	H.C.	and	controls	included	in	both	
their	childhood	and	city	centre	sketch	maps	at	Time	1	and	that	H.C.	included	at	Time	2,	
regardless	of	whether	they	were	accurately	placed.	H.C.’s	current	sketch	maps	included	23	
landmarks	in	total,	compared	to	the	20	reported	previously	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015),	which	
does	not	represent	a	significant	difference	(t	=	-0.245,	p	=	.408).	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	
landmarks	that	were	included	differed	from	Time	1	to	Time	2.	For	example,	H.C.	failed	to	
include	her	childhood	home	on	the	map	at	Time	1	but	included	it	on	her	most	recent	test.	
Consistent	with	Time	1,	H.C.	included	significantly	fewer	landmarks	in	her	sketch	maps	
compared	to	controls	(µ	=	44.833,	SD	=	8.660;	t	=	-2.334,	p	=	.033).		
H.C.	drew	38	street	segments	on	her	sketch	maps	at	Time	2,	compared	to	34	at	Time	1,	
but	this	was	not	statistically	significant	(t	=	-0.080,	p	=	.470).	There	was	a	trend	towards	fewer	
street	segments	included	in	H.C.’s	sketch	maps	at	Time	2	compared	to	those	included	in	the	
sketch	maps	created	by	controls	at	Time	1	(µ	=	106.167,	SD	=	35.254;	t	=	-1.790,	p	=	.067).		
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The	total	number	of	details	contained	within	H.C.’s	sketch	maps	at	Time	2	(61)	did	not	
differ	significantly	from	those	at	Time	1	(54;	t	=	-0.140,	p	=	.447),	and	remained	significantly	
fewer	than	those	included	by	controls	(µ	=	151,	SD	=	32.254;	t	=	-2.364,	p	=	.032).		
H.C.	had	difficulty	scaling	streets	and	landmarks	within	her	sketch	maps,	a	problem	that	
was	also	seen	in	the	sketch	maps	of	control	participants	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	She	spent	
approximately	five	minutes	planning	out	her	drawing	before	beginning	the	sketch	map	of	her	
childhood	environment	(Figure	3.1),	often	using	her	hands	to	help	orient.	She	shared	that	she	
would	begin	by	putting	things	where	she	“knows	they	are”	and	seeing	if	she	“can	connect	them	
with	the	proper	street.”	While	she	labelled	the	sides	of	the	pages	with	the	boundaries	that	were	
described	to	her	prior	to	drawing,	she	did	not	actually	draw	the	lake,	intersection	on	the	
northern	border,	or	the	railroad	tracks.	Consistent	with	the	sketch	map	drawn	in	2010,	H.C.	
oriented	one	of	the	main	roads,	Lakeshore,	East	to	West,	when	in	fact	its	correct	orientation	is	
North	to	South	and	it	intersects	with	M-Drive.	Along	this	street,	she	added	in	some	street	
segments,	but	they	were	not	grounded	using	a	street	name	or	nearby	landmarks.		
Similar	to	the	sketch	map	drawn	at	Time	1	(Figure	1.1),	H.C.’s	sketch	map	of	her	
childhood	neighbourhood	lacked	cohesiveness.	While	she	drew	a	street	connecting	the	street	
bordering	the	bottom	(southern)	part	of	the	page	(M	Street)	to	the	street	on	which	her	parents’	
live	(G	Street),	this	street	was	not	labelled.	There	is	no	road	that	directly	connects	the	M	and	G	
streets,	providing	further	evidence	that	H.C.	may	have	difficulty	integrating	disparate	elements	
of	her	environment.	The	streets	placed	to	either	side	of	her	parents’	street	were	flipped,	such	
that	the	one	on	the	right	should	have	been	on	the	left	and	vice	versa.	H.C.	also	drew	her	
parents’	street	(G	Street)	as	connecting	to	Lakeshore	Drive,	which,	in	actuality,	run	parallel	to	
one	another.	H.C.	said	that	while	drawing	her	sketch	maps,	she	was	envisioning	the	area	as	if	
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she	were	immersed	in	it.	She	may	have	been	generating	her	sketch	map	based	on	what	she	
might	visualize	along	the	way,	but	she	had	difficulty	integrating	separate	areas.	This	is	
consistent	with	her	plan	to	place	landmarks	and	then	try	to	connect	them	with	a	street.	The	
paucity	of	detail	in	her	sketch	map	of	her	childhood	neighbourhood,	however,	limits	the	
conclusions	that	can	be	made	about	her	ability	to	integrate	elements.		
The	sketch	map	that	H.C.	drew	of	the	downtown	city	environment	(Figure	3.2)	included	
several	more	streets	compared	to	that	drawn	in	2010	(see	Figure	1.2),	but	several	of	those	
streets	were	not	anchored	to	another	street	segment	or	landmark,	and	therefore	did	not	fit	the	
definition	of	a	“street	segment”	as	defined	above	and	in	our	previous	study	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	
2015).	H.C.	included	Main	Street,	one	of	the	busiest	downtown	streets,	and	several	other	street	
segments	that	run	perpendicular	to	F	Street,	a	street	that	she	frequently	takes	when	navigating	
to	and	from	her	current	home.	Interestingly,	H.C.	did	not	connect	these	streets	to	F	Street,	but	
instead	left	these	streets	as	separate	lines	isolated	in	the	centre	of	the	page.	She	also	failed	to	
include	several	other	streets	that	intersect	with	F	Street.	On	a	map,	Third	Avenue	intersects	
with	F	Street	and	south	of	F	Street,	Third	Avenue	turns	into	the	street	on	which	H.C.	lives	(H	
Street).	H.C.	did	not	connect	Third	Street	to	F	Street	or	H	Street,	and	although	she	included	her	
house	as	a	landmark	on	the	map,	it	was	further	west	than	it	should	have	been	given	the	position	
of	Third	Street.	H.C.	also	included	an	unlabelled	street	connecting	the	northern	tip	of	Third	
Street	to	F	Street,	which	does	not	exist	on	an	actual	map.		
H.C.	accurately	positioned	the	Burger	World	and	mall	landmarks	relative	to	one	another,	
and	relative	to	F	Street	and	H	Street.	It	is	notable	that	H.C.	frequently	travels	a	route	between	
her	home	and	the	mall,	where	she	works.	The	mall	is	located	directly	off	a	major	highway,	which	
H.C.	included	on	the	top	right	of	her	map	but	failed	to	position	accurately	relative	to	the	mall.	
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She	also	included	some	street	segments	and	landmarks	(e.g.,	McDonald’s	and	Montana’s)	below	
the	highway	that	instead,	are	located	north	of	the	highway	and	therefore	placed	outside	of	the	
boundaries	requested	for	this	sketch	map.	H.C.	drew	a	street	segment	with	landmarks	labelled	
“liquor	store”	and	“grocery	store”	drawn	to	the	right	of	it,	when,	in	fact,	they	are	located	on	the	
same	road	as	the	McDonald’s	and	Montana’s	restaurants.		
H.C.	labelled	a	line	on	her	sketch	map	as	Lakeshore	Drive,	which	also	did	not	connect	to	
any	other	elements	in	the	sketch	map.	Lakeshore	Drive	is	part	of	her	childhood	neighbourhood,	
and,	in	fact,	turns	into	Main	Street	past	an	overpass	that	connects	the	two	environments.	
Curiously,	she	placed	this	line	parallel	to	Main	Street.	Like	the	map	she	drew	in	2010,	H.C.	
included	other	elements	from	her	home	neighbourhood	in	the	downtown	city	core	sketch	map.	
On	the	far	left	of	the	page,	it	is	evident	that	H.C.	drew	the	street	her	parents	live	on,	including	
their	house,	as	well	as	a	street	that	runs	between	her	parents’	street	and	Lakeshore	Drive.		
While	none	of	these	streets	belonged	on	the	sketch	map	of	the	city	centre,	it	is	interesting	to	
note	that	these	erroneous	elements	were	also	flipped,	such	that	her	parents’	street	was	
oriented	to	the	left	of	Lakeshore	Drive,	when	it	should	be	on	the	right.		
Consistent	with	the	sketch	maps	drawn	in	2010	(see	reproductions	from	Rosenbaum	et	
al.,	2015,	in	Figures	1.1	and	1.2),	H.C.’s	most	recent	sketch	maps	continued	to	show	a	paucity	of	
landmarks	and	street	segments	compared	to	controls,	and	also	lack	cohesiveness.	
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Figure	3.1.	H.C.’s	current	sketch	map	of	her	childhood	neighbourhood.		
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Figure	3.2.	H.C.’s	current	sketch	map	of	the	downtown	city	core,	where	she	currently	resides.		
	
	

	 77	
	
	
	Figure	3.3.	Number	of	landmarks,	street	segments	and	total	details	on	sketch	maps	drawn	by	
control	participants	in	2010,	H.C.	in	2010,	and	H.C.	in	2018.	Error	bars	represent	standard	error.		
	
Landmark	Localization		
When	provided	with	a	sheet	of	paper	containing	only	the	outline	of	streets	that	border	
her	childhood	neighbourhood,	H.C’s	ability	to	place	well-known	landmarks	accurately	on	that	
page	was	similar	to	that	demonstrated	in	2010	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	Her	mean	localization	
error	for	this	neighbourhood	on	current	testing	was	0.279	km,	which	does	not	differ	significantly	
from	her	mean	localization	error	calculated	in	2010	(0.370	km;	t		=	0.894,	p	=	.206;	see	Figure	
3.4).	Her	performance	compared	to	controls	(0.247	km	(SD	=	0.072	km))	showed	sufficient	
improvement	such	that	her	mean	localization	error	was	no	longer	representing	a	trend	towards	
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significance,	as	it	had	in	2010,	but	instead	did	not	differ	significantly	(t	=	0.411,	p	=	.349).	
Notably,	H.C.	seemed	to	place	most	of	the	landmarks	very	close	to	the	main	street	in	her	
childhood	neighbourhood,	which	may	relate	to	her	assertion	that	she	was	imagining	walking	
down	this	street	while	deciding	where	to	place	the	landmarks.	Given	this	disclosure,	it	is	
especially	interesting	that	she	seemed	to	have	difficulty	placing	the	landmarks	as	a	dot	on	the	
map	in	the	correct	sequence.	In	fact,	she	did	not	place	any	of	the	landmarks	in	the	correct	
sequential	relationship	(North-South)	to	at	least	one	neighbouring	landmark	on	the	childhood	
neighbourhood	map.		
When	asked	to	place	well-known	landmarks	accurately	on	a	sheet	of	paper	containing	
the	outline	of	streets	that	border	the	downtown	city	centre	neighbourhood,	H.C.’s	mean	
localization	error	(0.707km)	remained	significantly	impaired	compared	to	controls’	(0.273	km	
(SD	=	0.118	km);	t	=	3.405,	p	=	.010).	Her	mean	localization	error	for	the	downtown	
neighbourhood	on	current	testing	did	not	differ	significantly	from	her	mean	localization	error	
calculated	in	2010	(0.762	km;	t		=	0.330,	p	=	.378).	Her	total	mean	localization	error,	calculated	
by	combining	error	scores	from	her	childhood	environment	and	the	city	centre,	was	significantly	
impaired	compared	to	controls’	(0.260	km	(SD	=	0.086	km);	t	=	2.508,	p	=	.027),	and	did	not	
differ	significantly	from	her	score	at	Time	1	(0.566km;	t	=	0.600,	p	=	.287).	
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Figure	3.4.	Mean	localization	error	for	H.C.’s	childhood	environment	and	the	downtown	city	
centre,	where	she	currently	resides,	for	control	participants	in	2010,	H.C.	in	2010,	and	H.C.	in	
2018.	Error	bars	represent	standard	error.	
	
Landmark	Sequencing		
On	a	formal	task	assessing	landmark	sequencing	that	required	placing	photographs	of	
landmarks	in	the	correct	order,	the	results	indicated	a	trend	towards	worse	performance	from	
Time	1	(0.800)	to	Time	2	(0.643;	t	=	1.528,	p	=	.094;	Figure	3.5).	When	recently	tested,	H.C.	
accurately	sequenced	fewer	landmarks	to	at	least	one	adjacent	landmark	compared	to	controls	
(µ	=	0.933,	SD	=	0.073;	t	=	-3.678,	p	=	.014).	While	H.C.’s	performance	on	this	task	remained	
impaired,	it	is	notable	that	she	was	able	to	accurately	sequence	more	landmarks	when	asked	to	
place	photographs	of	landmarks	in	order,	compared	to	when	she	was	asked	to	place	a	dot	on	an	
outline	of	a	map	(described	above).		
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Figure	3.5.	Proportion	of	correctly	sequenced	landmarks	on	the	landmark	sequencing	task	for	
control	participants	in	2010,	H.C.	in	2010,	and	H.C.	in	2018.	Error	bar	represents	standard	error.	
	
Blocked	Routes		
As	previously	reported	in	Rosenbaum	et	al.	(2015),	H.C.’s	ability	to	describe	the	most	
efficient	detour	between	two	landmarks	when	the	most	direct	route	was	blocked	was	
significantly	impaired	compared	to	controls	(with	one	control	outlier	removed).	As	H.C.	could	
only	be	tested	on	two	of	the	original	five	routes,	it	was	not	prudent	to	compare	her	current	
performance	to	her	past	performance	or	controls’	performance	quantitatively.	Her	performance	
on	six	blocked	routes	is	described	qualitatively	below.		
Route	1.	
When	tested	in	2010	on	a	blocked	route	between	two	restaurants,	both	familiar	to	H.C.,	
she	was	able	to	provide	accurate	directions	but	did	not	take	the	most	efficient	route,	resulting	
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in	a	score	of	zero.	When	tested	on	the	same	route	for	this	current	study,	she	was	unable	to	
provide	accurate	directions.	She	did	not	use	street	names,	instead	giving	directions	such	as,	
“From	there	go	left	for	three	intersections.”	When	the	examiner	tried	to	follow	her	directions	
on	a	map,	it	became	apparent	that	H.C.’s	directions	were	not	fluid.	For	example,	she	described	
arriving	at	an	area	where	the	“road	turns,”	but	no	such	turn	could	be	found	anywhere	within	
the	area.	The	examiner	had	the	impression	that	H.C.	was	having	difficulty	keeping	in	mind	the	
area	that	she	just	described	and	was	navigating	from,	which	led	to	very	disjointed	directions.	As	
her	initial	directions	were	difficult	to	follow,	H.C.	was	asked	to	describe	the	route	again.	This	
time	she	successfully	described	arriving	at	an	overpass	that	was	part	of	a	longer	route	to	the	
destination,	but	she	did	not	continue,	ultimately	failing	to	reach	the	destination.		
Route	2.		
When	asked	in	2010	to	navigate	between	the	high	school	she	attended	and	a	pharmacy	
located	in	her	childhood	neighbourhood,	whilst	avoiding	a	main	street,	H.C.	was	able	to	reach	
the	destination,	but	unable	to	do	so	in	the	most	recent	testing	session.	At	one	point,	she	
instructed	that	one	would	take	a	right	at	a	retirement	residence	and	then	continue	“up	3	
intersections,”	where	the	pharmacy	could	be	found	on	the	right.	However,	the	road	does	not,	in	
fact,	continue	for	three	intersections	and	would	have	required	returning	to	the	blocked	street.	It	
is	interesting	to	note	that	the	pharmacy	was	located	north,	past	3	intersections,	had	she	turned	
on	the	blocked	street	instead	of	at	the	retirement	residence,	which	again	suggests	that	she	may	
have	had	difficulty	keeping	track	of	where	she	was	on	the	route.		
Route	3.		
On	another	blocked	route	trial,	H.C.	was	asked	to	navigate	a	very	familiar	route	from	her	
parents’	home	to	her	current	residence,	avoiding	a	main	street.	In	the	Google	Street	View	task	
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(Study	1),	she	was	able	to	navigate	a	portion	of	this	familiar	route	when	there	was	no	detour,	
even	though	the	route	was	mirrored.	When	attempting	this	blocked	route,	H.C.	stopped	herself	
midway	and	asked	to	start	over.	On	her	second	attempt,	she	was	able	to	provide	accurate	
directions	from	her	parents’	home	into	the	city	proper,	and	her	directions	were	accurate	until	
the	end	of	the	route.	After	giving	directions	to	“go	right”	at	a	“big	government	building	near	a	
parking	lot,”	she	said	to	“Cross	[street	that	was	hypothetically	blocked],”	which	would	have	
been	impossible	as	it	was	two	blocks	south	and	parallel	to	the	street	on	which	she	imagined	
herself.	It	seems	she	missed	heading	South	on	one	street,	which,	had	she	included	it,	would	
have	resulted	in	successful	navigation	of	the	blocked	route.		
Route	4.	
H.C.	was	able	to	successfully	navigate	a	route	from	the	cinema	in	her	childhood	
neighbourhood	to	her	parents’	house	on	the	Google	Street	View	task	(Study	1;	familiar	route)	
and	the	blocked	route	task,	where	she	was	required	to	avoid	a	main	street.	On	this	trial,	she	
took	the	second-most	efficient	route	given	that	the	most	direct	route	was	blocked.	When	
describing	this	route,	she	used	key	landmarks	to	signify	the	streets	to	turn	onto	(e.g.,	
Elementary	school,	Catholic	school,	Gas	Provider).	It	is	notable	that	H.C.	navigated	using	
landmarks	located	along	this	route,	whereas	in	the	routes	described	above	she	provided	
minimal	mention	of	landmarks	and	predominantly	described	how	many	intersections	to	cross	
before	turning.	It	may	be	that	using	landmarks	at	choice	points	was	a	more	useful	strategy	to	
keep	track	of	her	location	than	the	number	of	streets	passed	when	describing	the	route.		
Route	5.	
When	navigating	between	her	in-laws’	home	and	her	current	home	on	Google	Street	
View,	H.C.	was	able	to	successfully	reach	the	destination	(familiar	route).	By	contrast,	when	
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asked	to	navigate	between	the	two	landmarks	in	this	grid-like	environment,	avoiding	one	of	the	
streets	she	typically	takes,	H.C.	had	some	difficulty.	She	described	travelling	straight	down	a	
street	and	turning	left	at	City	Hall.	Notably,	had	H.C.	continued	straight,	she	could	have	taken	a	
more	direct	route	and	would	have	reached	a	main	street	that	intersects	with	the	street	on	
which	she	lives.	H.C.	described	arriving	at	a	set	of	lights	where	one	“can’t	turn	right”.	There	
were	no	intersections	on	the	street	with	streetlights.	Furthermore,	navigation	onto	her	own	
street	would	have	required	turning	onto	one	of	the	main	roads,	which	she	did	not	mention	
when	providing	directions.		
Route	6.	
Finally,	H.C.	was	asked	to	navigate	between	her	place	of	work	and	current	home,	
avoiding	a	major	street.	This	was	a	slightly	more	challenging	route,	as	the	most	direct	pathway	
usually	requires	only	one	turn,	whereas	the	most	direct	detour	would	require	five	turns.	On	her	
first	attempt,	H.C.	used	the	blocked	road.	When	asked	to	begin	again,	she	successfully	navigated	
part	of	the	route	but	seemed	to	repeat	a	portion	of	the	route	multiple	times.	The	first	time	she	
instructed	that	one	should	turn	right	at	a	particular	house,	and	then	seemingly	returned	to	this	
same	corner	in	her	mind,	directing	one	to	turn	right	at	the	elementary	school	(which	is	beside	
the	house).	She	gave	directions	that	led	away	from	this	street	but	said	at	one	point	that	it	“puts	
you	at	the	church	on	[home	street],”	which	suggests	that	she	again	had	returned	a	third	time	to	
the	same	street	(without	giving	directions	to	navigate	there).	When	navigating	from	the	church	
on	the	street	on	which	she	resides,	she	also	instructed	the	experimenter	to	go	left	“3	
intersections,”	whereas	one	would	only	need	to	go	past	two.		
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Discussion		
	 The	purpose	of	the	study	described	in	this	chapter	was	to	examine	whether	spatial	
representations	of	extensively	travelled	environments	can	improve	over	time	in	H.C.,	an	
individual	who	experienced	atypical	hippocampal	development.	Results	from	re-testing	on	
mental	navigation	tasks	suggest	that	H.C.’s	impoverished	and	incoherent	representation	of	her	
home	environment	has	not	changed	significantly	since	she	was	tested	8	years	ago.	Her	
performance	remains	impaired	on	the	sketch	mapping,	landmark	localization,	and	landmark	
sequencing	tasks,	and	her	performance	on	the	blocked	route	task	was	qualitatively	worse.		
No	Evidence	of	Substantially	Improved	Flexible,	Map-like	Representations	of	Space		
In	2016,	H.C.	was	able	to	successfully	navigate	very	familiar	and	less	familiar	routes	
within	her	home	environment	on	the	Google	Street	View	task,	as	well	as	the	more	challenging	
mirrored	routes	that	were	expected	to	require	flexible	navigation	(described	in	Chapter	2).	This	
raised	the	possibility	that	H.C.’s	representation	of	her	home	environment	became	more	
coherent	and	flexible	since	she	was	first	tested	on	mental	navigation	tasks	in	2010.		When	
initially	tested,	H.C.	was	able	to	represent	distances	and	directions	between	familiar	landmarks	
and	describe	accurate,	albeit	inefficient,	detours	on	a	blocked	route	task	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	
2015).	Her	fragmented	sketch	maps	and	inefficient	detours	suggested	a	coarse	representation	
of	her	home	environment	that	limited	flexible	navigation	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).		
Although	H.C.’s	intact	performance	on	the	mirrored	routes	(Chapter	2)	suggests	that	her	
representation	of	space	may	have	become	more	flexible	over	time,	results	from	re-
administration	of	the	mental	navigation	tasks	for	the	current	study	suggest	that	H.C.	continues	
to	lack	a	coherent	representation	of	her	home	environment,	which	one	would	expect	would	
limit	flexible	navigation.	For	example,	many	elements	of	her	sketch	maps	were	disjointed	and	
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incorrectly	oriented.	She	also	was	unable	to	provide	accurate	verbal	directions	on	five	of	the	six	
blocked	route	trials.	This	was	worse	than	expected	given	that	H.C.	was	able	to	provide	verbal	
directions	that	were	accurate,	although	inefficient,	on	the	same	task	when	tested	8	years	prior	
(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	It	was	not	possible	to	retest	H.C.	on	all	of	the	same	routes	used	in	the	
2010	test	session,	but	an	effort	was	made	to	achieve	a	similar	level	of	difficulty	in	both	versions.	
Nonetheless,	we	cannot	rule	out	the	possibility	that	her	decline	in	performance	reflects	trial	
difficulty.	While	H.C.’s	poor	performance	on	this	task	could	be	attributed	to	her	having	an	
incoherent	and	inflexible	representation	of	her	home	environment,	it	is	also	possible	that	the	
verbal	nature	of	the	task	could	have	impacted	her	performance,	as	she	had	to	keep	track	of	her	
position	along	the	route	in	her	mind’s	eye,	without	cues	from	an	external	source.	While	
impairment	on	the	blocked	route	task	may	appear	to	be	discordant	with	H.C.’s	intact	ability	to	
navigate	mirrored	routes,	it	is	possible	that	the	type	of	flexibility	required	to	successfully	
navigate	along	mirrored	routes	differs	from	that	required	to	navigate	a	blocked	route	(as	
proposed	in	Chapter	2).	It	is	unclear	whether	H.C.	would	have	fared	better	if	asked	to	navigate	a	
blocked	route	task	in	vivo	or	using	Google	Street	view.	Future	studies	examining	H.C.’s	
performance	on	a	dynamic,	virtual	reality,	blocked	route	task	would	provide	insight	into	
whether	H.C.’s	difficulty	on	the	blocked	route	task	is	due	to	an	inflexible	representation	of	space	
that	lacks	cohesion,	the	demands	on	working	memory,	or	a	mixture	of	the	two.		
	 H.C.’s	lack	of	improvement	on	the	mental	navigation	tasks	suggests	that	representations	
of	frequently	travelled	environments	do	not	become	more	coherent	or	flexible	in	an	individual	
with	an	atypical	hippocampal	system,	even	after	8	additional	years	of	time	and	frequent	
exposure.	This	contradicts	H.C.’s	personal	belief	that	her	ability	to	navigate	within	her	home	
environment	has	improved	over	time.	It	may	be	that	8	years	is	not	enough	time	to	observe	
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substantial	improvements.	It	seems	highly	unlikely,	however,	that	we	would	not	see	even	
incremental	improvement	over	nearly	a	decade	of	daily	exposure.	Perhaps	features	of	an	
environment	integral	for	navigation	are	more	easily	acquired,	but	since	H.C.	already	has	access	
to	a	coarse,	schematic	representation	of	her	home	environment	that	is	sufficient	for	navigation,	
it	is	possible	that	additional	spatial	information	that	enables	flexible	navigation	is	acquired	at	a	
slower	rate,	or	may	not	benefit	at	all	from	extended	exposure.		
Although	H.C.’s	performance	on	the	mental	navigation	tasks	administered	to	her	did	not	
improve,	it	is	still	possible	that	she	acquired	new	spatial	information.	For	example,	she	was	able	
to	learn	the	location	of	her	apartment	and,	later,	her	new	home	within	the	city	centre.	Also,	
there	is	anecdotal	evidence	from	actual	navigation	and	objective	evidence	from	Google	Street	
View	(Chapter	2)	that	she	can	travel	successfully	using	these	“new”	landmarks.	In	an	attempt	to	
keep	the	tests	as	consistent	as	possible,	these	new	landmarks	were	not	included	in	the	re-test	
of	the	landmark	localization	or	landmark	sequencing	tasks.	It	is	notable	that	H.C.	included	a	few	
of	these	new	landmarks	on	her	sketch	maps,	but	overall	her	sketch	maps	remained	
impoverished	and	did	not	change	substantially	in	quality	from	2010	to	2018.	Some	of	these	new	
landmarks	were	used	in	the	blocked	route	task,	and	H.C.	had	difficulty	navigating	with	these,	
although	her	difficulty	on	this	task	could	have	been	confounded	by	other	factors,	as	discussed	in	
greater	detail	below.		
It	may	be	that	the	coarse	representation	of	space	acquired	prior	to	2010	did	not	
improve,	as	it	was	sufficient	for	navigation,	but	that	schematic	information	about	areas	with	
which	H.C.	was	less	familiar	could	be	acquired	with	time.	Perhaps	it	does	not	take	much	time	or	
experience	to	learn	new	locations	and	basic	relations	between	them,	especially	when	they	can	
be	anchored	to	established	knowledge.	For	example,	H.C.	learned	the	location	of	her	new	home	
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by	considering	its	location	in	the	context	of	previously	learned	landmarks	and	by	repeatedly	
travelling	between	her	home	and	those	landmarks.	H.C.’s	difficulty	navigating	blocked	routes	
with	these	new	landmarks,	however,	suggests	that	flexible	use	of	these	places	may	not	be	
possible.	The	landmarks	that	H.C.	learned	during	the	past	8	years	were	also	likely	the	most	
meaningful,	as	she	lived	in	them.	The	speed	at	which	new	learning	would	occur,	if	at	all,	for	
landmarks	that	are	not	personally	meaningful	is	unclear.	Additional	time	and	experience	do	not	
seem	to	benefit	the	flexible	nature	of	a	representation	of	a	well-known	environment	in	H.C.	It	
appears,	however,	that	additional	landmarks	can	be	integrated	into	the	representation,	which	
might	still	be	viewed	as	schematic	and	sufficient	for	travelling	between	a	start	location	and	a	
goal,	albeit	in	an	inefficient	way.	
	It	is	possible	that	H.C.	navigates	and	learns	novel	routes	using	an	egocentric	framework,	
defining	landmark	locations	in	relation	to	body-centered	coordinates,	rather	than	to	other	
landmarks.	This	is	consistent	with	her	self-report	on	the	Navigation	Strategies	questionnaire,	
described	in	Chapter	2.	An	egocentric	framework	is	not	viewed	as	relying	on	the	hippocampus,	
but	instead	the	caudate	nucleus	(Bohbot,	Lerch,	Thorndycraft,	Iaria,	&	Zijdenbos,	2007;	Hartley	
et	al.,	2003;	Iaria,	Petrides,	Dagher,	Pike,	&	Bohbot,	2003;	Marchette,	Bakker,	&	Shelton,	2011).	
While	the	status	of	H.C.’s	caudate	nucleus	remains	to	be	determined,	it	is	possible	that	H.C.	has	
adopted	an	egocentric	strategy	over	an	allocentric	strategy.	Because	an	egocentric	framework	is	
less	conducive	for	flexible	navigation	than	an	allocentric	framework,	H.C.’s	ability	to	form	a	
cognitive	map	and	flexibly	navigate	environments	may	be	limited.		
No	Evidence	of	Improved	Detailed	Representations	of	Space		
	 Perhaps	less	surprising,	H.C.’s	sketch	map	remained	impoverished	and	she	continued	to	
have	difficulty	accurately	sequencing	more	than	two	landmarks	that	were	close	in	proximity	to	
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one	another,	which	suggests	that	she	did	not	form	a	more	detailed	representation	of	her	home	
environment,	even	after	an	additional	8	years	of	navigational	experience.	This	is	consistent	with	
findings	that	adult-onset	hippocampal	amnesic	patients	have	impoverished	detailed	
representations	of	well-known	environments	that	lack	richness	of	detail	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	
2000;	Herdman	et	al.,	2015),	and	supports	the	Trace	Transformation	Theory,	which	posits	that	
the	fine,	detailed,	perceptual	information	about	an	environment	will	always	rely	on	the	
hippocampus	(Rosenbaum,	Winocur	&	Moscovitch,	2001;	Winocur	&	Moscovitch,	2011).	It	may	
be	that	fine-grained	detailed	features	of	an	environment	do	not	benefit	from	extended	time	and	
exposure	in	the	same	way	that	coarse	spatial	features	do,	as	they	are	not	as	pertinent	to	
navigation.			
When	completing	the	landmark	localization	task	and	landmark	sequencing	tasks,	H.C.	
shared	that	she	tried	to	envision	the	landmark	and	imagine	what	was	surrounding	it,	rather	than	
evoke	a	picture	of	a	map	of	the	environment	in	her	mind.	H.C.	reports	such	a	strategy	yet	she	
continues	to	have	difficulty	sequencing	landmarks.	This	raises	the	possibility	that	H.C.’s	ability	to	
richly	envision	a	route	and	think	about	additional	context,	possibly	beyond	the	two	landmarks	
that	are	being	compared,	is	somewhat	impaired.	She	may	believe	that	she	is	envisioning	the	
route	while	sequencing	landmarks	but	she	may	have	access	to	a	less	rich	representation	of	
space	compared	to	controls,	which	affects	her	ability	to	sequence	the	landmarks.	Interestingly,	
on	a	question	on	the	Navigation	Strategies	questionnaire	(Study	1)	that	asked	about	her	ability	
to	picture	buildings	along	a	familiar	street,	H.C.	said	she	could	picture	the	buildings	“somewhat	
clearly”.	It	is	possible	that	H.C.	may	not	have	a	detailed	representation	of	space	from	which	to	
draw	information.	The	mental	navigation	tasks	described	in	this	study	require	the	ability	to	
conjure	up	a	coherent	spatial	representation	in	imagery.	On	the	other	hand,	the	immersive	
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nature	of	the	virtual	reality	Google	Street	View	paradigm	eliminates	the	demand	to	retrieve	or	
construct	a	detailed	representation	of	space,	and	instead	relies	on	recognizing	landmarks	or	
spatial	features	to	navigate.	The	provision	of	this	detail	may	have	helped	H.C.	to	navigate	
flexibly	on	the	mirror-reversed	routes	described	in	Chapter	2.	Chapter	4	further	examines	
whether	H.C.	can	conjure	up	a	rich,	detailed	representation	of	her	home	environment	that	
allows	for	a	sense	of	re-experiencing.	It	is	also	possible	that	there	are	other	factors	contributing	
to	the	lack	of	detail	on	H.C.’s	sketch	maps	and	her	difficulty	sequencing	and	localizing	landmarks	
that	are	in	close	proximity	to	one	another.		
Additional	Factors	that	May	Affect	Performance	on	Mental	Navigation	Tasks		
Strategic	retrieval.	
Re-administration	of	the	mental	navigation	tasks	revealed	that	H.C.	likely	has	an	
incoherent	representation	of	her	home	environment	that	is	lacking	in	detail.	She	continued	to	
draw	impoverished	sketch	maps	and	have	difficulty	on	navigation	tasks	that	require	fine-grained	
discrimination	between	landmarks.	H.C.	may	not	have	a	detailed	representation	of	space	from	
which	to	draw.	It	is	also	possible	that	H.C.	has	maintained	in	memory	a	representation	of	
detailed	information	about	environments,	but	a	retrieval	deficit	makes	it	difficult	for	her	to	
construct	or	conjure	up	such	representations.	Intensive	cueing	may	be	required	to	retrieve	a	
rich,	detailed	representation	of	her	home	environment.	Such	visual	cues	were	available	to	H.C.	
in	the	Google	Street	View	task,	described	in	Chapter	2,	and	may	explain	her	intact	performance	
flexibly	navigating	routes	in	the	mirrored	route	condition.		Similarly,	in	the	current	study,	H.C.	
qualitatively	performed	better	(although	her	performance	was	still	significantly	worse	than	
controls)	on	the	landmark	sequencing	task,	where	pictures	of	landmarks	were	provided	and	
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might	have	assisted	her	imagery,	compared	to	the	landmark	localization	task,	where	landmark	
locations	that	needed	to	be	placed	on	the	map	were	cued	only	verbally.		
Perhaps	H.C.	also	benefits	from	cues	that	are	not	as	perceptually	rich	as	those	seen	in	
the	Google	Street	View	paradigm	or	the	pictures	of	landmarks	in	the	landmark	sequencing	task.		
To	further	test	the	possibility	that	a	retrieval	deficit	impeded	performance,	H.C.	was	re-tested	
on	the	landmark	localization	task	for	her	childhood	neighbourhood	and	retrieval	demands	were	
reduced	by	providing	maps	with	increasing	levels	of	support.	In	approximately	one-hour	
intervals,	H.C.	was	given	maps	that	provided	increasing	support	and	instructed	to	place	the	
landmarks	without	regard	to	where	she	placed	them	on	previous	trials.	The	first	map	had	
boundaries	of	the	environment	marked	on	the	map,	and	she	was	required	to	place	dots	on	the	
page	indicating	the	locations	of	10	specified,	well-known	landmarks.	The	second	map	was	
identical	to	the	first,	except	that	the	map	had	three	of	the	ten	landmarks	pre-marked	on	the	
page.	The	third	map	offered	the	most	support,	with	all	of	the	streets	within	the	boundaries	
clearly	marked.	With	increasing	support,	H.C.	was	able	to	improve	her	mean	localization	error	
score	(absolute	deviation	in	distance	from	the	marked	landmark	to	the	actual	location)	from	
0.364	km	to	0.265	km	to	0.213	km.	Based	on	these	results,	it	would	seem	that	a	retrieval	deficit	
could,	in	part,	explain	H.C.’s	impoverished	sketch	maps	and	difficulty	on	the	landmark	
localization	task.		
When	the	placement	of	the	dots	(representing	landmarks)	relative	to	other	placed	
landmarks	was	examined	on	these	maps,	we	found	variable	performance	in	terms	of	landmark	
sequencing	(see	Table	A.1	in	the	appendix).	On	the	first	map,	which	consisted	only	of	the	
boundary	streets,	H.C.	placed	five	of	ten	landmarks	in	the	correct	sequential	relationship	
relative	to	at	least	one	neighbouring	landmark.	When	she	was	provided	with	increased	support	
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in	the	form	of	three	of	the	ten	landmarks	pre-marked	on	the	map,	she	was	able	to	correctly	
sequence	only	two	landmarks,	which	suggests	that	there	may	have	been	some	interference.	
Finally,	provided	with	a	map	that	included	all	of	the	streets	within	the	boundaries,	H.C.	was	able	
to	correctly	sequence	six	of	ten	landmarks.	The	variability	in	the	accuracy	with	which	H.C.	placed	
landmarks	on	the	three	maps	with	increasing	support	suggests	that	a	retrieval	deficit	does	not	
fully	explain	H.C.’s	difficulty	accurately	sequencing	landmarks.			
Relational	memory.		
In	both	2010	and	2018,	H.C.	had	difficulty	on	those	mental	navigation	tasks	that	involved	
4+	landmarks,	even	when	she	did	not	have	to	hold	information	in	mind	but	instead	could	refer	
to	it	visually.	For	example,	when	placing	well-known	landmarks	in	the	landmark	localization	
task,	H.C.	did	not	have	to	keep	the	locations	of	all	landmarks	in	mind	and,	instead,	could	visually	
refer	to	landmarks	that	were	previously	placed	(whether	correctly	or	incorrectly).	While	her	
deficient	performance	in	this	regard	could	be	due	to	increased	susceptibility	to	interference,	it	
could	alternatively	be	due	to	a	deficit	in	relational	memory,	or	perhaps	a	combination	of	the	
two.	H.C.	seems	to	have	difficulty	representing	and	integrating	individual	spatial	elements	in	
relation	to	other	elements.	This	possibility	was	suggested	by	Rosenbaum	and	colleagues	(2015)	
to	explain	H.C.’s	poor	performance	on	the	landmark	sequencing	task	that	approached	
significant	impairment	in	2010	and	upon	noticing	the	existence	of	“swap	errors,”	where	she	
would	reverse	the	relative	positions	of	landmarks	along	a	route.	We	see	a	similar	pattern	when	
we	more	closely	examine	her	most	recent	performance	on	the	landmark	sequencing	task,	
where	she	correctly	sequenced	9	of	14	landmarks	relative	to	at	least	1	adjacent	landmark.	Of	
the	5	landmarks	that	were	incorrectly	sequenced,	3	were	swap	errors	between	landmarks	that	
were	relatively	close	in	distance.	This	pattern	is	also	found	when	we	look	at	the	relative	
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placement	of	landmarks	on	a	map	of	H.C.’s	childhood	environment	during	the	landmark	
localization	task.	While	H.C.’s	deviation	in	absolute	distance	did	not	differ	significantly	
compared	to	that	of	controls,	she	placed	landmarks	on	the	map	such	that	none	of	the	
landmarks	were	correctly	sequenced	relative	to	a	neighbouring	landmark.	On	this	task,	H.C.	
incorrectly	swapped	two	pairs	of	landmarks.	Further	evidence	of	this	comes	from	the	follow-up	
landmark	localization	tasks,	on	which	H.C.	placed	landmarks	on	maps	with	increasing	visual	aids.	
While	these	swap	errors	occurred	consistently,	even	with	the	provision	of	additional	cues	as	an	
aid	to	place	the	landmarks,	swap	errors	do	not	account	for	every	incorrectly	placed	landmark.		
The	frequency	and	persistence	of	swap	errors	in	H.C.	is	reminiscent	of	that	seen	in	adult-
onset	hippocampal	amnesic	cases.	Swap	errors	on	an	object	array	were	found	to	occur	40	times	
more	often	in	adult-onset	hippocampal	amnesic	patients	compared	to	healthy	controls,	and	
multiple	swap	errors	within	a	single	trial	were	common	in	amnesic	patients	(Watson,	Voss,	
Warren,	Tranel,	&	Cohen,	2013).	Watson	and	colleagues	found	that	swap	errors	contributed	to	
the	localization	error,	as	the	absolute	distance	between	the	object’s	position	at	study	versus	the	
position	as	placed	by	the	participant	was	significantly	reduced	when	swap	errors	were	removed	
from	the	analysis.	This	raises	the	possibility	that	the	swap	errors	seen	on	H.C.’s	maps	could	have	
inflated	her	localization	error	score.	Watson	and	colleagues	(2013)	also	consistently	found	swap	
errors	on	trials	involving	only	a	single	pair	of	objects.	On	mental	navigation	tasks,	H.C.	seems	to	
exhibit	swap	errors	on	tasks	that	involve	the	sequencing	or	placement	of	multiple	landmarks,	
such	as	the	landmark	sequencing	task	or	the	landmark	localization	task.	The	paucity	of	details	
on	H.C.’s	sketch	map	make	it	difficult	to	identify	swap	errors,	but	there	was	evidence	that	she	
swapped	the	streets	on	either	side	of	her	parents’	street.	On	mental	navigation	tasks	that	
involved	3	or	fewer	landmarks,	however,	H.C.’s	performance	was	intact	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	
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2015).	Swap	errors	would	have	been	impossible	with	the	vector	mapping	task,	as	participants	
were	given	the	location	of	a	landmark	on	a	map	and	asked	to	draw	a	vector	representing	
distance	and	direction	to	a	named	landmark.	Nevertheless,	it	is	curious	that	H.C.	was	able	to	
select	which	of	two	landmarks	was	closet	to	a	third	reference	landmark	(proximity	judgment	
task)	as	well	as	control	participants,	as	such	a	task	could	be	influenced	by	swap	errors.		
The	evidence	of	swap	errors	provided	in	the	current	study	is	compatible	with	the	
proposition	that	the	hippocampal	system	is	required	for	relational	processing	(Eichenbaum	et	
al.,	2016;	Eichenbaum	&	Cohen,	2001;	Watson	et	al.,	2013).	Individuals	with	hippocampal	
amnesia	have	been	found	to	show	deficits	in	memory	for	spatial,	temporal,	and	associative	
relations	among	items	(see	Konkel	&	Cohen,	2009,	for	a	review).		
There	is	also	evidence	of	relational	binding	deficits	outside	of	the	spatial	realm	in	
developmental	amnesic	H.C.	Olsen	and	colleagues	(2015)	tested	H.C.’s	ability	to	recognize	faces	
studied	from	variable	viewpoints.	They	found	that	H.C.	was	able	to	recognize	faces	she	encoded	
from	a	fixed	viewpoint,	but	significantly	impaired	compared	to	controls	on	recognizing	faces	
studied	from	variable	viewpoints,	which	led	them	to	suggest	that	H.C.	did	not	have	access	to	
flexible	relational	representations.	This	may	parallel	H.C.’s	inflexible	representation	of	her	home	
environment.	A	deficit	in	relational	processing	would	explain	the	incoherence	seen	in	H.C.’s	
sketch	maps	and	demonstrated	during	the	blocked	route	task.		
Susceptibility	to	distraction	&	interference.		
That	H.C.	correctly	placed	only	two	landmarks	on	a	map	in	the	correct	sequence	when	
provided	with	additional	support	on	the	landmark	localization	task	raises	the	possibility	that	
additional	stimuli	might	actually	interfere	with	H.C.’s	ability	to	accurately	represent	spatial	
information.	When	provided	with	a	map	that	included	all	of	the	streets	within	a	specified	
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boundary,	H.C.	improved	and	was	able	to	correctly	place	six	of	ten	landmarks	in	the	correct	
sequence	relative	to	at	least	one	neighbouring	landmark.	Unfortunately,	we	do	not	have	a	
control	group	for	the	follow-up	test	that	examined	the	benefits	of	additional	support	but	one	
might	speculate	that	accurately	sequencing	60%	of	the	landmarks	would	be	significantly	worse	
than	controls,	who	accurately	sequenced	93%	of	the	landmarks	on	the	actual	landmark	
sequencing	task	described	above	that	involved	sequencing	pictures	of	landmarks.		
The	mental	navigation	tasks	on	which	H.C.	performed	poorly	when	first	tested	(2010),	
and	again	when	tested	more	recently	(2018),	required	placement	or	sequencing	of	4	or	more	
landmarks.	Those	mental	navigation	tasks	on	which	H.C.	was	reported	to	show	intact	
performance	at	Time	1	required	manipulation	or	placement	of	3	or	fewer	landmarks	
(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	For	example,	the	vector	mapping	task	required	her	to	draw	a	line	
representing	the	relative	distance	and	direction	between	a	marked	landmark	and	a	second,	
unmarked	landmark.	On	the	proximity	judgment	task,	she	had	to	identify	which	of	two	
landmarks	was	closest	in	distance	to	a	third	landmark.	The	distance	judgment	task	required	an	
estimation	of	absolute	distance	between	just	two	landmarks.	This	suggests	that	H.C.’s	
performance	may	decline	when	an	increasing	number	of	landmarks	or	spatial	features	must	be	
considered.		
Of	note,	both	H.C.	and	her	husband	reported	that	H.C.	rarely	gets	lost	in	her	home	
environment,	unless	she	is	distracted.	Her	husband	provided	an	example	of	H.C.	travelling	to	
one	location,	but	upon	mention	of	another	location	during	the	course	of	a	conversation,	she	
began	driving	to	the	second	location.	He	also	mentioned	that	she	forgets	where	she	was	going	if	
she	gets	absorbed	in	music	while	driving.	Distraction	or	interference	may	make	it	more	difficult	
to	represent	and	integrate	elements	or	maintain	a	route	in	working	memory.	This	may	be	
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especially	true	for	H.C.,	who	has	an	anterograde	memory	deficit;	as	information	may	not	be	
transferring	from	working	memory	to	long-term	memory,	it	would	be	harder	for	her	to	recover	
from	even	a	minor	distraction.	This	should	not	come	as	a	surprise	as	the	fact	that	hippocampal	
lesions	increase	susceptibility	to	interference	is	well	established	in	the	animal	literature	
(Douglas,	1967;	Kimble,	1968;	Winocur	&	Mills,	1969).	As	described	in	the	next	section,	this	is	
also	in	line	with	findings	that	H.C.	was	impaired	on	complex	working	memory	tasks	that	
included	a	distractor	task,	where	attention	was	shifted	away	from	the	items	to	be	remembered	
(Rose,	Olsen,	Craik,	&	Rosenbaum,	2012).		
Working	memory.	
H.C.’s	performance	on	mental	navigation	tasks	seems	to	decline	when	an	increasing	
number	of	landmarks	or	spatial	features	must	be	considered.	This	may	be	explained	by	an	
increased	susceptibility	to	distraction	and	interference.	Alternatively,	H.C.’s	poor	performance	
could	be	explained	by	a	deficit	in	a	related	construct,	working	memory,	which	involves	
maintaining	and	manipulating	information	in	mind.	It	may	be	that	maintaining	4	or	more	
landmarks	or	spatial	elements	in	mind	may	place	too	great	a	demand	on	H.C.’s	working	
memory.	H.C.’s	difficulty	with	online	processing	of	individual	landmarks	in	relation	to	one	
another	and	recent	performance	on	the	blocked	route	task	raised	flags	that	she	may	have	a	
working	memory	deficit.	On	most	blocked	routes,	she	had	difficulty	providing	a	fluid	and	
accurate	verbal	description	to	the	goal	location,	and	she	seemed	to	jump	to	particular	parts	of	
the	route	unexpectedly.	She	performed	marginally	better	when	her	directions	included	notable	
landmarks	rather	than	streets,	which	may	speak	to	the	use	of	a	route-based	navigation	strategy	
rather	than	the	use	of	a	flexible	cognitive	map.	These	landmarks	also	may	have	made	it	easier	
for	H.C.	to	keep	track	of	her	position	along	a	route.		
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In	the	current	study,	H.C.	was	asked	to	provide	detours	for	routes	that	were	also	used	in	
the	Google	Street	View	task	(Chapter	2).		She	was	able	to	successfully	navigate	all	routes	on	the	
Google	Street	View	task,	even	when	the	route	was	mirrored,	yet	she	was	able	to	successfully	
navigate	to	only	one	goal	destination	on	the	blocked	route	task.	It	may	be	that	solving	a	blocked	
route	task	is	more	challenging	than	navigating	a	mirrored	route,	as	a	mirrored	route	may	be	
successfully	navigated	using	a	hippocampal-independent	strategy	(e.g.,	egocentric	strategy).	It	is	
also	possible,	however,	that	the	visual	aids	provided	during	dynamic	virtual	navigation	place	
fewer	demands	on	working	memory	compared	to	a	blocked	route	task	requiring	the	generation	
of	a	mental	representation	of	space	and	verbal	output.		
Interest	in	the	role	of	the	medial	temporal	lobes	in	working	memory	has	grown	in	the	
past	few	decades.		Visual	working	memory	deficits	for	faces,	scenes,	and	abstract	shapes	and	
patterns	(Holdstock,	Shaw,	&	Aggleton,	1995;	Olson,	Moore,	Stark,	&	Chatterjee,	2006;	Owen,	
Sahakian,	Semple,	Polkey,	&	Robbins,	1995)	and	on	complex	tasks	where	elements	must	be	
bound	together	(Ezzyat	&	Olsen,	2008;	Hannula,	Tranel,	&	Cohen,	2006)	have	been	documented	
in	several	cases	and	groups	of	adult-onset	amnesic	cases	with	medial	temporal	damage.	
The	possibility	of	working	memory	impairment	in	H.C.	was	unexpected	as	H.C.	showed	
no	evidence	of	a	working	memory	deficit	on	neuropsychological	testing	(see	Table	2.1).	For	
example,	her	performance	on	the	Digit	Span	was	in	the	low	average	to	average	range.		Perhaps	
there	is	a	discrepancy	because	visual	working	memory	tasks	are	more	difficult	than	verbal	
working	memory	tasks,	as	there	are	fewer	techniques	that	enable	rehearsal	(Ezzyat	&	Olson,	
2008).	Rose	and	colleagues	(2012)	tested	H.C.	on	a	delayed	match-to-sample	task	for	novel	and	
familiar	faces	and	words.	They	found	that	she	was	able	to	maintain	familiar	faces	and	words	in	
mind	for	1-8	seconds,	but	showed	significantly	impaired	performance	for	novel	faces,	low-
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frequency	words	and	non-words	compared	to	controls.	The	authors	took	this	as	evidence	that	
working	memory	for	familiar	stimuli	can	exist	independent	of	the	medial	temporal	lobe,	but	that	
the	hippocampus	is	required	for	maintaining	a	novel	stimulus	in	working	memory.	Rose	and	
colleagues	(2012)	suggest	that	the	demands	to	learn	new	relations	among	features	are	reduced	
when	associations	and	representations	already	exist	in	semantic	memory.		Congruent	results	
were	found	in	neuroimaging	studies,	where	the	medial	temporal	lobe	regions	were	found	to	be	
more	active	when	maintaining	novel	information	in	working	memory	than	familiar	information	
(Ranganath	&	D’Esposito,	2001;	Stern,	Sherman,	Kirchhoff,	&	Hasselmo,	2001).		These	results	
are	discordant	with	the	working	memory	difficulties	seen	on	our	tasks,	which	involve	familiar	
stimuli.	Perhaps	task	complexity	plays	a	role;	maintaining	a	famous	face	or	word	in	mind	is	less	
challenging	than	maintaining	elements	from	a	complex	visual	representation	of	space.	Yonelinas	
(2013)	suggests	that	tests	of	working	memory	involve	the	hippocampus	when	items	are	
complex	or	require	fine	discrimination.	This	may	be	why	H.C.’s	performance	was	intact	on	
simple	working	memory	tasks,	such	as	the	Digit	Span.	It	is	unclear	whether	H.C.’s	difficulty	on	
the	mental	navigation	tasks	is	best	explained	by	a	strategic	retrieval	impairment,	relational	
memory	deficit,	susceptibility	to	distraction,	working	memory	deficit,	or	a	combination	of	the	
above.		
Limitations		
One	limitation	of	this	study	is	that	we	did	not	have	the	opportunity	to	test	H.C.	on	those	
mental	navigation	tasks	that	she	had	performed	well	on	when	first	tested	in	2010.	We	might	
have	seen	that	her	performance	on	these	tasks	improved	beyond	her	intact	ability	in	2010	and	
results	could	perhaps	speak	to	whether	certain	types	of	spatial	information	within	an	
environment	are	more	easily	or	efficiently	learned.	Similar	to	vector	mapping,	proximity	
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judgment,	and	distance	judgment	tasks,	the	landmark	localization	and	sketch	mapping	tasks	
assess	one’s	ability	to	estimate	distance	and	direction	between	landmarks.	As	such,	it	is	
conceivable	that	H.C.’s	performance	upon	further	testing	on	those	tasks	on	which	she	was	
previously	intact	may	have	also	remained	consistent	with	her	performance	when	tested	the	first	
time.		
	 Another	limitation	of	this	study	was	that	H.C.’s	most	recent	scores	on	the	mental	
navigation	tasks	were	compared	to	the	same	controls	who	were	tested	in	2010.		H.C.’s	home	
environment	is	located	in	a	remote	part	of	Ontario,	making	it	difficult	to	recruit	individuals	who	
are	familiar	with	the	environment.	Therefore,	the	controls	recruited	for	the	original	study	varied	
in	age,	ranging	from	16	to	50.	As	H.C.	was	30	years	old	when	re-tested	on	the	mental	navigation	
tasks,	her	age	did	not	differ	significantly	from	that	of	the	controls	(t	=	0.263,	p	=	.803),	although	
it	is	important	to	be	mindful	that	she	was	compared	to	a	group	with	high	variability	in	age.			
We	are	unable	to	speak	to	how	long	it	might	take	to	form	a	representation	of	a	familiar	
environment	in	an	individual	with	an	abnormal	hippocampal	system,	as	we	did	not	attempt	to	
have	H.C.	learn	a	new	environment	in	this	study.	Nevertheless,	it	is	clear	that	flexible	and	
detailed	representations	of	frequently	travelled	environments	do	not	appear	to	emerge	over	an	
8-year	period	of	time	in	an	individual	with	a	compromised	hippocampal	system.	In	the	future,	
H.C.	could	be	formally	tested	on	her	knowledge	of	“new”	spatial	locations,	learned	since	she	
was	first	tested	in	2010,	using	mental	navigation	tasks	to	determine	whether	coarse	information	
of	such	areas	have	formed.	Better	yet,	she	could	be	followed	over	an	extended	period	of	time	to	
see	how	long	it	would	take	for	her	to	form	a	representation	of	new	landmarks	or	areas	within	
her	current	environment,	though	it	may	be	difficult	to	implement	from	a	logistical	standpoint	
(for	a	similar	attempt,	see	Gardiner	et	al.,	2008).	
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Summary		
Building	on	results	from	the	Google	Street	View	study	(Chapter	2),	which	showed	that	
H.C.’s	ability	to	navigate	was	intact	and	flexible	when	significant	visual	cues	and	an	immersive	
environment	were	provided,	the	current	study	aimed	to	examine	whether	H.C.’s	mental	
representation	of	that	same	environment	improved	and	gained	similar	flexibility	over	the	8	
years	that	elapsed	since	she	was	first	tested	on	mental	navigation	tasks.	Results	from	sketch	
mapping,	landmark	localization,	landmark	sequencing,	and	blocked	route	tasks	suggest	that	
H.C.’s	representation	continues	to	lack	flexibility	and	remains	impoverished	in	detail	and	
coherence.	To	reconcile	the	discrepancy	between	results	from	the	Google	Street	View	paradigm	
and	the	re-testing	of	mental	navigation	tasks,	other	factors	that	could	affect	H.C.’s	performance	
on	the	mental	navigation	tasks	were	considered.		
H.C.’s	impoverished	representation	of	space	is	consistent	with	studies	of	adult-onset	
amnesic	cases	(Herdman	et	al.,	2015)	and	could	suggest	that	she	lacks	a	detailed,	perceptually	
rich	representation	of	the	environment	in	which	she	has	lived	her	entire	life.	Alternatively,	the	
lack	of	detail	found	in	H.C.’s	sketch	maps	and	her	difficulty	sequencing	landmarks	that	are	close	
in	space	to	one	another	could	reflect	a	retrieval	deficit.	Further	examination	of	the	integrity	of	
H.C.’s	detailed	representation	of	space	is	required.		
H.C.’s	poor	performance	on	the	sketch	mapping,	blocked	route,	landmark	localization,	
and	landmark	sequencing	tasks	could	indicate	that	H.C.	has	only	a	coarse,	inflexible	
representation	of	her	home	environment	in	which	spatial	elements	are	not	fully	integrated.	Her	
performance	on	the	tasks	hinted	towards	the	possibility	of	additional	deficits	with	working	
memory	and	relational	memory,	which	also	could	have	contributed	to	her	impaired	
performance	on	these	mental	navigation	tasks.	It	may	be	that	an	immersive	virtual	reality	
	 100	
paradigm,	such	as	that	used	in	our	Google	Street	View	Study,	provides	additional	cues	or	
structure	that	aid	in	flexible	navigation,	or	that	it	reduces	the	working	memory	demands	as	the	
environment	is	provided	rather	than	conjured	up	by	the	participant.	As	proposed	in	the	
discussion	in	Chapter	2,	it	may	be	that	mental	navigation	tasks	are	more	sensitive	to	deficits	in	
spatial	memory	than	dynamic	virtual	reality	tools.	Results	from	this	raise	the	possibility	that	the	
spatial	deficits	seen	using	mental	navigation	tasks	could	be	better	explained	by	broader	deficits	
in	working	memory	or	relational	memory,	or	perhaps	H.C.’s	difficulties	on	these	tasks	are	due	to	
a	combination	of	these	factors.	Further	examination	of	H.C.’s	ability	to	bind	objects	and	
locations	on	a	smaller	scale	than	the	environment	is	warranted,	as	is	a	more	thorough	
investigation	into	her	working	memory.		
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CHAPTER	4	
Study	3:	Route	description	in	developmental	amnesia	
	
When	thinking	of	dissociations	within	spatial	memory,	researchers	often	focus	on	
allocentric	versus	egocentric	distinctions.	Research	in	amnesic	individuals	with	damage	to	the	
hippocampus	points	to	another	dichotomy:	coarse	or	gist-like	versus	detailed	representations	of	
environments.	Suggestion	that	the	hippocampus	may	play	an	important	role	in	maintaining	or	
retrieving	detailed	representations	of	space	is	gleaned	from	several	studies,	beginning	with	an	
investigation	of	remote	spatial	memory	in	amnesic	case	K.C.,	a	man	with	bilateral	medial	
temporal	lobe	lesions	incurred	as	an	adult	due	to	a	motor	vehicle	accident	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	
2000).	Adult-onset	amnesic	case	K.C.	was	able	to	accurately	estimate	distance	and	direction	on	
mental	navigation	tasks	(such	as	those	described	in	Chapters	1	and	3)	designed	for	his	home	
environment,	which	indicated	that	he	had	access	to	a	representation	of	space	that	was	
sufficient	for	navigation.	He	included	fewer	landmarks	and	streets	in	his	sketch	maps	and	
performed	worse	than	control	participants	on	a	landmark	recognition	task,	except	for	
landmarks	that	were	pertinent	for	navigation	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000).	These	results	led	
Rosenbaum	and	colleagues	(2000,	2005)	to	surmise	that	the	hippocampus	was	required	for	
representing	detailed	features	of	remotely	learned	environments,	but	that	individuals	with	
hippocampal	damage	retained	a	schematic,	gist-like	representation	of	the	same	environment	
outside	of	the	hippocampal	system.	Similar	findings	of	impoverished	sketch	maps	and	difficulty	
on	landmark	recognition	tasks	were	found	in	other	adult-onset	amnesic	patients	including	D.G.,	
a	man	who	suffered	anoxia	secondary	to	cardiac	arrest	in	2010	and	shows	a	characteristic	
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amnesic	pattern	of	preserved	semantic	memory	in	the	context	of	impaired	episodic	memory,	
and	D.A.,	a	man	who	contracted	herpes	encephalitis	in	1993	and	shows	severe	damage	to	
medial	temporal	lobe	structures,	including	his	hippocampi	(Herdman	et	al.,	2015).	Further	more,	
amnesic	case	T.T.	reportedly	could	navigate	along	main	artery	roads	to	reach	a	destination,	but	
had	a	hard	time	navigating	along	minor,	non-artery	roads	(Maguire	et	al.,	2006).	Again,	this	is	
suggestive	of	impoverished	representations	of	well-known	environments	that	lack	detail.		
A	study	by	Rosenbaum	and	colleagues	(2015)	provided	evidence	that	H.C.	had	
impoverished	sketch	maps	and	difficulty	sequencing	landmarks	in	close	proximity	to	one	
another,	which	hinted	that	H.C.	has	an	impoverished	representation	of	her	home	environment	
that	is	lacking	in	detail	and	richness.	As	described	in	the	previous	chapter,	H.C.	was	re-tested	on	
mental	navigation	tasks	to	examine	whether	the	seemingly	coarse,	inflexible	representation	of	
her	home	environment	would	change	with	an	additional	8	years	of	frequent	exposure.	Results	
revealed	few	changes	in	H.C.’s	performance:	her	sketch	maps	continued	to	be	fragmented	and	
lacked	detailed	elements	such	as	landmarks	and	street	segments.	H.C.	also	had	difficulty	
accurately	placing	well-known	landmarks	on	a	map	consisting	of	only	boundary	streets,	though	
her	performance	improved	with	added	support	in	the	form	of	pre-marked	landmarks	and	
streets.	H.C.	continued	to	have	difficulty	sequencing	photographs	of	landmarks	that	were	in	
close	proximity	to	one	another,	and	even	greater	difficulties	when	asked	to	correctly	sequence	
landmarks	on	a	map.	In	the	latter	case,	she	was	provided	with	the	name	of	the	landmark	rather	
than	a	perceptually	rich	visual	cue	(photograph).	
H.C.’s	pattern	of	performance	on	remote	spatial	memory	tasks	might	indicate	that	she	
lacks	access	to	a	detailed	representation	of	her	home	environment,	resulting	in	the	inclusion	of	
fewer	details	on	her	sketch	maps	and	impacting	her	ability	to	make	fine-grained	spatial-
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relational	judgments.	This	interpretation	could	also	help	to	explain	H.C.’s	intact	ability	to	flexibly	
navigate	familiar	routes	that	had	been	mirror	reversed	in	a	virtual	simulation	using	Google	
Street	View	as	a	platform	(described	in	Chapter	2),	where	additional	visual	cues	were	provided.	
In	effect,	such	cues	could	provide	H.C.	with	a	detailed	representation	of	her	home	environment,	
which	she	has	difficulty	conjuring	up	in	her	own	mind’s	eye,	aiding	in	flexible	navigation.		
While	her	performance	on	mental	navigation	tasks	hints	that	she	may	have	an	
impoverished	representation	of	space,	a	more	thorough	investigation	of	the	integrity	of	H.C.’s	
detailed	representation	of	her	home	environment	is	warranted.	In	this	chapter,	I	reveal	results	
from	a	route	description	study	in	which	H.C.	and	healthy	control	participants	were	asked	to	
provide	detailed	descriptions	of	very	familiar	routes.	Transcriptions	of	these	route	descriptions	
were	then	segmented	into	meaningful	bits	of	information	that	allowed	for	the	evaluation	of	the	
proportion	of	spatial	and	detailed	information	within	the	description.			
Further	evidence	implicating	the	hippocampus	in	vivid	re-experiencing	comes	from	
Hirshhorn,	Newman,	&	Moscovitch’s	(2011)	route	description	study	with	healthy	older	adults,	
who	experience	normal	age-related	hippocampi	volume	reduction	(Levine,	Svoboda,	Hay,	
Winocur,	&	Moscovitch,	2002).	The	collection	of	data	was	similar	to	that	of	this	study	-	
participants	were	asked	to	provide	basic	directions	and,	directly	after,	descriptive	directions	for	
a	familiar	route.	Hirshhorn	and	colleagues	(2011)	found	that	the	number	of	details	on	the	route	
description	task	correlated	with	well-known	tests	of	hippocampal	integrity.		
To	rule	out	the	possibility	that	healthy	older	adults’	poor	performance	on	the	route	
description	task	was	due	to	other	brain	structures	that	also	undergo	age-related	changes,	
Herdman	and	colleagues	(2015)	tested	three	adult-onset	amnesic	cases	(K.C.,	D.G.,	and	D.A.,	
previously	described)	on	the	route	description	task.	While	amnesic	cases	could	provide	intact	
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descriptions	of	spatial	properties	along	a	route,	their	descriptions	showed	a	paucity	of	
perceptual	features	along	the	same	routes	(Herdman	et	al.,	2015).		
The	impoverished	representations	of	well-known	environments	are	analogous	to	the	
impoverished	descriptions	of	episodic	events	found	in	individuals	with	hippocampal	
compromise.	Levine	and	colleagues	(2002)	found	that	older	adults	provide	significantly	less	
episodic	details	when	recounting	autobiographical	memories	compared	to	younger	adults,	and	
tend	to	favour	semantic	details	that	are	context-independent.	Kwan,	Carson,	Addis,	&	
Rosenbaum	(2010)	found	that	developmental	amnesic	H.C.	had	significantly	fewer	episodic	
details	in	her	constructions	of	past	events.	Indeed,	several	studies	have	found	impaired	episodic	
details	in	the	context	of	relatively	spared	semantic	facts	in	individuals	with	medial	temporal	
lobe	damage	caused	by	a	wide	range	of	aetiologies	(for	reviews	see	Piolino,	Desgranges,	&	
Eustache,	2009	and	Winocur	&	Moscovitch,	2011).	Furthermore,	functional	neuroimaging	
studies	show	that	hippocampal	activation	is	positively	correlated	with	the	number	of	details	or	
vividness	of	a	recalled	autobiographical	memory	(Sheldon	&	Levine,	2013)	and	indicate	that	it	is	
the	detailed	representation	of	an	event,	not	the	temporal	aspect,	that	is	reliant	on	the	
hippocampus	(Addis,	Moscovitch,	Crawley,	&	McAndrews,	2004;	St-Laurent,	Moscovitch,	Levine,	
&	McAndrews,	2009).		
Findings	of	impoverished	detailed	representations	of	well-known	environments	or	
autobiographical	events	in	the	context	of	spared	schematic	or	semantic	representations	in	
individuals	with	hippocampal	damage	or	degeneration	form	the	basis	of	the	Trace	
Transformation	Theory,	which	posits	that	the	hippocampus	is	required	for	richly	re-experiencing	
an	environment	or	episodic	event,	as	well	as	for	richly	experiencing	non-mnemonic	tasks,	such	
as	imagining	a	future	or	fictitious	event	(Rosenbaum,	Winocur,	&	Moscovitch,	2001;	Winocur	&	
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Moscovitch,	2011).	The	Trace	Transformation	Theory	builds	off	of	the	Multiple	Trace	Theory	
(Moscovitch,	Nadel,	Winocur,	Gilboa,	&	Rosenbaum,	2006;	Nadel	&	Moscovitch,	1997),	which	
proposed	that	over	time	semantic	information	from	a	memory	can	be	represented	cortically,	
while	episodic	information	continues	to	require	the	hippocampus,	irrespective	of	the	age	of	the	
memory.	The	Trace	Transformation	Theory	accommodates	the	apparent	dissociation	of	
impoverished	detailed	representations,	but	spared	schematic,	gist-like	representations	of	well-
known	environments,	likening	detailed	representations	to	episodic	memory	and	schematic	
representations	to	semantic	memory.	Winocur	&	Moscovitch	(2011)	argue	that	the	initial,	
detailed	memory	and	transformed,	schematic	memory	can	co-exist	and	interact.	While	it	has	
been	proposed	that	the	hippocampus	is	always	required	for	representing	detailed,	contextual	
features,	it	is	unclear	whether	the	hippocampus	actually	stores	the	detailed	representation,	or	
whether	its	involvement	is	related	only	to	retrieving	or	binding	objects	with	their	spatial	and	
temporal	contexts	to	evoke	the	feeling	of	experiencing.		
Another	theory	of	hippocampal	function,	the	Scene	Construction	Theory	(Hassabis,	
Kumaran,	Vann,	&	Maguire,	2007;	Hassabis	&	Maguire,	2007;	Maguire,	Intraub,	&	Mullally,	
2016),	can	also	accommodate	findings	of	impoverished	descriptions	of	environments	in	
amnesia.	It	suggests	that	the	hippocampus	enables	the	integration	of	spatial	features	into	a	
coherent	whole,	which	is	critical	for	a	sense	of	rich	re-experiencing	during	spatial	navigation,	
recollecting	autobiographical	memories,	or	imagining	future	events	(Maguire	et	al.,	2016).	This	
theory	proposes	that	spatially	coherent	scenes	are	at	the	center	of	hippocampal	functioning,	
and	form	the	context	in	which	episodic	memories	can	take	place.	Hassabis	and	colleagues	
(2007)	found	that	adult-onset	amnesic	cases	were	unable	to	imagine	future	experiences	within	
a	spatially	coherent,	holistic	representation	of	the	environmental	setting.	Similarly,	a	functional	
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neuroimaging	study	with	healthy	adults	revealed	extensive	activation	in	the	hippocampi	when	
imagining	fictitious	and	future	scenes	(Hassabis	&	Maguire,	2007).		
The	Scene	Construction	Theory,	however,	does	not	readily	account	for	findings	of	intact	
schematic	representations	of	well-known	environments	in	adult-onset	amnesic	patients	when	
tested	on	mental	navigation	tasks	(Herdman	et	al.,	2015;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000).	These	studies	
suggest	that	coherent	scenes	or	representations	can	exist	in	individuals	with	hippocampal	
damage,	and	is	more	in	line	with	the	Trace	Transformation	Theory.	It	is	notable	that	Hassabis	
and	colleagues’	(2007;	see	also	Hassabis	&	Maguire,	2007)	studies	were	designed	to	evoke	more	
of	a	sense	of	experiencing	than	would	be	expected	with	several	of	the	mental	navigation	tasks.	
As	several	of	the	mental	navigation	tasks	used	in	Herdman	and	colleagues’	(2015)	and	
Rosenbaum	and	colleagues’	(2000)	studies	on	which	adult-onset	amnesic	cases	were	intact	
could	be	solved	without	envisioning	a	rich	representation	of	the	environment,	the	impaired	
scene	construction	seen	in	Hassabis	et	al.	(2007)	may	be	more	reflective	of	a	difficulty	in	richly	
imagining	in	the	scenario,	rather	than	a	deficit	in	coherence.		
The	Hassabis	and	colleagues’	(2007)	study	also	involved	the	construction	of	a	future,	
fictitious	experience,	rather	than	reconstruction	of	a	past	environment	(as	seen	in	Herdman	et	
al.,	2015,	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000).	As	such,	we	may	see	adult-onset	amnesic	cases’	impairment	
on	scene	construction	tasks	(Hassabis	et	al.,	2007)	despite	intact	schematic	representations	of	
space	(Herdman	et	al.,	2015;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000)	because	constructing	future	experiences	
is	more	challenging	than	past.	Scene	Construction	theorists	highlight	that	autobiographical	
memory	and	future	thinking	rely	on	a	common	neural	network,	and	suggest	that	the	scene	
construction	deficit	seen	for	imagining	future	events	would	likely	extend	to	past	events	and	
environments.	While	Addis,	Wong,	&	Schacter	(2007)	found	considerable	overlap	in	neural	
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activity	for	past	and	future	events	when	elaboration	was	required,	they	found	that	construction	
of	a	personal	future	event	engaged	the	right	hippocampus	more	so	than	remembering	a	past	
event,	and	likely	requires	greater	cognitive	demands.		To	our	knowledge	a	scene	construction	
task	has	not	formally	been	applied	to	evaluate	past	experiences	or	environments.		
The	Scene	Construction	Theory	seems	to	make	sense	of	developmental	amnesic	case	
H.C.’s	sketch	maps	that	lacked	cohesion	and	her	difficulty	describing	a	detour	between	two	
familiar	landmarks	on	the	blocked	route	task	(see	Chapter	3	and	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	
Therefore,	it	comes	as	a	surprise	that	Hurley	and	colleagues	(2011)	found	that	H.C.	was	able	to	
construct	detail-rich	future	scenarios	(but	see	Kwan	et	al.,	2010).	Maguire,	Vargha-Khadem,	&	
Hassabis	(2010)	suggest	that	discrepant	findings	of	impaired	imagination	of	future	events	in	
developmental	amnesic	H.C.	by	Kwan	and	colleagues	(2010)	can	be	explained	by	differences	in	
methodology,	whereby	using	single	word	cues	for	the	construction	of	fictitious	scenarios	is	
more	constraining	than	full	sentences	and	makes	the	task	more	challenging.	Preserved	ability	to	
construct	spatially	coherent	fictitious	scenes	and	future	events	has	been	found	in	other	
developmental	amnesic	cases,	including	Jon	(Maguire	et	al.,	2010)	and	school-age	patients	
(Cooper,	Vargha-Khadem,	Gadian,	&	Maguire,	2011),	suggesting	that,	unlike	adult-onset	
amnesic	cases,	individuals	with	developmental	amnesia	can	construct	scenes,	perhaps	via	use	of	
functional	residual	hippocampal	tissue	or	support	of	semantic	memory.	Although	Maguire	and	
colleagues	(2010)	reported	that	developmental	amnesic	Jon	was	able	to	construct	coherent	
scenes,	his	ability	to	provide	fine-grained	sensory	descriptions	within	those	scenes	was	
borderline	impaired,	which	may	suggest	that	his	scene	constructions	are	not	very	detailed,	
despite	being	coherent.	H.C.,	on	the	other	hand,	was	able	to	provide	such	details.	Intact,	
sensory-rich	scene	construction	for	future	imagined	events	in	H.C.	(Maguire	et	al.,	2010)	is	at	
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odds	with	the	fragmented,	inflexible,	and	impoverished	representation	of	a	well-known	
environment	found	by	Rosenbaum	et	al.	(2015).		
In	the	current	study,	we	aimed	to	examine	whether	the	pattern	of	impoverished	detailed	
representations	of	frequently	travelled	environments	in	adult-onset	amnesic	cases,	which	limits	
rich	re-experiencing	of	the	environment	during	recall	(Herdman	et	al.,	2015),	is	also	present	in	
developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.,	despite	the	greater	potential	for	functional	reorganization.	
We	adopted	a	modified	version	of	Hassabis	and	colleagues’	(2007)	scoring	procedure	(as	
described	in	Herdman	et	al.,	2015)	to	segment	transcripts	of	familiar	route	descriptions	into	
detailed	and	spatial	information.	In	keeping	with	the	Trace	Transformation	Theory,	we	
predicted	that	H.C.	would	have	an	impoverished	route	description,	based	on	findings	of	
significantly	fewer	details	contained	within	H.C.’s	sketch	maps	of	her	home	environment	and	
difficulties	on	mental	navigation	tasks	that	require	a	fine-grained	representation	of	the	
environment	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	It	was	also	plausible	that	H.C.	would	perform	similarly	to	
controls	on	the	route	description	task,	as	she	had	on	tasks	involving	the	construction	of	novel,	
fictitious	scenes	and	future	scenarios	(Hurley	et	al.,	2011),	from	which	we	derived	our	(slightly	
modified)	scoring	procedure.	Here	we	report	results	assessing	H.C.’s	description	of	a	familiar	
route	within	her	frequently	travelled	home	environment,	rather	than	novel	scenes	and	future,	
fictitious	scenarios.		
Methods	
Participants		
	 Developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.	(described	above)	was	28	years	old	when	she	took	
part	in	this	study	and	her	performance	was	compared	with	that	of	31	healthy	controls	(19	
female)	matched	in	age	(µ	=28.935	years,	SD	=	4.358)	and	education	(µ	=	16.516	years;	SD	=	
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2.027).		Controls	were	recruited	through	H.C.’s	family,	online	advertisements,	and	by	postings	at	
York	University.	Twenty-three	of	the	controls	in	this	study	also	completed	Study	1	(reported	in	
Chapter	2),	including	H.C.’s	sister	and	husband.	Healthy	control	participants	reported	normal	or	
corrected-to-normal	vision	and	hearing,	and	no	history	of	neurological	or	psychological	illness.	
This	study	was	approved	by	the	ethics	boards	at	York	University	and	Baycrest	Hospital.	All	
participants	gave	informed	written	consent	and	were	provided	with	monetary	compensation	for	
their	time.		
Procedure		
Participants	were	asked	to	describe	a	very	familiar	walking	route.	Each	route	was	unique	
to	the	participant,	except	for	H.C.	and	her	husband,	who	described	the	same	route.	To	compare	
performance	across	participants,	experimenters	asked	for	routes	that	took	approximately	10	
minutes	to	walk.	Participants	were	first	asked	to	provide	the	basic	directions	necessary	to	get	
from	their	start	point	to	their	end	location.	They	were	then	asked	to	provide	descriptive	
directions.	That	is,	describe	the	route	again	in	as	much	detail	as	possible,	providing	information	
not	only	about	what	things	looked	like,	but	also	where	features	of	the	environment	were	in	
relation	to	each	other	and	to	themselves	as	they	progressed	along	the	route.	Participants	were	
allowed	to	continue	with	their	descriptions	until	they	reached	a	natural	end.	The	experimenter	
then	probed	participants	for	further	detail	about	three	landmarks	that	the	participant	had	
mentioned.		
Scoring	Procedure		
Route	descriptions	were	transcribed	and	then	scored	by	a	scorer	blind	to	group	
allocation	and	double-checked	by	KH.	Route	descriptions	were	segmented	into	meaningful	units	
of	information,	with	statements	classified	into	three	categories	(spatial	reference,	entity,	or	
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sensory	description)	based	on	a	modified	version	of	Hassabis	and	colleagues’	(2007)	scoring	
procedure	(as	described	by	Herdman	et	al.,	2015).	The	entities	category	consisted	of	distinct	
items	that	were	mentioned	(e.g.,	landmarks,	objects,	or	people).	The	spatial	references	category	
included	statements	about	explicit	measurements,	the	relative	positions	of	entities	in	the	
environment	as	they	pertain	to	each	other	and	to	the	participant,	and	directions	as	described	
from	the	participant’s	vantage	point.	Descriptive	statements	about	any	entity	were	classified	as	
sensory	descriptions,	regardless	of	modality,	as	were	commentaries	on	weather.	Any	repeated	
or	irrelevant	statements	that	did	not	fit	into	the	former	categories	were	not	included	in	the	total	
output,	as	they	did	not	make	substantial	contributions	to	our	understanding	of	spatial-
perceptual	representations	of	very	familiar	routes.	Unlike	Hassabis	et	al.	(2007),	there	was	no	
limit	on	the	score	in	each	category,	as	we	strived	to	represent	the	total	content	of	the	
descriptions.	Following	the	same	method	as	Herdman	et	al.	(2015),	the	number	of	statements	in	
each	category	was	divided	by	the	participant’s	total	output,	allowing	examination	of	the	
proportion	of	each	individual’s	total	output	that	was	attributed	to	spatial	references,	entities,	
and	sensory	descriptions,	while	controlling	for	variations	in	total	verbal	output	among	
participants.	To	examine	whether	additional	support	in	the	form	of	probing	for	extra	details	
would	boost	H.C.’s	proportion	of	fine-grained	information	(entities	and	sensory	descriptions),	
we	examined	descriptions	prior	to	probing,	and	again	afterwards.		
Each	participant’s	route	description,	as	a	whole,	was	also	subjectively	attributed	a	
quality	judgment	by	the	blind	scorer.	The	descriptions	were	rated	out	of	10	and	based	solely	on	
how	vividly	the	scorer	was	able	to	envision	the	route	after	reading	the	participant’s	description.	
A	score	of	0	indicated	that	scorers	were	completely	unable	to	imagine	a	detailed,	vivid,	
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perceptually	rich	route	based	off	of	the	participant’s	description,	while	a	score	of	10	indicated	
that	the	description	evoked	a	very	rich	picture	in	the	mind’s	eye	of	the	scorer.	
Results	
	
H.C.	was	able	to	accurately	describe	the	basic	directions	necessary	for	travelling	a	well-
known	route,	which	suggests	that	she	retains	a	representation	of	her	home	environment	that	is	
sufficient	for	navigation.	She	described	the	basic	directions	for	a	very	familiar	walking	route	
from	the	house	in	which	she	currently	resides	to	her	in-laws’	house.	As	H.C.’s	husband	was	also	
very	familiar	with	this	route,	H.C.’s	description	of	the	route	was	compared	directly	to	her	
husband’s	description.	Sample	transcripts	of	H.C.’s	and	her	husband’s	descriptive	directions	of	
the	route	(before	probing)	are	presented	in	Figures	4.1	and	4.2,	respectively.		Note	that	H.C.	
chose	to	describe	only	a	portion	of	the	route	in	detail,	whereas	her	husband	described	the	route	
in	detail	in	totality.	For	comparison	purposes,	the	part	of	the	route	where	H.C.	began	her	
detailed	description	is	marked	on	her	husband’s	detailed	description	(Figure	4.2).		
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Figure	4.1.	Developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.’s	descriptive	directions	from	the	route	description	
task,	before	probing,	with	scoring	using	a	modified	version	of	Hassabis	et	al.	(2007;	as	described	
in	Herdman	et	al.,	2015).	Blue	font	represents	landmarks	that	were	incorrectly	placed	on	the	
route.		
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Figure	4.2.	Developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.’s	husband’s	descriptive	directions	from	the	route	
description	task,	before	probing.		
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H.C.’s	performance	on	the	route	description	task	prior	to	probing	and	after	probing	was	
compared	to	that	of	controls	using	Crawford	and	Garthwaite’s	(2002)	modified	t-test	procedure.	
All	analyses	were	tested	at	a	significance	level	of	p	<	.05.	H.C.’s	total	output	generated	without	
probing	included	a	similar	proportion	of	spatial	references	compared	to	controls	(Figure	4.3).	
The	proportion	of	spatial	references	in	H.C.’s	total	output	(0.300)	did	not	differ	significantly	
from	that	of	controls	(0.304	(SD	=	0.095);	t	=	-0.041	p	=	.484).	This	was	unexpected,	as	we	
predicted	that	an	impoverished	description	lacking	in	entities	and	sensory	descriptions	would	
cause	the	proportion	of	spatial	references	to	be	larger.	While	H.C.’s	total	output	consisted	of	a	
significantly	smaller	proportion	of	entities	(0.300)	compared	to	controls	(0.521	(SD	=	0.089;	t	=	-
2.444,	p		=	.010),	she	provided	a	significantly	higher	proportion	of	sensory	descriptions	(0.400)	
compared	to	controls	(0.175	(SD	=	0.105);	t	=	2.109,	p		=	.022).		
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Figure	4.3.	Developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.’s	and	control	participants’	proportion	of	total	pre-
probe	route	description	segmented	into	sensory	descriptions	(SD),	entities	(EP),	and	spatial	
references	(SPA).	Error	bars	represent	standard	error.	
	
Post-probe	analysis	revealed	that	the	proportion	of	H.C.’s	total	output	attributed	to	
spatial	references,	entities,	and	sensory	descriptions	remained	roughly	the	same	as	seen	pre-
probe	(Figure	4.4).	The	proportion	of	her	post-probe	output	attributed	to	spatial	references	
(0.278)	remained	similar	to	that	seen	in	controls	(0.251	(SD	=	0.081;	t	=	0.328,	p	=	.373).	As	seen	
in	the	pre-probe	condition,	her	total	post-probe	output	consisted	of	a	significantly	smaller	
proportion	of	entities	(0.331)	compared	to	that	produced	by	controls	(0.490	(SD	=	0.092;	t	=	-
1.701,	p		=	.050).	The	proportion	of	sensory	details	produced	by	H.C.	in	response	to	probing	
(0.391),	however,	continued	to	be	higher	than	that	of	controls	(0.259;	SD	=	0.093),	and	
approached	significance	(t		=	1.397,	p	=	.086).	Contrary	to	our	predictions,	these	results	suggest	
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that	H.C.’s	ability	to	generate	fine-grained	sensory	details	of	elements	along	her	route	is	on	par	
with	controls,	even	without	probing.		
	
Figure	4.4.	Developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.’s	and	control	participants’	proportion	of	total	post-
probe	route	description	segmented	into	sensory	descriptions	(SD),	entities	(EP),	and	spatial	
references	(SPA).	Error	bars	represent	standard	error.		
	
A	blind	scorer’s	rating	of	the	quality	of	H.C.’s	route	descriptions	on	a	scale	of	0	to	10	(7.5)	
did	not	differ	significantly	from	ratings	of	healthy	controls’	descriptions	(µ	=	7.224	(SD	=	0.830);	t	
=	0.327,	p	=	.373),	meaning	that	the	scorer	was	able	to	richly	envision	walking	along	the	route	
that	H.C.	described	just	as	well	as	she	envisioned	walking	along	controls’	routes.	This	finding	
was	unexpected,	as	previous	research	with	mental	navigation	tasks	showed	H.C.	had	an	
impoverished	representation	of	her	home	environment	that	we	expected	would	not	be	
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sufficient	to	enable	her	to	describe	the	route	in	a	way	that	would	evoke	a	sense	of	experiencing	
in	the	scorer.		
A	qualitative	examination	of	H.C.’s	route	description	revealed	some	curiosities.	As	seen	
in	Figure	4.1,	H.C.	provided	descriptive	directions	for	only	a	portion	of	her	route.	Participants	
were	asked	to	select	two	or	three	blocks	of	the	route	to	describe	in	further	detail	and	probing	
began	only	after	the	participant	came	to	a	natural	end.	It	is	noteworthy	that	she	did	not	
describe	actually	navigating	along	the	route	when	providing	descriptive	directions,	instead	
describing	what	one	might	see	at	a	particular	intersection,	including	information	about	where	
landmarks	are	located	in	relation	to	each	other	and	in	relation	to	herself	as	she	envisioned	the	
area,	as	well	as	detailed	perceptual	information	about	the	appearance	of	visual	features	along	
the	way.	On	the	surface,	her	description	seemed	to	be	quite	fluid	and	detailed,	yet	she	included	
landmarks	that	are	not	actually	located	on	her	route	or	visible	from	her	route.	For	example,	she	
stated,	“If	you	look	up	there	is	also	a	school	on	that	street.”	While	there	is	a	school	on	the	
street,	it	is	a	block	and	a	half	from	the	intersection	she	was	describing	and	would	not	be	visible	
along	the	route.	After	mention	of	the	school,	she	said,	“The	top	left	[pause]	is,	it’s	now	an	
apartment	building.	Used	to	be	a	convenience	store.”	In	actuality,	this	apartment	building	exists	
one	block	west	of	the	intersection,	is	hard	to	see	from	that	vantage	point,	and	would	fall	outside	
of	H.C.’s	route	from	her	home	to	her	in-laws’	house.		
Although	H.C.’s	directions	were	very	fluid	in	terms	of	vocal	quality,	her	actual	
descriptions	of	the	locations	of	landmarks	were	quite	fragmented.	She	described	what	can	be	
found	on	various	corners	of	the	intersection,	recalling	a	“massive	house”	on	the	“bottom	right”	
corner	(as	she	envisioned	it)	and	a	“white	house”	on	the	“bottom	left”	corner,	which	do	stand	
opposite	one	another	in	reality.	After	mentioning	the	school,	H.C.	stated	that	the	apartment	
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building	(described	above)	is	on	the	“top	left”	of	the	intersection,	which	is	incorrect.	She	then	
went	on	to	re-describe	the	same	“massive”	house	with	the	black	iron	fence	as	if	she	hadn’t	
mentioned	it	before.		
The	examiner	did	not	have	access	to	Google	Street	View	to	ascertain	the	veracity	of	
H.C.’s	description	until	after	testing.	As	such,	one	of	H.C.’s	probes	was	the	school.		H.C.’s	
description	of	the	school	was	very	detailed	and	included	information	about	what	things	looked	
like	and	where	elements	were	located	in	relation	to	each	other	and	to	her.	She	also	was	asked	
to	describe	the	“white	house”	in	further	detail	and	provided	a	rich	description	of	what	it	looked	
like.	Finally,	she	was	asked	to	describe	the	convenience	store	that	was	converted	into	an	
apartment	building	in	further	detail.	H.C.,	however,	described	another	building	that	is,	in	reality,	
located	along	her	route	-	a	house	that	was	converted	into	a	store.		The	perceptual	details	that	
H.C.	provided	were	consistent	with	what	the	examiner	observed	on	Google	Street	View	after	
testing.		
Discussion		
	 The	purpose	of	the	current	study	was	to	examine	the	extent	to	which	detailed	
representations	of	a	familiar	environment	are	preserved	in	a	case	of	developmental	amnesia.	
Developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.	was	able	to	provide	basic	directions	from	her	house	to	her	in-
laws’	home,	which	supports	previous	assertions	that	H.C.	has	an	intact	schematic	
representation	of	her	home	environment	(or	at	least	an	intact	representation	of	that	particular	
route)	that	is	sufficient	for	navigation.	However,	her	route	description	was	fairly	simplistic	in	
nature,	requiring	only	three	turns.	Her	route	description	without	and	with	probing	consisted	of	
a	similar	proportion	of	spatial	references	as	that	of	control	participants.	Although	we	
anticipated	that	she	would	show	a	greater	proportion	of	spatial	references	(owing	to	a	smaller	
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proportion	of	detailed	entities	and	sensory	descriptions),	these	results	still	suggest	that	H.C.	
retains	a	schematic,	gist-like	representation	of	her	home	environment,	or	at	least	of	the	
particular	route	on	which	she	was	tested.	Closer	examination	of	H.C.’s	route	description	
revealed	that	H.C.	included	descriptions	of	landmarks	that	did	not	fall	along	her	route	and	had	
difficulty	accurately	describing	the	spatial	relations	between	landmarks	at	an	intersection.	It	
seemed	as	though	H.C.	could	envision	a	scene	along	her	route	but	was	unable	to	envision	the	
same	scene	from	another	viewpoint	or	bind	that	scene	with	the	features	around	it.		
Contrary	to	our	predictions,	the	proportion	of	sensory	descriptions	in	H.C.’s	route	
description	was	similar	to	the	proportion	seen	for	control	participants	for	the	post-probe	
condition,	and	significantly	higher	for	the	pre-probe	condition.	This	indicates	that	H.C.	may	have	
access	to	detailed,	perceptual	information	about	entities.	Indeed,	H.C.	was	able	to	describe	
several	entities	in	detail,	commenting	on	the	colour	and	material	of	landmarks	and	other	spatial	
features,	although	some	of	the	landmarks	she	described	were	not	actually	located	along	her	
proposed	route.	Perhaps	H.C.’s	route	description	consisted	of	a	higher	proportion	of	sensory	
descriptions	compared	to	controls	because	she	may	have	chosen	to	describe	those	aspects	of	
the	environment	with	which	she	felt	more	confident.	As	she	appeared	to	have	difficulty	binding	
the	location	of	entities	in	relation	to	other	entities,	she	may	have	described	those	aspects	of	the	
scene	that	were	easier	for	her	to	envision,	such	as	the	internal	features	of	landmarks,	rather	
than	the	relation	of	those	landmarks	to	surrounding	spatial	features.				
H.C.	had	a	significantly	smaller	proportion	of	entities	than	controls	in	her	pre-probe	and	
post-probe	descriptions.	It	is	notable,	however,	that	when	H.C.’s	entities	and	sensory	
descriptions	were	combined	(Pre:	0.700,	Post:	0.722)	they	made	up	a	similar	proportion	of	the	
total	output	as	seen	in	control	participants	(Pre:	0.696,	Post:	0.749),	which	suggests	that	H.C.	
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had	a	similar	proportion	of	her	route	description	comprised	of	these	detailed	types	of	
information	about	the	environment.	Interestingly,	H.C.’s	score	on	the	blind	quality	judgment	
measuring	the	degree	to	which	the	route	description	evoked	a	sense	of	vividness	and	
experiencing	in	the	scorer	also	did	not	differ	from	controls’	scores.		
	 These	results,	particularly	that	H.C.’s	total	output	consisted	of	a	similar	proportion	of	
sensory	descriptions	describing	the	perceptual	properties	of	entities,	suggest	that	H.C.	has	
access	to	a	detailed,	fine-grained	representation	of	her	home	environment.	This	is	discordant	
with	the	impoverished	sketch	maps	found	in	Rosenbaum	et	al.	(2015),	however	other	factors,	
such	as	working	memory	or	relational	deficits,	could	have	impacted	the	sketch	map	results.	On	
the	other	hand,	the	current	results	are	in	keeping	with	Hurley	and	colleagues’	(2011)	study	with	
H.C.,	where	she	was	asked	to	construct	a	future	scenario.	When	transcripts	of	future	scenarios	
were	segmented	into	categories,	no	significant	differences	were	found	between	H.C.	and	
controls	on	the	number	of	spatial	references,	entities,	or	sensory	descriptions	(Hurley	et	al.,	
2011).	Based	on	these	findings,	it	seems	that	H.C.	is	able	to	access	vivid	representations	of	fine-
grained	aspects	of	well-known	environments,	but	has	difficulty	locating	landmarks	in	relation	to	
other	landmarks.		
How	Might	H.C.	Generate	Detail	that	is	Sufficient	for	Imagining?			
It	is	unclear	why	H.C.’s	route	description	differed	from	the	impoverished	descriptions	of	
routes	(Herdman	et	al.,	2015)	and	impaired	scene	construction	(Hassabis	et	al.,	2007)	found	in	
adult-onset	amnesic	cases.	Despite	findings	in	adult	cases,	it	may	be	that	the	hippocampus	is	
not	required	for	accessing	detailed	representations	of	well-known	environments	or	constructing	
coherent	scenes.	Here	we	propose	the	following	other	possible	reasons,	which	we	believe	
represent	more	likely	explanations	for	H.C.’s	intact	route	descriptions:		
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Residual	hippocampal	tissue.		
Although	H.C.’s	hippocampi	are	reduced	in	volume	and	atypically	oriented	(Olsen	et	al.,	
2013;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2014),	she	still	has	residual	hippocampal	tissue	that	could	be	sufficient	
for	generating	a	detailed	description	of	a	well-known	route.	While	Hassabis	and	colleagues	
(2007)	found	most	adult-onset	amnesic	patients	were	unable	to	construct	coherent	future	
scenarios,	implicating	the	hippocampus	in	scene	construction,	one	patient	with	hippocampal	
damage,	P01,	was	able	to	construct	future	scenarios.	In	a	functional	neuroimaging	follow-up	
study	with	P01,	Mullally,	Hassabis,	&	Maguire	(2012)	identified	that	he	activated	residual	tissue	
in	his	right	hippocampus	when	constructing	scenes.	Adult-onset	amnesic	case	P01	was	able	to	
utilize	his	right	hippocampus,	despite	volume	reduction	of	46.2%.		H.C.	shows	a	volume	
reduction	of	29.5%	and	31.2%	in	the	left	and	right	hippocampi,	respectively	(Olsen	et	al.,	2013).	
If	residual	hippocampal	tissue	in	amnesic	case	P01	was	sufficient	to	construct	spatially	coherent	
scenes,	despite	a	46.2%	volume	reduction,	it	stands	to	reason	that	H.C.	may	be	able	to	do	the	
same,	given	that	her	volume	reduction	is	not	as	large.	To	investigate	this	possibility,	a	future	
study	could	use	fMRI	to	examine	the	brain	areas	that	are	activated	in	H.C.	when	describing	a	
familiar	route.			
Functional	reorganization.			
H.C.’s	intact	detailed	representation	of	her	home	environment	may	also	be	explained	by	
functional	neural	reorganization.	Developmental	amnesic	cases	possess	a	greater	predisposition	
for	functional	reorganization	compared	to	adult-onset	amnesic	cases,	due	to	the	fact	that	the	
brain	of	such	an	individual	is	presented	with	the	opportunity	to	restructure	itself	during	the	
early	stages	of	life,	when	neural	networks	are	being	established.	Evidence	of	functional	
reorganization	has	been	found	in	developmental	amnesic	case,	Jon.	When	asked	to	imagine	
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future	scenarios,	Jon	showed	intact	scene	construction	(Maguire	et	al.,	2010).	This	led	Mullally,	
Vargha-Khadem,	&	Maguire	(2014)	to	examine	the	brain	regions	activated	during	scene	
construction	in	Jon	using	fMRI.	They	found	that	Jon	activated	several	regions	of	the	brain	that	
have	previously	been	implicated	in	imagining	scenes,	including	the	posterior	parietal,	
retrosplenial,	posterior	cingulate,	and	ventromedial	prefrontal	cortices,	but	showed	negligible	
activation	in	his	hippocampi	compared	to	controls	(Mullally	et	al.,	2014).	They	suggested	that	he	
relied	on	these	other	brain	structures	to	successfully	construct	a	coherent	scene	(Mullally	et	al.,	
2014).	As	such,	successful	recall	of	details	from	H.C.’s	well-known	environment	could	occur	if	
that	typically	hippocampal-dependent	task	was	taken	over	by	(an)other	brain	structure(s).	It	is	
possible	that	an	fMRI	investigation	while	completing	our	route	description	task	would	show	
activation	of	similar	brain	regions	in	H.C	as	seen	in	developmental	amnesic	case,	Jon.	
If	functional	reorganization	underlies	H.C.	and	other	developmental	amnesic	cases’	
intact	performance	on	route	description	and	scene	construction	tasks,	the	mechanism	by	which	
this	could	occur	is	unknown.	Developmental	amnesic	cases	typically	show	impaired	episodic	
memory	in	the	context	of	spared	semantic	memory	(Vargha-Khadem	et	al.,	1997).		Gardiner	and	
colleagues	(2008)	demonstrated	that	individuals	with	developmental	amnesia	could	acquire	
semantic	knowledge	over	an	extended	period	of	time.	In	a	similar	vein,	H.C.’s	previously	
reported	intact	performance	on	mental	navigation	tasks	estimating	distance	and	direction	
(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015),	and	ability	to	navigate	routes	using	Google	Street	View	paradigm	
(Chapter	2)	suggest	that	learning	can	also	occur	for	a	larger-scale	environment	with	substantial	
exposure	and	time.	It	may	be	that	developmental	amnesic	cases	make	use	of	their	intact	
semantic	memory	to	support	their	description	of	frequently	travelled	routes	or	construction	of	
scenes.			
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Possible	mechanism:	Semanticization	of	detailed	information.		
Perhaps	detailed	information	can	be	acquired	in	a	similar	way	as	semantic	or	schematic	
information	in	developmental	amnesia,	with	extended	time	and	exposure.	It	is	possible	that	
H.C.’s	repeated	exposure	to	her	environment	allowed	her	to	“semanticize”	the	information,	and	
overtime	learn	the	intricacies,	which	could	have	not	only	helped	her	navigate,	but	also	assisted	
in	the	creation	of	a	relatively	rich	and	coherent	representation	of	the	environment.	With	
enough	exposure,	details	of	landmarks	or	features	of	the	environment	that	are	frequently	
encountered	may	undergo	a	type	of	“semanticization.”	If	this	were	the	case,	H.C.	would	be	able	
to	recall	detailed	perceptual	features	of	landmarks	that	she	engages	with	on	a	regular	basis	
more	easily	than	those	landmarks	with	which	she	has	less	experience.	In	a	similar	vein,	Brandt,	
Gardiner,	Vargha-Khadem,	Baddeley,	&	Mishkin	(2006)	examined	factors	that	could	boost	
episodic-like	recall	in	developmental	amnesic	case	Jon.	They	found	that	his	ability	to	recall	
words	from	a	new	word	list	was	better	after	four	trials	compared	to	one,	and	speculate	that	the	
additional	exposure	was	more	effective	for	learning	because	it	was	less	reliant	on	episodic	
memory	as	it	“decontextualized	the	learning	experience”	(Brandt	et	al.,	2006).	Essentially	it	
enabled	episodic-like	information	to	be	encoded	into	semantic	memory.	Repetition	may	play	a	
similar	role	for	encoding	detailed	information	about	the	environment	into	a	schematic	
representation	of	space.	They	also	found	that	Jon	was	better	at	remembering	words	that	he	had	
generated	a	semantic	associate	for,	compared	to	a	rhyming	word,	again	suggesting	that	
semantic	memory	can	assuage	the	recall	impairment	typically	seen	in	developmental	amnesia	
(Brandt	et	al.,	2006).	Interestingly,	Blumenthal	and	colleagues	(2017)	found	that	when	H.C.	was	
asked	to	write	down	as	many	features	as	possible	for	different	concepts	(e.g.,	pig,	shoes),	she	
generated	a	similar	number	of	intrinsic	features	(e.g.,	colour	and	shape)	as	control	participants,	
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but	significantly	fewer	extrinsic	features	(e.g.,	how	something	is	used,	where	it	is	typically	
located).	This	distinction	in	semantic	memory	seems	to	parallel	findings	from	the	current	study,	
where	H.C.	could	generate	perceptual	features	of	landmarks	(intrinsic),	but	had	difficulty	placing	
these	landmarks	in	context	relative	to	other	landmarks	(extrinsic).		
	It	is	possible	that	when	H.C.	was	asked	to	describe	a	route	in	detail,	she	conjured	up	any	
aspects	of	the	environment	that	she	had	extensive	experience	with,	which	might	explain	why	
some	of	the	landmarks	she	described	were	not	on	the	route.	For	example,	the	convenience	
store-turned-apartment	building	described	in	her	descriptive	directions	is	located	on	a	main	
street	that	H.C.	frequently	travels	along,	which	makes	it	possible	that	the	details	were	learned	
with	extended	time	and	experience.	In	contrast,	however,	H.C.	was	able	to	provide	a	detailed	
description	of	a	school	that	she	never	attended	which	was	located	off	the	route	on	a	side	street	
that	she	does	not	take	as	often.	
Possible	mechanism:	Semantic	and	world	knowledge	increase	detail	in	descriptions,	
but	prevent	a	rich	sense	of	experiencing.			
	 Results	from	Mullally	and	colleagues’	(2014)	fMRI	study	suggest	that	developmental	
amnesic	case	Jon	is	able	to	construct	spatially	coherent	scenes	for	future	scenarios	without	the	
hippocampus.	They	argue	that	preserved	semantic	memory	and	knowledge	about	the	world,	in	
conjunction	with	intact	reasoning	ability,	may	underlie	this	non-hippocampal	dependent	scene	
construction.	If	one	knows	how	a	particular	type	of	event	typically	unfolds,	this	may	aid	in	the	
construction	of	a	future	scenario.	Klein	(2013)	also	found	that	semantic	memory	enables	future	
thinking.	Conceivably	semantic	and	world	knowledge	could	also	help	generate	details,	or	“fill	in	
the	blanks”	in	an	individual’s	schematic	representation	of	space.	In	the	current	study,	H.C.	could	
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have	been	aware	there	was	a	school,	but	may	have	had	difficulty	conjuring	up	a	picture	of	the	
school	in	her	mind’s	eye.	She	could	have	successfully	described	features	of	and	near	the	school	
using	semantic	knowledge,	however,	which	could	have	enabled	her	to	envision	a	school	(albeit,	
not	the	actual	one).	For	example,	she	mentions	a	basketball	court	and	playground	near	the	
school,	features	which	are	found	at	most	schools.	H.C.,	however,	was	able	to	provide	detailed	
information	about	the	school	that	would	go	beyond	what	would	be	expected	if	she	were	solely	
relying	on	world	knowledge.	For	example,	she	accurately	described	the	relation	of	the	
basketball	court	and	playground	relative	to	the	school,	which	is	not	consistent	at	every	school,	
and	she	mentioned	the	location	of	a	gravel	pit,	which	would	not	be	a	stereotypical	feature	at	a	
school.		
Mullally	and	colleagues	(2014)	suggest	that	while	developmental	amnesic	cases	show	
intact	performance	on	scene	construction	tasks,	they	may	not	be	visualizing	the	scene	in	their	
mind’s	eye.	Although	Jon	was	reported	to	have	intact	scene	construction,	Jon	showed	
borderline	impairment	on	the	number	of	sensory	descriptions	he	conjured	up	in	his	future	
scenario	(Maguire	et	al.,	2010).	This	is	consistent	with	the	Trace	Transformation	Theory’s	idea	
that	the	hippocampus	is	always	required	for	representing	detail.	Indeed,	Jon	has	shared	that	he	
finds	it	difficult	to	visualize	things	in	his	mind’s	eye	(Maguire	et	al.,	2010).	Conjuring	up	
imaginary	scenarios	seems	to	be	quite	effortful	for	Jon,	who	told	Maguire	and	colleagues	
(2010),	“It	doesn’t	come	at	the	snap	of	a	finger,	like	it	does	with	other	people,	I	have	a	starting	
point	and	then	fill	in	the	details”	(p.	3191).	This	led	Maguire	and	colleagues	(2010)	to	suggest	
that	the	non-hippocampally-dependent	scene	constructions	may	not	be	based	on	true	
visualization,	as	would	occur	with	a	functioning	hippocampus.		
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H.C.,	on	the	other	hand,	did	not	differ	significantly	from	controls	on	the	number	of	
sensory	descriptions	provided	when	envisioning	a	future	scenario	(Hurley	et	al.,	2011)	and	
before	probing,	she	had	a	higher	proportion	of	sensory	descriptions	compared	to	controls	for	
this	study’s	route	description	task.	She	also	did	not	report	significantly	different	ratings	for	
vividness	of	the	scenario	or	sense	of	presence	within	the	scenario	(Hurley	et	al.,	2011).	Hurley	
and	colleagues	(2011)	report	that	H.C.	was	unable	to	describe	her	strategy	for	constructing	
scenarios	and	suggest	she	may	consider	her	representation	to	be	vivid	and	coherent,	but	that	
the	nature	of	her	hippocampal	damage	might	have	made	it	impossible	for	her	to	truly	visualize	a	
scenario,	so	her	perception	of	what	constitutes	vividness	may	differ	from	that	of	controls	
(Hurley	et	al.,	2011).	While	this	is	a	possibility,	H.C.’s	intact	number	of	sensory	descriptions	
compared	to	controls	suggests	that	H.C.	is	able	to	vividly	imagine	a	scenario.	Unfortunately,	
ratings	of	vividness	and	a	sense	of	re-experiencing	were	not	collected	for	H.C.’s	route	
description,	which	could	have	shed	more	light	on	H.C.’s	ability	to	conjure	up	a	rich	
representation	of	her	home	environment.			
Inaccurate	details	within	descriptions.			
	 A	third	possibility	that	could	explain	how	H.C.	managed	to	have	a	comparable	amount	of	
detail	in	her	route	description	as	controls	is	that	details	she	provided	could	have	been	
inaccurate.	Rose	and	colleagues	(2012)	found	that	H.C.	recalled	a	larger	number	of	intrusions	
than	controls	on	a	delayed-match-to-sample	task	for	famous	and	non-famous	faces.	They	
speculated	that	H.C.	might	have	a	very	liberal	report	criterion,	such	that	she	reports	anything	
that	comes	to	mind	in	an	attempt	to	compensate	for	her	memory	deficit	(Rose	et	al.,	2012).	A	
verbal	task	like	the	route	description	in	this	study	may	be	more	prone	to	such	confabulation	
compared	to	a	delayed-match-to-sample	or	paper-and-pencil	task,	as	it	might	put	more	
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pressure	on	the	participant	to	provide	a	description	that	sounds	fluid.	This	could	explain	why	we	
see	detailed	route	descriptions	but	impoverished	sketch	maps	in	H.C.		As	described	in	the	
results,	H.C.	seemed	to	have	difficulty	forming	a	coherent	representation	of	space,	but	the	
details	provided	to	describe	perceptual	features	of	landmarks	were	found	to	be	accurate.	As	
such,	we	rule	out	the	possibility	that	the	proportion	of	sensory	descriptions	provided	by	H.C.	
were	inflated	by	inaccurate	details	about	entities.		
	 It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	H.C.’s	proportion	of	sensory	descriptions,	entities,	
and	spatial	references	included	those	landmarks	that	she	described	that	fell	outside	of	her	
planned	route.	Since	the	examiner	could	not	confirm	the	accuracy	of	entities	along	the	route	
while	H.C.	was	providing	her	detailed	description,	the	examiner	probed	some	of	the	landmarks	
off	the	route.		As	such,	removal	of	those	landmarks	would	have	put	H.C.	at	a	disadvantage.	
Impact	of	Results	on	Theories		
On	the	surface,	findings	of	rich	route	descriptions	in	developmental	amnesic	H.C.	could	
be	considered	at	odds	with	the	Trace	Transformation	Theory	(Winocur	&	Moscovitch,	2011),	as	
it	provides	evidence	that	some	detail	may	exist	outside	of	the	hippocampus	and	be	readily	
accessed,	even	before	cues	or	probes	are	provided.	H.C.’s	ability	to	recall	details	about	entities,	
above	what	would	have	been	expected	if	relying	on	a	schema	or	semantic	memory,	further	
supports	the	notion	that	she	has	access	to	an	intact	detailed	representation	of	her	home	
environment.	As	previously	noted,	individuals	with	developmental	amnesia	have	a	propensity	
for	functional	reorganization.	As	such,	findings	of	rich	detailed	representations	of	space	in	
developmental	amnesia	would	not	debunk	the	proposal	that	the	hippocampus	is	required	for	
accessing	detailed	representations	that	enable	re-experiencing	in	individuals	with	typical	
hippocampal	development.	
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Moscovitch,	Cabeza,	Winocur,	&	Nadel	(2016)	suggest	that	the	hippocampus	is	
responsible	for	creating	complex	events,	enabling	a	rich	sense	of	experiencing	by	binding	
objects	with	their	spatiotemporal	contexts.	They	proposed	that	prior	to	reaching	the	
hippocampus,	sensory	information	is	bound	to	objects	and	contexts	in	sensory	and	cortical	
medial	temporal	lobe	regions	(Moscovitch	et	al.,	2016).	From	this	perspective,	the	types	of	
sensory	details	provided	by	H.C.	in	the	current	study	would	not	rely	on	the	hippocampus,	
whereas	the	integration	of	the	entities	into	a	spatial	context	would.	Interestingly,	a	qualitative	
examination	of	H.C.’s	route	description	revealed	difficulty	creating	a	cohesive	representation	
that	integrated	various	landmarks,	even	when	those	landmarks’	perceptual	features	could	be	
described	in	detail.		
The	suggestion	of	a	lack	of	coherence	in	H.C’s	route	descriptions	is	in	contrast	with	H.C.’s	
reportedly	intact	scene	construction	for	future	scenarios	(Hurley	et	al.,	2011).	One	difficulty	that	
arises	when	comparing	studies	is	that	a	scene	is	not	fully	operationalized	in	Hurley	and	
colleagues’	study.	Assuming	that	scene	construction	involves	describing	a	scenario	from	only	
one	point	of	view,	then	one	could	interpret	H.C.’s	ability	to	accurately	describe	an	intersection	
from	one	point	of	view	in	the	current	study	as	intact	based	on	the	Scene	Construction	Theory.	
When	required	to	alter	her	mental	representation	by	shifting	her	point	of	view,	however,	H.C.	
had	difficulty	binding	the	original	scene	with	the	features	around	it.	Mullally	and	colleagues	
(2014)	believe	that	the	non-hippocampal-dependent	semantic	strategy	that	may	be	used	for	
scene	construction	in	developmental	amnesia	would	be	inadequate	for	spatial	navigation,	
where	vivid	visualization	of	the	scene	in	one’s	mind’s	eye	is	required.	As	such,	one	might	
speculate	that	they	would	also	predict	impairment	in	shifting	viewpoints.	Perhaps	H.C.	was	
intact	on	the	scene	construction	task	because	she	had	to	bind	a	scene	together,	a	less	
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challenging	task	then	binding	several	scenes	together,	as	would	be	required	for	mental	
navigation	of	a	route	or	rotation	within	an	imagined	intersection.	It	may	also	be	the	case	that	
the	ability	to	extend	the	boundaries	of	a	representation	and	imagine	what	comes	next	may	be	
impaired	in	developmental	amnesia,	despite	intact	scene	construction.	To	our	knowledge,	
boundary	extension	has	not	been	formally	tested	in	developmental	amnesia.		
Revisiting	the	Possibility	of	a	Relational	Memory	Deficit			 H.C.’s	difficulty	accurately	describing	the	location	of	landmarks	relative	to	other	
landmarks	along	a	familiar	route	is	consistent	with	a	relational	memory	deficit.	The	Relational	
Memory	Theory	proposes	that	the	hippocampus	is	required	for	creating	memory	
representations	of	all	types	of	relations,	including	spatial	relations	(Eichenbaum,	2017).	The	
inability	to	bind	spatial	relations	would	lead	to	a	fragmented	representation	of	an	environment,	
as	was	found	in	H.C.’s	sketch	maps	(Chapter	3).	H.C.’s	difficulty	binding	entities	to	their	locations	
and	in	relation	to	other	entities	limited	her	ability	to	mentally	navigate	a	familiar	route.	While	
H.C.	could	accurately	describe	perceptual	details	of	landmarks	and	a	scene	as	imagined	from	a	
single	viewpoint,	she	was	unable	to	bind	together	the	locations	of	landmarks	to	mentally	
navigate	from	one	to	the	other.	This	is	evident	from	her	inclusion	of	landmarks	that	do	not	fall	
along	the	route	and	incorrect	placement	of	landmarks	on	the	corners	of	an	intersection.	
H.C.	can	retrieve	landmarks	from	memory,	but	she	does	not	seem	able	to	retrieve	the	relations	
between	them.	It	is	also	possible	that	H.C.’s	hippocampal	compromise	affects	her	ability	to	
encode	the	spatial	relations	in	the	first	place,	which	is	detrimental	for	subsequent	recall	or	
recognition.	Olsen	and	colleagues	(2015)	reported	that	H.C.	could	not	recognize	faces	studied	
from	variable	viewpoints	but	could	recognize	faces	studied	from	a	single	viewpoint.	This	led	the	
authors	to	propose	that	the	hippocampus	is	needed	to	flexibly	integrate	item	representations	
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across	different	viewpoints	but	that	extrahippocampal	regions	are	sufficient	for	encoding	when	
the	viewpoint	does	not	vary	across	repetitions.	Results	from	these	studies	highlight	the	
important	role	of	the	hippocampus	in	binding	elements	into	a	flexible	relational	representation.	
Revisiting	the	Possibility	of	a	Working	Memory	Deficit		
Similar	to	her	performance	on	the	blocked	route	task	(described	in	Chapter	3),	when	
H.C.	was	asked	to	describe	her	familiar	route	in	more	detail,	she	seemed	to	have	difficulty	
keeping	track	of	what	elements	she	had	already	described	and	where	she	“was”	in	her	imagined	
scene.	It	seemed	as	though	she	had	difficulty	maintaining	her	viewpoint	in	her	mind’s	eye.	This	
could	be	due	to	difficulty	integrating	various	elements	in	an	environment	into	a	cohesive	whole,	
or	difficulty	truly	envisioning	the	scene.	However,	the	fact	that	she	seemed	to	jump	from	one	
scene	to	another	and	forget	what	she	had	described	only	moments	before	suggest	that	a	deficit	
in	working	memory	could	also	be	at	play.	A	possible	deficit	in	working	memory	could	underlie	or	
contribute	to	the	lack	of	coherence	seen	in	the	route	description	task.		
Limitations		
This	study	aimed	to	assess	the	integrity	of	H.C.’s	detailed	representation	of	her	home	
environment.	H.C.’s	ability	to	provide	basic	directions	from	her	home	to	her	in-laws’	house	was	
intact,	which	was	taken	as	support	that	she	has	a	coherent	representation	of	her	home	
environment	(or	at	least	a	coherent	representation	of	a	route	within	the	environment)	that	is	
sufficient	for	navigation.	Interestingly,	she	seemed	to	have	difficulty	forming	a	coherent	
representation	of	a	portion	of	the	same	route	when	she	was	trying	to	imagine	what	she	saw	
along	the	way.	It	is	possible	that	H.C.	was	able	to	provide	basic	directions	of	the	route	because	
she	could	focus	on	a	few	pertinent	features	within	the	environment	to	aid	navigation.	With	the	
added	task	of	imagining	a	detailed	representation	of	the	route,	she	seemed	to	lose	track	of	
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where	she	was,	leading	to	an	incoherent	representation,	even	on	a	smaller-scale	at	just	one	
intersection.	This	study	would	have	benefited	from	the	addition	of	vividness	ratings,	sense	of	
experience	ratings,	and	the	Coherence	Index	(see	Hurley	et	al.,	2011).	The	Coherence	Index	asks	
participants	to	reflect	on	the	level	of	fragmentation	seen	in	the	scene	they	just	imagined.	They	
provide	a	list	of	statements	and	ask	participants	to	mark	the	ones	that	best	describe	their	
experience	of	recalling	the	scene.	Statements	include,	“	I	could	see	individual	details,	but	it	
didn’t	all	fit	together	as	a	whole	scene,”	“It	wasn’t	so	much	a	scene	as	a	collection	of	images,”	
and,	“It	wasn’t	a	scene	you	could	step	into;	it	wasn’t	really	joined-up.”	Comparing	level	of	
vividness	and	sense	of	experiencing	ratings	after	the	basic	directions	instruction	and	again	
following	the	instruction	to	provide	detailed	directions	could	have	provided	insight	into	whether	
the	detail	that	H.C.	was	conjuring	up	was	interfering	with	her	ability	to	recall	a	coherent	
representation	of	her	home	environment.	In	addition,	H.C.’s	responses	on	the	Coherence	Index	
would	have	provided	us	with	additional	insight	into	whether	the	scenes	H.C.	described	on	the	
route	description	task	felt	incoherent	to	her.		
Summary		
Contrary	to	our	hypotheses,	H.C.’s	proportion	of	detailed	features	was	similar	to,	and	at	
times	better	than,	that	of	controls.	This	suggests	that	H.C.	has	a	detailed	representation	of	her	
home	environment	on	which	to	call	upon,	despite	having	abnormal	hippocampal	development.	
Functioning	residual	hippocampal	tissue	may	explain	H.C.’s	ability	to	describe	perceptual	
features	of	entities.	Alternatively,	detailed	information	may	be	learned	with	extended	time	and	
exposure.	Another	possibility	is	that	semantic	knowledge	may	support	the	retrieval	of	detailed	
information.	While	semantic	and	world	knowledge	could	allow	H.C.	to	“fill	in	the	details”	of	a	
schematic	representation	of	space,	her	ability	to	describe	non-stereotypical	aspects	of	particular	
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landmarks	suggests	that	she	does,	in	fact,	have	access	to	a	detailed	representation	of	her	home	
environment.	Strikingly,	while	H.C.	was	able	to	provide	basic	directions	from	her	home	to	her	in-
laws’	house,	her	description	of	an	intersection	along	the	route	was	incoherent	when	she	was	
asked	to	describe	what	she	saw	along	the	route.	It	seems	she	is	able	to	describe	the	very	fine-
grained	detailed	of	objects	and	landmarks,	but	struggles	to	bind	scenes	together	into	a	cohesive	
whole.	H.C.’s	inability	to	accurately	describe	certain	entities’	locations	in	relation	to	other	
entities	may	be	best	explained	by	a	spatial-relational	deficit,	and	be	compounded	by	working	
memory	difficulties.		
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CHAPTER	5	
General	Discussion	
	
	 In	this	dissertation,	I	aimed	to	investigate	the	integrity	of	spatial	representations	of	
frequently	travelled	environments	in	an	individual	with	developmental	amnesia.	I	attempted	to	
address	three	main	research	questions:		
	
1) What	is	the	status	of	spatial	memory	representations	of	large-scale	environments	
learned	over	many	years	in	a	person	with	developmental	amnesia?	
	
2) Is	the	hippocampus	needed	for	flexible	navigation,	to	reconfigure	or	remap	familiar	
routes	in	the	service	of	navigation?		
	
3) Are	detailed	representations	of	well-known,	large-scale	environments	affected	in	
developmental	amnesia,	as	they	are	in	individuals	with	adult-onset	hippocampal	
amnesia?		
	
Following	the	results	of	Study	1,	a	fourth	question	became	integral	to	this	dissertation,	
namely:	How	do	representations	of	extensively	travelled	environments	change	over	time	in	
developmental	amnesia?		
Below	I	will	elaborate	on	the	main	findings	from	each	of	the	three	studies,	and	discuss	
how	they	provide	insight	into	the	questions	above.	Next,	I	compare	H.C.’s	performance	on	
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spatial	memory	tasks	to	that	of	adult-onset	amnesic	cases	to	speculate	about	what	differences	
between	them	may	reveal	about	the	necessity	of	the	hippocampus	for	learning	environments.	I	
discuss	findings	of	working	memory	difficulties	in	H.C.	and	in	what	way(s)	working	memory	may	
contribute	to	the	deficits	described	here.	I	then	discuss	how	these	results	fit	or	fail	to	fit	with	
several	theories	or	hippocampal	function.	Finally,	I	discuss	the	clinical	implications	of	these	
findings	and	future	research	to	address	outstanding	issues.		
Summary	of	Studies		
The	studies	in	this	dissertation	demonstrate	that	developmental	amnesic	case	H.C.	is	
able	to	navigate	in	her	home	environment	in	which	she	has	lived	her	entire	life.	Despite	atypical	
hippocampal	development	and	impaired	episodic	memory,	H.C.	has	been	able	to	form	a	
representation	of	space	that	is	sufficient	for	navigating	familiar	and	less	familiar	routes.	Given	
her	intact	ability	to	provide	perceptual	details	about	landmarks,	H.C.’s	impoverished	sketch	
maps	could	be	attributed	to	a	strategic	retrieval,	relational	memory,	or	working	memory	
difficulty.	She	described	landmarks	on	the	route	description	task	that	fell	outside	the	route	and	
inaccurately	described	the	placement	of	landmarks	along	the	route,	suggesting	that	she	has	
difficulty	mentally	travelling	along	a	route.	This	raised	the	possibility	that,	while	she	may	have	
access	to	fine-grained	perceptual	details	of	landmarks,	she	has	difficulty	forming	a	coherent	
representation	of	space	that	allows	for	rich	re-experiencing.	At	this	time,	it	is	unknown	whether	
the	incoherence	in	Studies	2	and	3	was	observed	because	she	only	has	access	in	memory	to	a	
coarse,	inflexible	representation	of	her	home	environment,	or	whether	additional	factors,	such	
as	a	deficit	in	relational	memory	or	working	memory	could	also	play	a	role.	Notably,	H.C.	had	
difficulty	when	she	had	to	generate	or	manipulate	multiple	landmarks	or	spatial	features	in	
mind,	as	seen	on	the	landmark	sequencing,	landmark	localization,	sketch	maps,	and	blocked	
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route	tasks	from	Study	2.	This	was	also	seen	in	Study	3,	where	she	could	give	accurate	basic	
directions	but	failed	to	integrate	elements	into	a	cohesive	whole	when	asked	to	provide	more	
descriptive	directions.	This	may	explain	why	H.C.	performed	comparably	to	controls	on	the	
Google	Street	View	task	(Study	1)	–	the	dynamic	virtual	reality	task	bound	together	features	in	
the	environment	and	reduced	retrieval,	working	memory,	and	relational	memory	demands.			
	 The	first	study	in	this	dissertation	follows	up	on	previous	work	showing	that	H.C.	had	
formed	a	coarse,	schematic	representation	of	her	frequently	travelled	home	environment	that	
was	impoverished	and	lacked	cohesion	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).	Because	the	initial	study	was	
based	on	a	battery	of	tests	of	mental	navigation,	I	capitalized	on	technological	advances	with	
Google	Street	View	that	enables	the	virtual	navigation	of	real-world	environments	to	address	
the	first	two	research	questions:	whether	spatial	learning	of	extensively	travelled	environments	
is	possible	in	the	context	of	an	atypically	developed	hippocampal	system,	and	whether	the	
representations	that	are	formed	can	be	used	flexibly.	Here	we	used	a	more	immersive	set	of	
tasks	that	enable	virtual	navigation	along	pre-experimentally	familiar	and	less	familiar	routes	to	
test	whether	the	coarse,	schematic	representation	suggested	in	previous	work	would	be	
sufficient	for	actual	navigation	within	the	environment.	Familiar	routes	that	were	mirrored-
reversed	were	also	used	to	examine	the	flexibility	of	H.C.’s	representations	of	the	environment.	
H.C.’s	performance	on	outcome	measures	such	as	number	of	pauses,	number	of	progression	
errors,	latency	between	button	presses,	and	directness	of	travel,	was	largely	on	par	with	that	of	
controls,	despite	her	atypical	hippocampal	development.	Results	arising	from	use	of	this	
dynamic,	immersive	virtual	reality	research	tool	indicate	that	normal	development	of	the	
hippocampus	is	not	critical	for	navigating	routes	within	an	extensively	experienced	
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environment.	Furthermore,	H.C.’s	successful	navigation	of	mirrored	routes	suggested	that	the	
hippocampus	might	not	be	required	for	flexible	navigation.		
	 While	H.C.’s	intact	ability	to	navigate	familiar	and	less	familiar	routes	within	her	home	
environment	was	expected,	her	ability	to	navigate	mirrored	routes	in	Study	1	was	unexpected	
and	at	odds	with	previous	findings	of	inflexible	representations	of	her	home	environment,	
reported	in	Rosenbaum	et	al.	(2015).	As	there	was	a	6-year	gap	between	navigation	testing	and	
Study	1,	an	improvement	in	H.C.’s	mental	representation	of	her	home	environment	could	have	
explained	her	intact	ability	to	navigate	her	home	environment	flexibly.	As	such,	this	dissertation	
was	amended	to	include	an	additional	research	goal:	to	examine	how	representations	of	
frequently	travelled	environments	might	change	over	time	in	developmental	amnesia.	To	this	
end,	H.C.	was	re-tested	on	the	mental	navigation	tasks	on	which	she	showed	impairment	when	
first	tested	in	2010	(as	reported	in	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015).		Contrary	to	expectations,	H.C.’s	
representations	of	her	home	environment,	as	assessed	using	mental	navigation	tasks,	did	not	
improve	over	the	8-year	period	since	she	was	first	tested.		She	continued	to	draw	impoverished	
and	incoherent	sketch	maps,	and	had	difficulty	placing	multiple	landmarks	on	a	map,	
sequencing	landmarks,	and	describing	detours	on	blocked	routes.	The	results	suggest	that	
although	H.C.	was	able	to	represent	some	aspects	of	her	home	environment,	it	remained	
inflexible	and	seemed	to	be	lacking	in	detail	and	cohesion.	While	H.C.’s	representation	of	her	
home	environment	did	not	seem	to	change,	it	is	notable	that	she	was	able	to	learn	novel	routes	
between	her	new	home	and	work	during	this	time.	Unexpected	findings	that	H.C.	seemed	to	
lose	track	of	where	she	was	when	mentally	navigating	a	blocked	route	raised	the	possibility	that	
other	non-spatial	factors,	such	as	an	increased	susceptibility	to	distraction	and	interference,	
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poor	working	memory,	or	a	deficit	in	relational	memory,	could	have	contributed	to	H.C.’s	poor	
performance	on	these	mental	navigation	tasks.			
	 The	third	study	in	this	dissertation	provided	a	more	thorough	investigation	of	the	
integrity	of	H.C.’s	detailed	representation	of	her	home	environment,	which	was	hypothesized	to	
be	impoverished	based	on	the	lack	of	detail	included	in	her	sketch	maps	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	
2015	and	Study	2)	and	the	impoverished	route	descriptions	that	have	been	reported	in	separate	
studies	of	adult-onset	hippocampal	amnesic	cases	(Herdman	et	al.,	2015).	H.C.’s	performance	
on	the	route	description	task	revealed	that	she	is,	in	fact,	able	to	recall	accurate	perceptual	
details	of	landmarks	within	her	environment.	Consistent	with	her	sketch	maps	(Study	2),	
however,	she	seemed	to	have	difficulty	binding	these	landmarks	into	a	cohesive	whole,	as	her	
description	of	landmarks	along	the	route	seemed	disconnected.	This	could	reflect	an	issue	with	
relational	processing	of	landmarks	with	their	locations	as	well	as	in	the	context	of	other	
surrounding	landmarks.	Further	evidence	of	a	possible	working	memory	deficit	was	also	found	
in	this	study,	as	H.C.	seemed	to	jump	from	location	to	location,	forgetting	what	she	had	
previously	described	when	providing	descriptive	directions.		
What	is	the	nature	of	spatial	representations	of	large-scale,	extensively	experienced	
environments	in	developmental	amnesia,	and	how	do	they	affect	real-world	navigation?			
	 Results	from	this	dissertation	suggest	that	H.C.	has	developed	a	representation	of	her	
home	environment,	although	it	seems	to	be	rather	fragmented,	which	likely	limits	mental	
navigation.	Evidence	that	H.C.’s	poor	performance	on	mental	navigation	tasks	remains	
unchanged	after	8	years	(Study	2),	in	the	context	of	an	intact	ability	to	learn	new	routes	within	
her	home	environment	(as	demonstrated	by	successful	navigation	between	H.C.’s	new	house	
and	other	landmarks	in	Study	1),	may	speak	to	the	way	in	which	H.C.	learns	spatial	relations.	She	
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has	been	able	to	navigate	particular	routes	between	landmarks	learned	even	within	only	the	
last	few	years	(for	example,	from	her	current	home	to	her	work),	but	she	still	seems	to	have	
difficulty	drawing	a	sketch	map	and	placing	landmarks	accurately	on	a	map,	tasks	believed	to	
require	an	allocentric,	map-like	knowledge	of	the	relations	between	landmarks	themselves.	It	
seems	that	H.C.	is	able	to	learn	and	follow	routes,	and	perhaps	with	exposure	to	many	
overlapping	routes,	she	has	formed	a	coarse,	topological	representation	of	space	that	allows	for	
some	minor	flexibility	in	navigation,	but	that	is	not	a	flexible,	cognitive	map	of	the	environment	
that	enables	navigation	of	novel	routes	(Eichenbaum,	2017).	The	fragmented	nature	of	H.C.’s	
sketch	maps	supports	this	interpretation.		
On	the	Google	Street	View	paradigm	(Study	1),	her	ability	to	accurately	navigate	less	
familiar	routes	within	her	home	environment	was	believed	to	provide	evidence	that	she	has	a	
schematic,	map-like	representation	of	space,	and	that	she	was	not	merely	“following	well-worn	
routes.”	Upon	further	examination	of	her	impaired	performance	on	mental	navigation	tasks,	
however,	it	seems	plausible	that	H.C.	was	engaging	in	topological	navigation	during	the	Google	
Street	View	task.	Successful	navigation	of	less	familiar	routes	could	have	been	achieved	using	
habit	memory	and	knowledge	about	overlapping	routes	to	navigate	along	paths	that	have	
already	been	traversed.	This	may	explain	why	she	failed	to	take	the	most	direct	routes	in	several	
cases,	as	doing	so	might	have	required	navigating	down	streets	on	which	she	has	little	
experience	travelling.		
Following	routes	is	consistent	with	H.C.’s	self-report	on	the	Navigation	Strategies	
questionnaire,	described	in	Chapter	2.	She	reported	a	preference	for	using	a	list	of	directions	
over	a	map	to	navigate.	Consistent	with	her	performance	on	the	sketch	map	task,	she	indicated	
that	she	would	have	difficulty	drawing	a	map	of	an	area	of	the	city	that	she	knows	well	on	the	
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Navigation	Strategies	questionnaire.	This	suggests	that	she	navigates	predominantly	using	an	
egocentric	strategy,	where	she	considers	landmarks	in	relation	to	her	own	position,	rather	than	
the	position	of	landmarks	relative	to	one	another.	Interestingly,	when	planning	a	route	in	her	
mind,	she	reported	that	she	pictures	scenes	of	what	she	would	see	along	the	way.	When	
navigating	in	the	real	world	and	perhaps	in	virtual	reality,	H.C.	likely	has	recognition-triggered	
responses,	where	she	recognizes	and	approaches	sequential	landmarks,	allowing	her	to	reach	
her	goal	without	substantial	planning	(Eichenbaum,	2017).		
While	this	recognition-triggered	response	strategy	may	be	sufficient	for	H.C.’s	navigation	
of	routes	in	the	real	world	and	on	virtual	reality	tasks,	it	does	not	seem	to	be	adequate	for	
navigating	or	envisioning	a	mental	representation	of	the	same	environment.	Being	able	to	form	
a	mental	representation	in	one’s	minds	eye	that	allows	one	to	envision	what	comes	next	is	
important	for	planning	navigation	and	providing	directions	to	others.	On	the	Navigation	
Strategies	questionnaire,	H.C.	reported	picturing	travelling	along	a	route	via	a	street-level	view.	
This	is	curious,	as	individuals	with	hippocampal	amnesia	typically	do	not	have	access	to	a	vivid	
representation	that	enables	a	sense	of	experiencing.	Indeed,	while	H.C.	seems	to	be	able	to	
accurately	conjure	up	perceptual	details	of	landmarks,	she	seems	to	have	trouble	integrating	
landmarks	into	a	scene	and	integrating	multiple	scenes,	as	would	be	needed	for	navigation.	This	
might	explain	why	she	has	difficulty	on	mental	navigation	tasks	that	benefit	from	an	immersive	
perspective	but	is	able	to	navigate	successfully	virtually	and	in	the	real	world,	which	provide	the	
immersive	experience.	
Virtual	navigation	of	real-world	environments	provides	visual	cues	that	permit	a	rich	
sense	of	re-experiencing	that	H.C.	seems	unable	to	conjure	up	on	her	own.	As	such,	a	retrieval	
deficit	may	underlie	H.C.’s	difficulties	on	the	mental	navigation	and	route	description	tasks,	
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which	require	mental	imagery.	Additional	visual	cues	on	maps	(Study	2)	benefited	H.C.’s	
placement	of	landmarks	on	a	map,	but	did	not	drastically	benefit	her	ability	to	sequence	
landmarks	on	that	map.	While	her	performance	might	improve	with	additional	cues,	perhaps	
most	useful	to	H.C.	are	cues	that	assist	in	the	creation	of	a	vivid,	first	person	scene.	An	inability	
to	conjure	up	a	representation	that	enables	a	sense	of	re-experiencing	might	make	it	
challenging	for	H.C.	to	adopt	an	egocentric	perspective	when	there	are	no	visual	aids	that	
encourage	re-experiencing.	Perhaps	H.C.’s	difficulty	with	forming	a	vivid	spatial	representation	
is	not	due	to	a	lack	of	detail,	as	H.C.	was	able	to	describe	accurate	perceptual	descriptions	of	
landmarks,	but	a	lack	of	coherence	of	fine-grained	features	within	the	environment.	A	
fragmented	sketch	map,	swap	errors	on	the	landmark	sequencing	task,	and	confusion	about	her	
location	on	the	blocked	route	and	route	description	task	suggest	that	H.C.	is	unable	to	bind	
together	these	landmarks	or	scenes	in	her	own	mind’s	eye.	This	interpretation	could	be	
consistent	with	theories,	including	the	Trace	Transformation	Theory,	Scene	Construction	
Theory,	and	Relational	Memory	Theory,	which	have	in	common	the	supposition	that	the	
hippocampus	is	required	for	binding	information	together.		
Comparing	H.C.’s	spatial	representations	to	that	of	adult-onset	amnesic	cases		
Individuals	with	early-onset	hippocampal	damage	have	been	found	to	differ	in	many	
ways	from	adults	who	acquired	hippocampal	damage	later	in	life.	Although	both	groups	
experience	impaired	episodic	memory,	individuals	with	early-onset	hippocampal	damage	are	
able	to	form	new	semantic	memories	(Vargha-Khadem	et	al.,	1997),	whereas	this	process	seems	
much	more	laborious	for	adult-onset	cases	(Elward	&	Vargha-Khadem,	2018).	Adult-onset	
amnesic	cases	have	difficulty	acquiring	new	semantic	information	but	continue	to	have	access	
to	factual	information	that	was	acquired	prior	to	the	onset	of	their	amnesia	(Elward	&	Vargha-
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Khadem,	2018).	Elward	&	Vargha-Khadem	(2018)	suggested	that	adult-onset	amnesic	cases	
might	continue	to	rely	more	on	their	hippocampal	system	to	encode	and	retrieve	novel	
information,	even	though	it	is	damaged.	Given	that	the	brain	has	increased	plasticity	early	in	
development,	they	suggest	that	the	absence	of	a	functioning	hippocampal	system	in	early	life	in	
developmental	amnesic	cases	likely	results	in	functional	reorganization	that	is	sufficient	for	
semantic	learning	(Elward	&	Vargha-Khadem,	2018).	How	might	adult-onset	and	developmental	
amnesic	cases	differ	when	it	comes	to	spatial	memory?		
Like	H.C.,	adult-onset	amnesic	cases	drew	sketch	maps	of	environments	learned	prior	to	
the	onset	of	their	amnesia	that	were	lacking	in	detail,	but	their	maps	were	much	more	cohesive	
than	those	of	H.C.	(see	Herdman	et	al.,	2015	for	examples).	The	reason	that	adult-onset	amnesic	
cases	are	able	to	access	a	more	cohesive	representation	of	frequently	travelled	environments	
compared	to	HC	is	unclear.	One	possibility	is	that	it	has	something	to	do	with	how	the	
environments	are	learned.	With	a	functioning	hippocampus,	allocentric	representations	might	
form	prior	to	the	onset	of	amnesia.	Perhaps	the	hippocampus	is	needed	to	form	a	flexible	
representation,	but	over	time	is	no	longer	required	to	store	or	retrieve	it.	Without	a	functioning	
hippocampus,	it	may	be	that	H.C.	could	not	form	a	flexible	representation,	instead	relying	on	
well-travelled	routes	and	the	overlap	between	them	to	navigate.		
Unlike	adult-onset	amnesic	cases,	H.C.	was	able	to	describe	just	as	many	perceptual	
details	(sensory	descriptions)	as	controls	on	the	route	description	task	(Study	3).	It	may	be	that	
certain	types	of	detailed	information,	such	as	perceptual	details,	can	exist	outside	of	the	
hippocampus	in	developmental	amnesic	cases,	while	other	types	of	information,	such	as	spatial	
relations	between	landmarks,	cannot	form	in	the	presence	of	early-onset	hippocampal	damage	
and	resulting	episodic	memory	impairment.	There	is	evidence	that	the	perirhinal	cortex,	which	
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is	intact	in	H.C.,	is	involved	in	binding	perceptual	features	of	landmarks	together	(Lee,	Yeung,	&	
Barense,	2012).	This	may	explain	why	H.C.	was	able	to	provide	a	comparable	proportion	of	
perceptual	details	relative	to	control	participants,	whereas	adult-onset	amnesic	cases,	who	have	
larger	lesions,	showed	a	paucity	of	perceptual	details.	Two	of	the	three	adult-onset	amnesic	
cases	that	were	tested	on	the	route	description	task	(Herdman	et	al.,	2015),	D.A.	and	K.C.,	were	
documented	to	have	widespread	lesions	(D.A.:	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2008;	K.C.:	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	
2005),	which	included	the	perirhinal	cortex.	Unfortunately,	neuroanatomical	scans	for	the	third	
adult-onset	amnesic	case,	D.G.,	could	not	be	obtained	due	to	contraindications	for	scanning.	
This	highlights	the	necessity	of	considering	lesion	size	and	location	when	comparing	early-onset	
and	adult-onset	amnesic	case	performance,	especially	since	developmental	amnesic	cases	tend	
to	have	more	circumscribed	lesions	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2011).		
Working	Memory		
Perhaps	the	most	unexpected	finding	in	this	dissertation	was	H.C.’s	possible	working	
memory	deficit.	This	was	a	challenge	as	it	raised	the	possibility	that	deficits	seen	on	spatial	tasks	
may	not	solely	reflect	a	spatial	memory	deficit,	but	could,	at	least	in	part,	be	due	to	non-spatial	
factors.	H.C.	had	difficulty	maintaining	and	manipulating	information	in	mind	and	exhibited	
clear	working	memory	deficits	when	providing	detours	for	the	blocked	route	task	(Study	2)	and	
giving	descriptive	directions	in	the	route	description	task	(Study	3).	It	may	be	that	forming	a	
vivid	mental	representation	of	her	home	environment	places	too	great	a	demand	on	H.C.’s	
working	memory.	This	finding	was	unanticipated,	as	working	memory	has	traditionally	been	
thought	to	rely	largely	on	the	dorsolateral	prefrontal	and	superior	parietal	cortices	(Baddeley,	
2003)	and	be	intact	in	developmental	amnesia.	Indeed,	performance	on	standard	working	
memory	tests	such	as	the	Digit	Span	is	typically	intact,	as	seen	with	H.C.	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	
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2015).	Such	tasks	tend	to	require	a	low	memory	load,	and	often	consist	of	simple	numbers	or	
figures.		
Rose	and	colleagues	(2012)	tested	H.C.	on	verbal	and	visual	working	memory	tasks	with	
familiar	and	novel	verbal	and	visual	stimuli	and	found	that	H.C.	showed	working	memory	
deficits	but	only	for	novel	material.	This	is	incongruent	with	the	difficulties	H.C.	displayed	on	the	
blocked	route	and	route	description	tasks	in	this	dissertation,	which	involved	familiar	
environments.	Yonelinas	(2013)	posited	that	working	memory	is	hippocampal	dependent	when	
the	stimuli	require	fine	discrimination	or	are	complex.		It	may	be	that	with	more	complex	
stimuli,	such	as	a	scene,	H.C.	has	a	lower	working	memory	capacity.	
Interestingly,	when	H.C.’s	impaired	performance	on	several	of	the	mental	navigation	
tasks	was	considered	in	the	context	of	the	previously	reported	intact	distance	judgments,	vector	
mapping,	and	proximity	judgments,	it	was	clear	that	H.C.’s	performance	was	worse	on	those	
tasks	that	required	the	generation	or	manipulation	of	more	than	3	landmarks.	This	parallels	
recent	findings	by	Geva,	Cooper,	Gadian,	Mishkin,	&	Vargha-Khadem	(2016)	who	tested	working	
memory	capacity	in	developmental	amnesic	cases	and	found	that	working	memory	for	abstract	
designs	began	to	rely	on	the	hippocampus	beyond	4	items.	They	concluded	that	memory	load	is	
positively	related	to	hippocampal	function	(Geva	et	al.,	2016).	The	relationship	between	
hippocampal	lesions	and	deficient	working	memory	has	also	been	found	in	neonatal	monkeys	
with	bilateral	hippocampal	lesions,	who	showed	impairment	on	a	task	well	documented	to	be	
reliant	on	the	dorsolateral	prefrontal	cortex	(Heuer	&	Bachevalier,	2011).	Indeed,	many	animal,	
lesion,	and	neuroimaging	studies	have	implicated	the	hippocampus	in	working	memory	when	
the	number	of	stimuli	to	be	remembered	increased	(see	Jeneson	&	Squire,	2011,	for	a	review).	
Jeneson	and	Squire	(2011)	also	note	that	working	memory	is	compromised	when	attention	is	re-
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directed,	consistent	with	anecdotal	evidence	that	H.C.	gets	lost	in	her	home	environment	when	
she	is	distracted.		
In	light	of	the	literature,	H.C.’s	apparent	deficit	in	working	memory	could	be	directly	due	
to	her	atypically	oriented	and	small	hippocampi.	Alternatively,	given	that	there	are	indirect	
connections	between	the	hippocampus	and	dorsolateral	prefrontal	cortex,	her	atypical	
hippocampal	development	may	have	led	to	abnormal	development	of	the	dorsolateral	
prefrontal	cortex	(Geva	et	al.,	2016).		
Contribution	to	Theories	of	Hippocampal	Function		
Many	of	the	large	strides	made	in	understanding	memory	and	the	role	of	the	
hippocampus	came	from	work	with	individual	cases,	such	as	H.M.	(Scoville	&	Milner,	1957)	and	
K.C.	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2005).	Indeed,	single	cases	have	provided	the	foundation	for	some	
influential	theories	of	hippocampal	function.	As	functional	reorganization	is	more	common	in	
developmental	amnesia,	it	makes	it	difficult	to	draw	strong	conclusions	about	the	necessity	or	
lack	thereof	of	the	hippocampus	in	a	typically	functioning	brain.	It	is,	of	course,	unwise	to	try	to	
dispute	a	particular	theory	based	on	of	observations	in	one	developmental	amnesic	case,	as	
functional	reorganization	could	have	allowed	other	brain	structures	to	compensate	for	
performance	on	tasks	that	typically	require	the	hippocampus.		As	Rosenbaum	and	colleagues	
(2014)	note,	however,	new	theoretical	and	empirical	ideas	can	be	generated	from	seemingly	
small	observations	in	a	single	case.	I	would	argue	that	our	work	with	H.C.	has	done	just	that.	
Discussion	of	how	H.C.’s	data	fit	into	contemporary	theories	of	hippocampal	function	helps	
inform	the	theories	and	highlight	areas	within	the	theories	that	could	be	better	defined.		
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Trace	Transformation	Theory		
According	to	the	Trace	Transformation	Theory,	the	hippocampus	is	required	for	
representing	detail	within	a	memory,	regardless	of	when	the	memory	was	formed	(Winocur	&	
Moscovitch,	2011).	Interpreting	the	integrity	of	H.C.’s	detailed	representation	of	her	home	
environment	requires	considering	“detail”	at	multiple	levels.	In	previous	work,	my	colleagues	
and	I	(2015)	found	that	adult-onset	amnesic	peoples’	ability	to	recognize	landmarks	and	
describe	perceptual	details	along	a	route	was	impaired,	suggesting	that	the	hippocampus	is	
required	for	recollecting	perceptual	details	(see	Sheldon	&	Levine,	2013	and	St-Laurent,	
Moscovitch,	Jadd,	&	McAndrews,	2014	for	analogous	findings	in	episodic	memory).	In	this	
sense,	H.C.’s	ability	to	accurately	describe	perceptual	details	about	landmarks,	such	as	colour	
and	texture,	in	Study	3	does	not	support	the	Trace	Transformation	Theory,	as	it	suggests	that	a	
detailed	representation	of	a	frequently	travelled	environment	may	be	able	to	exist	independent	
of	the	hippocampus.	Such	detail	might	be	considered	integral	for	richly	re-experiencing	a	
memory	or	an	environment.		
On	the	other	hand,	detail	has	also	been	considered	on	a	larger	scale,	as	it	relates	to	
spatial	relations.	For	example,	the	inclusion	of	fewer	landmarks	on	a	sketch	map	(Herdman	et	
al.,	2015;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000),	difficulties	sequencing	landmarks	
that	are	in	close	proximity	to	one	another	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015),	and	trouble	navigating	
minor,	non-artery	roads	(Maguire	et	al.,	2006)	have	been	taken	as	evidence	to	suggest	an	
impoverished	representation	of	an	environment.	Contrary	to	landmark	recognition	and	route	
description	tasks,	these	tasks	do	not	require	an	immersive,	first	person	view	to	solve.		
Prior	to	this	dissertation,	studies	did	not	seem	to	differentiate	between	perceptual	and	
fine-grained	spatial	details	when	evaluating	the	integrity	of	detailed	representations	of	space	in	
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adult-onset	amnesic	cases	(Herdman	et	al.,	2015;	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2000).	Work	with	
developmental	H.C.	in	this	dissertation,	however,	demonstrates	that	although	perceptual	details	
and	fine-grained	spatial	details	could	both	be	considered	“details”,	they	are	certainly	not	one	
and	the	same.	In	light	of	this	disparity,	we	propose	that	the	Trace	Transformation	Theory	
provide	a	more	nuanced	working	definition	of	what	constitutes	“detailed”	information	in	the	
context	of	the	spatial	memory.		
The	Trace	Transformation	Theory	implicates	the	hippocampus	in	enabling	a	sense	of	re-
experiencing	of	an	event	or	location.	Unfortunately,	measures	of	vividness	and	sense	of	
presence	were	not	provided	following	the	mental	navigation	tasks	(Study	2)	or	the	route	
description	task	(Study	3),	so	we	cannot	say	with	certainty	whether	H.C.	believes	that	she	is	
richly	imagining	the	environment.	Even	if	these	measures	had	been	provided,	H.C.	might	not	
have	a	benchmark	against	which	to	measure	her	feelings	of	re-experiencing,	immersion,	and/or	
vividness.	The	lack	of	coherence	seen	in	the	blocked	route	task	(Study	2)	and	route	description	
task	(Study	3),	however,	made	it	difficult	for	experimenters	to	follow	along.	Given	the	
fragmentation,	it	seems	unlikely	that	H.C.	is	able	to	richly	envision	scenes	within	her	home	
environment.	This	suggests	that	access	to	perceptual	details	of	landmarks	may	not	be	enough	to	
enable	a	rich	sense	of	re-experiencing,	and	fine-grained	information	about	spatial	relations	may	
be	integral	to	such	re-experiencing.		
The	Trace	Transformation	Theory	also	posits	that	schematic,	gist-like	representations	of	
frequently	travelled	environments	can	exist	outside	of	the	hippocampus.	In	this	way,	H.C.’s	
ability	to	draw	parts	of	sketch	maps	(Study	2)	and	estimate	distance	and	direction	between	
landmarks	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2015)	is	consistent	with	the	theory.	She	clearly	has	been	able	to	
form	some	kind	of	representation	of	her	home	environment,	but	it	appears	to	be	sufficient	only	
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for	topological	navigation	along	routes	and	overlapping	routes	when	mental	navigation	is	
required.	As	seen	in	Study	1,	H.C.’s	representation	is	sufficient	for	virtually	navigating	within	her	
home	environment.		
Scene	Construction	Theory		
Scene	Construction	Theory	posits	that	“scenes	are	the	primary	currency	of	the	
hippocampus”	and	that	individuals	with	compromised	hippocampal	systems	are	unable	to	
construct	scenes	(Maguire	&	Mullally,	2013).	The	fragmentation	seen	in	H.C.’s	sketch	maps,	as	
well	as	her	difficulty	on	the	route	description	task	(Study	3)	and	blocked	route	task	(Study	2)	
suggest	that	she	has	access	to	only	a	fragmented	representation	of	her	home	environment.	
While	this	is	consistent	with	what	the	Scene	Construction	Theory	would	expect	for	adult-onset	
amnesic	cases,	it	is	at	odds	with	their	findings	of	intact	scene	construction	for	fictitious	and	
future	scenarios	in	developmental	amnesic	cases	Jon	(Maguire	et	al.,	2010)	and	H.C.,	herself	
(Hurley	et	al.,	2011).		
Results	from	this	dissertation	support	the	Scene	Construction	Theory	in	that	H.C	was	
able	to	describe	landmarks	and	some	visual	features	around	them	when	picturing	the	landmark	
from	a	single	viewpoint.	It	seems	she	was	able	to	envision,	at	least	to	some	degree,	a	scene	
from	a	real-world	environment.	H.C.,	however,	had	difficulty	imagining	walking	a	well-known	
route	and	even	had	trouble	imagining	one	scene	from	multiple	viewpoints.	In	her	descriptions,	
it	seemed	that	she	could	not	bind	the	previous	view	with	the	features	around	it	when	her	
mental	viewpoint	shifted	and	would	instead	describe	a	landmark	that	was	not	located	nearby.	
Similarly,	when	describing	a	detour	on	the	blocked	route	task	(Study	2),	H.C.	seemed	to	have	
difficulty	binding	distinct	scenes	or	representations	together	fluidly.	King	and	colleagues	(2002)	
found	that	developmental	amnesic	case	Jon	was	able	to	accurately	identify	spatial	locations	of	
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objects	when	tested	from	the	same	viewpoint,	but	that	he	was	impaired	compared	to	controls	
when	tested	on	the	same	scene	from	an	altered	viewpoint.	Lee	and	colleagues	(2012)	suggest	
that	one	must	be	able	to	combine	the	complex	spatial	relationships	between	features	that	make	
up	a	scene	in	order	to	perceive	the	same	scene	from	several	viewpoints.	A	failure	to	accurately	
represent	spatial	relations	would	make	it	very	difficult	to	vividly	imagine	movement	along	a	
route	and	would	explain	H.C.’s	impaired	landmark	sequencing	in	Study	2.		
Mullally	and	colleagues	(2014)	have	suggested	that	developmental	amnesic	cases	may	
rely	on	preserved	world	knowledge	in	semantic	memory	to	facilitate	mental	simulation,	and	
thus	not	vividly	experience	or	truly	visualize	the	scene	in	their	imagination.	Perhaps	H.C.	showed	
intact	scene	construction	when	constructing	fictitious	and	future	scenes	(Hurley	et	al.,	2011),	
but	not	when	describing	a	portion	of	her	route	(Study	3),	because	it	is	more	difficult	to	use	
world	knowledge	to	construct	a	scene	of	an	actual	location.	Her	scene	construction	may	have	
come	across	as	fluid	because	she	had	greater	leeway	with	the	placements	of	landmarks	and	
objects	in	a	fictitious	scene	compared	to	a	description	of	a	real	location,	in	which	spatial	
relations	are	set.	The	intricate	spatial	relationships	between	features	that	make	up	the	scene	
cannot	be	deemed	incorrect	in	a	fictitious	scenario,	but	can	be	inaccurate	when	envisioning	a	
route.	This	might	explain	why	H.C.’s	route	description	(Study	3)	sounded	fluid,	but	was	
incoherent	in	terms	of	the	spatial	relations	between	landmarks.		
Relational	Memory	Theory		
	 Cohen	and	Eichenbaum	(1993)	argued	that	the	hippocampal	system	is	a	relational	
processing	system.	Unlike	the	Scene	Construction	Theory,	the	Relational	Memory	Theory	posits	
that	the	hippocampus	is	involved	in	binding	not	only	spatial	relations,	but	also	more	generally,	
associative/co-occurring	and	sequential/temporal	relations	(Konkel	&	Cohen,	2009).	The	theory	
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highlights	that	the	distinct	nature	of	the	items	is	retained	in	addition	to	the	relevant	relationship	
between	objects	(Cohen	&	Eichenbaum,	1993).	H.C.	demonstrated	having	an	incoherent	
representation	of	her	spatial	environment	on	multiple	occasions	in	during	the	studies	reported	
in	this	dissertation,	including	the	sketch	mapping	and	landmark	sequencing	tasks	(Study	2).	She	
also	had	difficulty	mentally	navigating	routes	while	providing	detours	for	a	blocked	route	task	
(Study	2)	and	providing	descriptive	directions	in	the	route	description	task	(Study	3).	As	
previously	mentioned,	it	appears	that	H.C.	is	unable	to	bind	features	of	the	environment	
together	to	form	a	cohesive	whole	that	enables	mental	navigation,	and	this	is	consistent	with	
the	Relational	Memory	Theory.	Findings	in	this	dissertation	of	swap	errors	during	landmark	
sequencing	(Study	2)	provide	particularly	strong	evidence	for	a	deficit	in	relational	memory.	As	
the	focus	of	this	dissertation	was	on	spatial	memory	and	navigation,	we	cannot	comment	on	
whether	difficulty	binding	information	in	developmental	amnesia	is	found	outside	of	the	spatial	
realm.	Other	studies,	however,	have	found	non-spatial	relational	impairments	in	amnesia	(see	
review	in	Konkel	&	Cohen,	2009)	and	developmental	amnesia	(D’Angelo,	Rosenbaum,	&	Ryan,	
2016).		
Cohen	and	Eichenbaum	(1993)	argued	that	relational	dimensions	could	include	“sensory	
relationships,	such	as	relative	size,	color,	texture,	shape,	etc.;	more	integrative	perceptual	
relationships	such	as	relative	positions	of	objects	in	space	and	time;	and	higher-order	
relationships	based	on	the	temporal	contiguity	of	objects	and	events	with	other	objects	and	
events”	(p.	62).	It	is	not	clear	whether	the	theory	would	predict	that	different	types	of	relations	
(such	as	binding	texture	and	colour	to	shape	versus	integrating	the	relative	positions	of	objects	
in	space)	rely	on	different	components	of	the	hippocampal	system,	or	whether	damage	to	any	
part	of	the	system	results	in	dysfunction	of	all	relational	memory.	More	recent	research,	
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however,	suggests	that	binding	visual	features	occurs	in	earlier	sensory	brain	areas	(Mishkin,	
Vargha-Khadem,	&	Gadian,	1998;	Pickema,	Rijpkema,	Fernández,	&	Kessels,	2010).	The	results	
from	this	dissertation	support	the	view	that	the	hippocampus	is	required	for	relational	memory,	
as	predicted	by	the	Relational	Memory	Theory,	however,	it	may	not	be	required	for	all	types	of	
relational	memory,	including	semantic	and	fine-grained	perceptual	memories.		
Clinical	Implications			
The	mental	navigation	tasks	were	found	to	be	more	sensitive	to	impairment	in	H.C.	than	
the	immersive	virtual	reality	Google	Street	View	tasks	used	in	Study	1.	Based	on	these	findings,	
it	might	be	erroneously	concluded	that	static	paper-and-pencil	tasks	are	more	advantageous	
than	dynamic,	immersive	tools	for	accurately	screening	for	spatial	deficits.	It	seems	to	be	the	
case	that	the	mental	navigation	tasks	are	identifying	a	deficit	that	impinges	on	mental	
representations	of	space,	but	not	spatial	navigation	itself.	This	dissertation	provided	a	more	
nuanced	understanding	of	spatial	relational	impairment	in	developmental	amnesia	and	
highlighted	non-spatial	deficits	that	could	impact	results	on	mental	navigation	tasks.	I	would	
suggest	that	the	Google	Street	View	tool	could	still	be	a	valuable	resource	for	investigating	
navigation,	especially	since	dynamic,	immersive	tests	are	more	ecologically	valid.	The	mirror-
reversed	condition	in	the	Google	Street	View	study	may	not	have	adequately	detected	a	deficit	
in	flexible	navigation	in	H.C.	because	such	navigation	may	require	a	different	type	of	flexibility	
than	that	assumed	by	the	Cognitive	Map	Theory.	Given	H.C.’s	impairment	mentally	navigating	
blocked	routes,	it	would	be	interesting	to	investigate	whether	she	can	navigate	around	blocked	
routes	in	her	environment	using	the	immersive	Google	Street	view	platform.		Studies	that	build	
on	the	findings	from	this	dissertation	and	take	into	consideration	other	possible	non-spatial	
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deficits	may	be	just	as	sensitive	as	mental	navigation	tasks	in	revealing	deficits	in	developmental	
amnesia.		
Given	H.C.’s	ability	to	form	a	representation	of	her	frequently	travelled	home	
environment,	I	also	speculate	as	to	how	spatial	representations	might	form	in	the	absence	of	
episodic	memory.	This	could	serve	as	an	important	starting	point	for	future	research	that	
inevitably	could	result	in	interventions	that	assist	individuals	with	developmental	amnesia	in	
learning	new	environments.	Although	the	focus	of	this	dissertation	was	on	developmental	
amnesia,	such	interventions	may	prove	beneficial	for	other	groups	of	individuals	with	
hippocampal	compromise,	such	as	encephalitis	or	Alzheimer’s	disease.		
Finally,	our	findings	of	possible	working	memory	deficits	also	have	important	
implications	for	how	we	understand	amnesia,	which	is	traditionally	defined	as	an	isolated	deficit	
in	episodic	memory	in	the	context	of	preserved	general	intelligence,	semantic	memory,	
attention,	executive	functioning,	visuospatial	abilities,	and	working	memory	(Vargha-Khadem	et	
al.,	1997).		
Future	Directions		
	 There	were	several	unexpected	findings	across	the	three	studies	described	in	this	
dissertation	that	warrant	follow-up	research.	It	will	be	important	to	determine	if	the	current	
results	extend	to	other	developmental	amnesic	cases	and	adult-onset	amnesic	cases.	Also,	
functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging	(fMRI)	while	H.C.	is	navigating	familiar,	less	familiar,	and	
mirrored	routes	would	allow	us	to	understand	whether	H.C.’s	preserved	performance	on	any	of	
the	Google	Street	View	task	conditions	are	supported	by	residual	hippocampal	tissue	or	other	
brain	structures.	
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	 A	better	understanding	of	the	nature	of	H.C.’s	impairment	on	the	mental	navigation	
tasks	and	route	description	task	is	also	required.	New	paradigms	using	the	Google	Street	View	
tool	that	alter	perceptual	features	of	landmarks	or	reconfigure	the	spatial	layout	may	provide	
insight	into	what	type	of	information	is	integral	for	navigation.		It	would	also	be	interesting	to	
see	whether	H.C.	can	identify	landmarks	from	within	her	home	environment	from	various	points	
of	view	and,	given	her	impairment	mentally	navigating	blocked	routes,	whether	she	can	
navigate	around	blocked	routes	in	her	environment	using	the	immersive	Google	Street	View	
platform.	Eye	tracking	software	could	be	useful	to	gain	a	better	understanding	of	the	landmarks	
that	she	is	relying	on	during	navigation.	The	studies	in	this	dissertation	also	examined	navigation	
in	a	very	insulated	way,	without	regard	to	vestibular	and	kinesthetic	feedback,	factors	that	are	
well	known	to	contribute	to	navigation	(Brandt	et	al.,	2005;	Harris,	Jenkin,	&	Zikovitz,	2000;	for	
review	see	Cogné	et	al.,	2017).	As	such,	it	would	be	important	for	future	studies	to	integrate	the	
Google	Street	View	paradigm	with	other	tools	that	allow	for	a	more	immersive	and	ecologically	
valid	experience.			
	 Mullally	and	colleagues	(2014)	have	also	suggested	that	while	developmental	amnesic	
cases	can	construct	scenes,	they	do	not	seem	to	envision	them	as	vividly	as	controls.	However,	
on	their	future	scenario	task,	H.C.	was	able	to	provide	just	as	many	sensory	details	as	controls	
(Hurley	et	al.,	2011).	Similar	results	were	found	in	our	route	description	task	(Study	3),	where	
H.C.	could	describe	perceptual	features	of	landmarks.	Future	research	should	further	investigate	
the	ability	to	vividly	imagine	scenes	or	scenarios	in	developmental	amnesia	and	be	sure	to	
incorporate	self-report	measures.			
One	of	the	most	surprising	findings	in	this	dissertation	was	that	H.C.	seemed	to	have	
difficulty	maintaining	and	manipulating	information	in	mind.	This	working	memory	difficulty	
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should	be	further	explored	to	determine	whether	it	extends	to	non-spatial	information.	Perhaps	
one	could	build	on	Rose	and	colleagues	(2012)	work	with	H.C.,	who	found	that	she	showed	
working	memory	deficits	for	novel	words	and	faces,	by	examining	H.C.’s	ability	to	hold	more	
complex	visuospatial	stimuli	in	mind,	such	as	scenes.	H.C.’s	performance	on	the	self-ordered	
pointing	task	described	by	Geva	and	colleagues	(2016)	would	also	allow	assessment	of	spatial	
working	memory	with	slightly	less	complex	stimuli.	It	would	also	be	prudent	to	test	H.C.	on	a	
spatial	working	memory	task,	such	as	the	Corsi	Blocks,	to	rule	out	the	possibility	that	the	deficit	
observed	is	modality-specific,	rather	than	related	to	the	number	and/or	complexity	of	the	
stimuli.	
Conclusion		
The	aim	of	this	dissertation	was	to	examine	the	status	of	spatial	representations	of	
extensively	travelled	environments	in	an	individual	with	developmental	amnesia.	H.C.’s	ability	
to	navigate	routes	of	varying	familiarity	on	a	virtual	reality	task	using	real-world	pictures	of	
H.C.’s	home	environment,	provide	coarse	representations	of	her	home	environment	in	map-
form	on	mental	navigation	tasks,	and	describe	navigating	between	two	well-known	landmarks,	
provide	evidence	of	spatial	learning	of	large-scale	environments.	Speculation	was	offered	that	
this	could	be	accomplished	in	a	method	similar	to	how	semantic	information	is	acquired,	with	
extensive	experience	and	time.		
This	dissertation	also	aimed	to	examine	whether	the	hippocampus	was	needed	for	
reconfiguring	or	remapping	familiar	routes	in	the	service	of	navigation.	H.C.’s	intact	ability	to	
navigate	disorienting	mirrored	routes	on	the	Google	Street	View	paradigm	(Study	1)	suggested	
that	the	hippocampus	might	not	be	required	for	remapping.	As	it	is	plausible	that	this	task	could	
have	been	successfully	solved	using	a	habit-based,	non-hippocampal	strategy,	further	
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investigation	is	required.	H.C.’s	incoherent	sketch	maps	and	inability	to	successfully	navigate	the	
majority	of	the	blocked	routes	in	Study	2,	on	the	other	hand,	suggest	that	the	hippocampus	is	
required	for	accessing	a	coherent	large-scale	representation	of	space	that	enables	flexible	
navigation,	but	these	tasks	may	be	confounded	by	working	memory	demands.		
In	the	second	study,	emanating	from	H.C.’s	intact	performance	on	the	Google	Street	
View	paradigm,	H.C.’s	representations	of	her	home	environment	did	not	seem	to	improve	over	
the	course	of	8	years.	The	route	description	task	in	Study	3	provided	evidence	that,	in	contrast	
to	adult-onset	amnesic	cases,	H.C.	does	appear	to	have	access	to	detailed	representations	of	
frequently	travelled	environments,	in	the	sense	that	she	can	accurately	describe	perceptual	
features	of	landmarks	from	a	single	viewpoint.	However,	she	seems	to	have	difficulty	altering	
that	imagined	viewpoint	and	lacks	access	to	the	fine-grained	spatial	relations	between	features	
within	an	environment.	H.C.	seemed	to	have	the	greatest	difficulty	binding	together	spatial	
information	in	her	mind’s	eye.	It	is	unlikely	that	her	deficit	is	caused	by	a	retrieval	deficit	alone	
because	she	can	recall	particular	landmarks,	but,	at	times,	she	seems	unable	to	relate	landmarks	
to	one	another	to	form	a	coherent	representation.		
When	considering	the	findings	from	these	three	studies	in	the	context	of	the	extant	
literature,	I	would	venture	that	the	hippocampus	is	integral	for	binding	together	spatial	features	
within	environments,	which	allows	for	a	rich	sense	of	experiencing	or	immersion,	and	flexibility	
to	change	viewpoints.	From	this	perspective,	H.C.	could	have	navigated	her	real-world	home	
environment	using	the	Google	Street	View	paradigm	because	the	immersive	virtual	reality	
display	already	presented	spatial	features	in	relation	to	one	another.	To	navigate	between	
landmarks	in	Study	1,	H.C.	would	have	needed	to	draw	on	some	sort	of	representation	of	her	
home	environment.	Indeed,	H.C.’s	performance	on	the	sketch	mapping	and	landmark	
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localization	tasks	(Study	2)	show	that	she	does	have	such	a	representation,	although	it	seems	to	
be	coarse	and	fragmented.	She	likely	navigates	topologically,	having	created	a	mental	
representation	of	space	that	consists	of	overlapping	routes,	which	enables	navigation	along	
known	streets,	but	prevents	the	formation	of	a	representation	that	integrates	all	routes	for	
flexible	use.	As	H.C.	reported	trying	to	solve	several	of	the	mental	navigation	tasks	in	Study	2	by	
envisioning	walking	along	a	route	or	envisioning	what	surrounds	a	particular	landmark,	it	
perhaps	is	unsurprising	that	she	was	impaired	on	those	tasks.	An	inability	to	bind	spatial	
features	into	a	coherent	whole	to	allow	for	a	change	in	viewpoint	would	have	been	quite	
hindering	when	attempting	to	mentally	navigate	on	the	blocked	route	task	(Study	2)	and	route	
description	task	(Study	3).	While	H.C.	was	able	to	accurately	describe	perceptual	features	of	
landmarks	in	Study	3,	her	inability	to	bind	together	fine-grained	spatial	relations	within	the	
environment	prevented	her	from	accurately	describing	an	intersection.	It	may	be	that	
perceptual	features	of	landmarks	are	bound	together	in	other	structures	that	are	
interconnected	to	the	hippocampus,	such	as	the	perirhinal	cortex	(which	is	intact	in	H.C.),	and	
that	the	hippocampus	binds	slightly	larger-scale,	more	complex	features,	such	as	spatial	
relations	(Lee	et	al.,	2012).	If	a	detailed	representation	of	space	refers	to	the	fine-grained	spatial	
features,	then	these	findings	could	be	considered	as	in	line	with	the	Trace	Transformation	
Theory.	While	our	findings	of	incoherence	are	at	odds	with	H.C.’s	intact	scene	construction	for	
fictitious	events	described	by	Hurley	and	colleagues	(2011),	they	are	consistent	with	their	report	
that	H.C.	likely	was	not	richly	imagining	the	scene	and	that	this	would	impair	her	ability	to	
mentally	navigate	it.	
This	dissertation	also	revealed	non-spatial	factors	that	have	the	potential	to	impact	
performance	on	spatial	memory	and	mental	navigation	tasks,	such	as	increased	susceptibility	to	
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interference	and	distraction,	impaired	working	memory,	or	a	relational	deficit.	When	designing	
future	studies,	it	will	be	important	to	keep	these	factors	in	mind	to	limit	confounds	wherever	
possible	or	further	explore	them	as	factors	of	interest.			
Overall,	the	results	reported	in	this	dissertation	provide	evidence	that	an	individual	with	
developmental	amnesia	is	able	to	form	representations	of	frequently	travelled	environments	
that	incorporate	perceptual	details	of	landmarks,	but	that	lack	cohesive	spatial	relations	that	
may	be	important	for	vivid	re-experiencing	and	flexible	navigation.	H.C.’s	spatial	representation	
of	her	home	environment	does	not	appear	to	be	sufficient	for	mental	navigation,	which	has	
implications	for	her	ability	to	provide	directions	and	plan	out	routes.	H.C.’s	poor	performance	
on	mental	navigation	tasks	and	a	route	description	task	may	be	explained,	at	least	in	part,	by	a	
retrieval	deficit.	Her	impairment	seems	to	extend	beyond	this,	however,	as	results	indicated	
that	she	has	difficulty	accurately	positioning	retrieved	landmarks	relative	to	other	landmarks	in	
the	environment.	This	difficulty	binding	landmarks	to	their	locations	and	relative	to	each	other	
is	suggestive	of	a	spatial-relational	memory	deficit.	H.C.’s	performance	on	mental	navigation	
tasks	and	route	description	tasks	may	be	further	complicated	by	a	working	memory	impairment.	
While	evidence	from	the	Google	Street	View	study	shows	that	H.C.	has	been	able	to	learn	new	
routes	within	her	home	environment,	her	overall	mental	representation	of	her	home	
environment	did	not	change	substantially	over	time	and	remained	inflexible.	This	suggests	that	
H.C.	may	navigate	by	following	routes	and	these	routes	likely	underlie	the	formation	of	her	
spatial	representations.	When	relational	memory,	working	memory,	and	retrieval	demands	are	
reduced	or	eliminated,	as	is	the	case	with	virtual	reality	and	real-world	navigation,	she	appears	
to	be	able	to	use	the	visual	cues	to	adopt	a	recognition-triggered	or	habit-based	response	that	
allows	for	successful	navigation.	Even	though	H.C.	was	able	to	navigate	familiar,	less	familiar,	
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and	mirror-reversed	routes	on	a	virtual	reality	Google	Street	View	paradigm,	she	may	still	be	
limited	by	her	semi-flexible	topological	representation	of	the	environment	and	may	have	
difficulty	navigating	blocked	routes	or	along	unknown	streets.	This	could	be	explored	in	future	
research	using	a	virtual	reality	blocked	route	task.	Nevertheless,	the	results	reported	in	this	
dissertation	add	to	our	understanding	of	the	role	of	the	hippocampus	in	spatial	memory	and	
navigating	extensively	travelled	environments.	
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Appendix	A.	
	
Table	A.1.	H.C.’s	ability	to	sequence	landmarks	on	the	landmark	sequencing	task,	landmark	
localization	task,	and	landmark	localization	re-test	with	increasing	structure.	
	
	
	
